Customer Reviews

The Charge: The Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Mark Adkin examines the contributions made by each of the "Four Horsemen of Calamity" - Raglan, Lucan, Cardigan and Nolan - to the fatal Charge. Adkin's book contains much that will be familiar to anyone who has read Cecil Woodham Smith's "The Reason Why". However, Adkin deals with the Charge in greater detail and uses line drawings and maps to explain the confusing troop movements that preceded the Charge. My only criticism, having visited the battleground, is that the drawings fail to convey the scale and make Raglan's task seem far simpler than it actually was. Contrary to common belief, the number of fatalities was relatively small. Adkin's use of diagrams showing the arcs of fire from the Russian guns shows why this was so. The return journey should have been far more perilous. Had it not been for the action of the French cavalry (Chasseurs) who attacked the Russians on one flank the fatalities would have been far greater. Perhaps the most contentious issue in the book concerns the part played by Nolan who conveyed the fatal 4th Order from Raglan to Lucan. Adkin challenges the popular view that Nolan made a terrible mistake which he sought to correct by redirecting the Charge, and was only prevented from doing so because he was, ironically, the first casualty. Adkin suggests that Nolan, the cavalry fanatic, believed that cavalry could successfully attack artillery head on. He had after all sketched out such a plan years before. Nolan, according to Adkin, may have known exactly what he was doing and deliberately duped Lucan into ordering the Charge on the wrong guns. His attempt to redirect the cavalry was actually the result of his loss of control over his mount after he had been hit by shell fragments. It is a fascinating hypothesis butleft me unconvinced. I suggest you read the book and make your own mind up.

I don't think that I could really add much to the previous excellent reviews on this interesting account of the Charge of the Light Brigade. The author, Mark Adkin, has produced an excellent account of the Charge of the Light Brigade, which occurred on the 25th of October 1854 during the siege of Sebastopol. Utilising his in-depth research to provide answers to how, why and who, the narrative takes you along with the cavalrymen on their charge into the Russian gun positions. The book has a number of detailed drawings, maps, and photographs to assist you on this reckless advance into the mouth of the guns. The book is very readable and I think that the author attempts to answer the question `who' was to blame quite fairly and without malice. Overall a very good read for the student of military history or for anyone who just enjoys a good story.

A tip for readers of this book, a new release might be of interest: `CRIMEA: The Great Crimean War 1854-1856' by Trevor Royle.

This is the kind of book that shows how military history should be written. Although the maps and battle sketches are crude they are very effective in making Adkin's case. This is a careful military analysis of the Light Brigade's charge in October 1854, during the Crimean War, with the emphasis on untangling the hows and whys surrounding the mangled orders process that resulted in the charge. The usual culprit, the Cavalry Division commander Lord Lucan, is partly exonerated and receives only mild criticism. The primary culprits in Adkin's view are Lord Raglan and his ADC Captain Nolan. Adkin believes Nolan may have deliberately indicated the incorrect objective. Also interesting is the dissection of the actual charge, such as how many rounds were fired at the brigade and how the casualties were not as spectacular as is often claimed. It is interesting to note how incompetent the British chain of command appears next to the "amateur" generalship displayed seven years later in the American Civil War; even a Mclellan appears preferable to an (...) like Cardigan, the Light Brigade commander. The only omissions in this otherwise fine book: what kind of casualties did the Russian artillery battery suffer? What happened to the Light Brigade survivors in the brutal winter that followed?

This book,draws to a noticeable extent on Cecil Woodham Smiths exellent account of the Crimean War and the charge itself " The Reason Why".

Ms. Woodham Smiths description of the social climate and mores which created and fostered the fashionable incompetence in British army leadership of the time remains unmatched.

This author, a British cavalryman of this century, provides a detailed miltary analysis based on contempory accounts and records of the battle of Balaclava and of The Charge conducted on the still essentially unchanged battlefield.

This objective, exiting and pursuasive analysis, identifies, those who blundered and in what proportion. It concludes by convincingly identifying the individual [not one of the usual suspects] who must bear the lions share of the blame for this disaster and suggests a plausible course of action which might well have snatched real victory from the jaws of what history often views as a glorious defeat.

Mark Adkin's THE CHARGE is a relatively recent book (1996) and seeks to explain why the Crimean War blunder was made that led to perhaps the most famous cavalry charge in history, immortalized by Tennyson's poem. Besides standard time-space analysis and you-were-there personal accounts, Mr. Adkin introduces the element of topography and what can be seen from where which influenced decision-making at the moment. This is the sort of historical detective work that should be applauded and I liken it to plotting the location of shell casings found at the Custer battlefield site to infer cavalry troop movements. I used THE CHARGE as a reference to develop a computer game and found it invaluable. It has order of battle for the armies involved and maps that locate units at certain times. I recommend this book for any student of military history interested in finding out why decisions were made as well as an excellent account of the battle.

In addition to the other aspects of Adkins' treatment covered in the preceding reviews, Adkins also covers the British troopers' equipment and weapons of the time, and, hardly less important, some telling highlights of the protagonists' experiences and shenanigans prior to their service, one is tempted to say regrettable service, in the Crimea. What becomes clear is... well, you'll just have to enjoy the book for yourself.

Most everyone knows why the light brigade was lost at the battle of Balaclava, the culprits being either Raglan, Lucan, Cardigan, Nolan or Airey. This book clarifies the depth of animosity and ill-feelings between all the principal players which led to total confusion and the launch of the light brigade in the wrong direction. But even if it had gone off in the right direction, it could have also resulted in another fiasco, given Raglan's lack of understanding of his troops' capabilities. Thus the root of the problem rests fairly on Raglan's shoulders, with all the other players compounding his muddled leadership. The best thing about the book are the series of sketches purporting to show what was visible to Raglan from his viewpoint, a luxury denied his quarrelsome subordinates Lucan and Cardigan. This luxury of the aerial view afforded to Raglan therefore lays the blame on him for sheer incompetence in formulating his orders which were couched in arcane language. Mark Adkin is to be congratulated for using this unusual approach to analysing the most celebrated cavalry action in history.

This book offers a good review of how military personalities play such a strong role in the outcome of battle. Battle has been and, in my opinion, will continue to be directly impacted by human emotions and decisions. The author does a superb job introducing the mindset behind the decisions made at each level in the chain of command, which lead to the final disastrous outcome for the Light Brigade. I highly recommend this book to military professionals as a study in leadership and the decision making process. DPS