7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Solid resource for America's experience in unconventional war, February 16, 2007
This review is from: Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History (Hardcover)
Mr. Tierney provides an invaluable service reminding Americans of their long history of guerrilla warfare from our own guerrilla bands of the Revolution to our counterinsurgency experiences in Vietnam and Iraq. Each experience seems lost, however, on future generations that prefer conventional ideals of war to bring the enemy army to battle in order to destroy it in one final showdown. It has often been said that we are always preparing for the last successful war and ignoring the lessons of the wars we would prefer to forget. Perhaps it is the guilt in some of the drachonian measures we have adopted in past counterinsugencies such as the scorched-earth policies adopted against Confederate and Indian guerrillas. But guilt does not explain the entire picture.
Mr. Tierney brings our attention to how quickly and completely guerrilla wars can degenerate into bloodbaths of revenge such as the long guerrilla war along the Missouri-Kansas border. Mr. Tierney accounts campaigns, long overlooked in military histories, such as the Missouri-Kansas border war that was in chaos nearly a decade before the shots on Fort Sumter. But more than the failures or depravity of guerrilla warfare are overlooked. Also long overdue has been the attention needed for successful counterinsugency methods like those of General George Crook in the Indian wars. There are a great many lessons, good and bad, from which we can learn in our own history.
This book is organized into two major parts. Part 1 reviews guerrilla warfare in North America from the French and Indian wars through the latter 19th century Indian wars. Part 2 reviews the small wars of intervention and expansion of the early 20th century through Vietnam and Iraq. The final pages draw all together into the realization of just how much experience we have had in unconventional warfare and how we might learn from those experiences. Mr. Tierney does well not to draw too many definitive conclusions since not every situation can be met with exactly the same methods. But he does analyze some of the causes for success and failure in order to give a broad understanding of what works and what does not and why.
This is not a work such as Robert Asprey's _War in the Shadows_ intended to give a detailed account of guerrilla warfare history. And Mr. Tierney is quick to pay homage to that work in particular. It is intended more as an introduction to a study of the American experience of guerrilla war to give us an appreciation for a topic overlooked far too long and perhaps to stimulate further study in the field. It is not a detailed military history but even the most ardent military history student will find this work an entertaining and informative work. The writing style is easy to read and, for the most part, thoroughly researched. Some advanced students of military history may find some minor nit-picks to attack but the overall quality of the research is still very good and trustworthy.
There does seem to be a problem with the binding of my copy in that a few pages from the Revolutionary war period chapter somehow found their way into the chapter on the Confederate guerrilla war in Virginia. Other than that minor inconvenience (chapter titles are on the tops of the pages so you can easily remedy this problem to read them in the correct order), this is a valuable resource for understanding the nature of America's experience in unconventional war.
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Chasing Ghosts - Wars Lost in Memory, December 3, 2007
This review is from: Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History (Hardcover)
Chasing Ghosts, according to John Tierney "is a history that covers wars lost in memory while remaining based upon issues that have resurfaced since 9/11." The author takes us through this study of unconventional warfare in American history including occasions when Americans utilized this mode of warfare as well as when it was used against us. He has done his job well.
Clausewitz warns that failure to know and understand the war one is fighting is a recipe for disaster. Unconventional wars are hard to define and this is America's Achilles Heel, we do not know the type of war we are currently fighting so it is near impossible for us to develop an appropriate strategy to successfully wage it. Sun Tzu tells us that it is important to know your enemy, but much more so to know yourself. Unfortunately Americans not only are unaware of who they are, but they are wedded to a paradigm of wars fought face-to-face, or head-on. As a result Americans see everything in those terms. Should our enemies or allies for that matter, have different colored glasses, the United States is in trouble.
Yet US history contains a myriad of excellent examples from which we can learn pertinent lessons that are relevant not only in Iraq but in our war against international terrorism as well. However, in order to learn and apply these lessons, we have to be willing to change the color of our glasses. And this is what US senior leaders are reluctant to do.
As I read this book I saw principals for success emerging and these principals ran throughout its two hundred sixty odd pages. When the US has followed these principles it has been successful in accomplishing national objectives. The scary part is that the inverse is also true; when the US has not adhered to these principals she has suffered defeat. Presently the US does not seem to be following these principals thereby explaining why the situation in Iraq looks rather bleak.
An analysis of the guerrilla wars discussed by the author suggests that one of the most important factors that leads to success in a guerrilla or counter guerrilla war is knowledge of the local landscape. This means not only the geography but also local customs and culture. If one does not already possess this type of knowledge, such as the Patriots did, but the British did not, during the Revolutionary War it can be mitigated through the utilization of 'locals.' The US Army did this to great effect throughout the Indian Wars, in the Philippines, and elsewhere. The Marines have been particularly good at identifying tribal and ethnic splits in societies and taking advantage of these to divide and conquer.
Akin to this idea and one that the author repeatedly illustrates is the hiring, training, and employment of indigenous forces thereby removing the notion of 'invader' from the equation. The purpose of such forces is two fold. First is to provide localized security, which includes separating the guerrillas from the people. This makes it difficult for guerrillas to gather intelligence, obtain food and necessities, and maintain a source of logistical support. The second function is to use these forces as mobile strike teams designed to keep constant pressure on the guerrillas and thus give them no rest or time to reconstitute their forces.
Furthermore, everyone who reads this book will find several things that will catch their attention and cause him to bore into that area more deeply. Two things really grabbed my interest. The first has to do with the employment of air power. In several instances air power was used with great success. In instances such as Vietnam, however, it was not. A corollary is those instances in which air power was not available. If one envisions the full capabilities of air power, he can ask the question "If I had air power in (choose your war) how could I have maximized its utility?" The answer would, I posit, be intuitively obvious and one could then adapt the concept to the fight in Iraq, the war on terrorism, or some other guerrilla war. In order to do this, one has to realize that airpower would be in a supporting rather than a supported role. Could senior Air Force leadership accept such a role? I doubt it.
Another attention grabber had to do with my war, Vietnam. In that war all three services had and employed conventional war doctrines. They were not only ineffective, but an outright failure. Yet at the same time, noted the author, Special Forces "A" Teams were heavily involved in the creation and employment of Civil Irregular Defense Group units. These units were quite successful wherever and whenever they were utilized - just food for thought.
Having read this book and placing the lessons available in the context of Iraq or the war on terrorism one is compelled to ask "Have we learned nothing about guerrilla war in the past two hundred years or so?" The answer is not encouraging. Politicians and senior military leaders ought to read this book, and it deserves a place on every military professional development reading list. The wars we are now fighting, especially in Iraq, are not lost. We can still win, but we need to change the way we conduct business. This book will help us make the necessary changes in direction.
As previously noted, Mr. Tierney does a marvelous job throughout Chasing Ghosts in illustrating these and other war winning principles. If the reader of this review wants to learn more then about these principals then you need to read the book.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A guide key to understand our modern dilemmas., December 12, 2006
This review is from: Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History (Hardcover)
CHASING GHOSTS: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN AMERICAN HISTORY doesn't just focus on Iraq, but on the sweeping history of U.S. involvements overseas and forces faces with unconventional methods requiring unconventional responses. Both military and general interest readers will find it essential to have such a background, reminding that the modern experience has its roots in the past. John Tierney examines these past experiences from the Revolutionary War to modern times, analyzing U.S. responses to counterinsurgency campaigns in a guide key to understand our modern dilemmas.
Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch
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