Customer Reviews

Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost

5 star:		(8)
4 star:		(8)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

I have been waiting for this book for a long time. Not particularly this book, but any modern updated biography of Chiang Kai Shek. In recent years we have gotten updated biographies of Mao and Ho Chi Minh and now finally Chiang Kai-Shek.

First and foremost, this is a well written, well researched book. It is easy to read and never boring. So on that sense it is a good biography. The book also has some great pictures and good maps at the beginning of the book.

The book does a terrific job showing the politics going on in China between 1911 and 1945. The books strongest points about Chiang Kai-Shek are on his battles against the warlords and desires to eliminate the communists. I also felt the book did a great job discussing his wife, and her famous family the Soongs.

That being said, I felt the book was weak in its overall assessment of Chiang Kai-Shek. I got the impression that the author really did not want to make any strong judgements about Chiang Kai Shek. He does not hold back any facts, but just does not make strong judgements. However, the author is highly critical of Sun Yatsen, and General Stillwell. Two great men in history, this author is not afraid to judge, but Chiang Kai Shek he does not.

Sun Yatsen was a great leader and had such a vision for China, but Fenby is highly critical of him. Stillwell was exactly right on how Chiang Kai-Shek would lose China and was dead on in his assessment of KMT corruption. Instead, Fenby is critical of Stillwell. For a better look at Stillwell look at the Recent book on the Burma Road.

Also, I was surprized at how rushed the author gets at the end on the ultimate Communist victory. Fenby is great in discussing the Marshall visit and attempt to broker a peace, but his description of the Nationalist collapse and retreat to Taiwan was rushed in my opinion. Also, there is little to no information about Chiang Kai Shek on Taiwan.

But I am being picky. I enjoyed this book very much and am glad Fenby wrote it. Had Chiang Kai Shek been a better leader the history of Asia and the world would be very different.

This book was more than a biography of Chiang. For someone with little background knowledge of 20th century Chinese history it also taught me much of what the Chinese people have went through in the last 100 years as far as suffering, fighting, and just trying to survive. The book goes into extreme detail in describing nearly every facet of Chiang's life from what he was wearing at each of his weddings, to the names of all of his associates and their relevance/importance at each stage of his life. Basically the book paints a picture of many opportunities and resources that were at Chiang's disposal that were basically squandered. I was a little suprised at the amount of wealth that Chiang possessed and the amount of corruption that he both tolerated and at times encouraged. It was also very discouraging to read about the fact that he had such little regard for human life and for all of the people that perished at his hands. Overall, this was an eye opening book and one of the best biographies that I have ever read. With the number of current news stories about China on the increase, I believe that this book is essential reading for anyone interested in current events/world affairs and I would highly recommend it.

This important book fills a glaring void that exists in the historical record of modern China. While historians have always provided ready attention to Mao Zedong and communist China, they never accorded the same serious examination to the role and legacy of Chiang Kai-shek. Before this book, most of the resources on Chiang dated from the 1970s and earlier, largely consisting of hagiographic accounts penned by pro-KMT Chinese living in Taiwan or abroad, or similar propaganda fluff pieces financed by the Henry Luce China Lobby. A well-reasoned, independent account of Chiang's life was thus long overdue, and Fenby comes through in a huge way.

He writes an engaging narrative of Chiang, a person of quite humble origins, who became one of the world's most famous and powerful figures. Fenby also provides detailed, careful background on the China of Chiang's time, particularly that of the 1911 Revolution and subsequent warlord period. This is important in understanding why Chiang allied with the types of people and strata of society that he did, and why this alliance alienated vast numbers of Chinese, providing moral fodder and legitimacy for the alternative offered by Mao. Much of Fenby's information regarding Chiang's early political career comes from an autobiography written by his largely-forgotten second wife, Chen Jieru (Jennie). While this relationship is common knowledge in Taiwan, she is practically unknown in the west. Her book is entitled Chiang Kai-shek's Secret Past, and what Fenby was able to glean from it has whetted my appetite to read the book myself.

Fenby is at his best when he examines the decades-long struggle for control of China between Chiang and Mao. Indeed, theirs was a clash of legendary, tragic proportions, and it is hard to find a more riveting story elsewhere in history, not just because of the mythic stature and personal auras these two men obtained during their own lifetimes, but also due to the enormous cruelty and unimaginable suffering both inflicted on the country they would rule and the populace they would win to their cause. Chapter 15, "The Long Chase" opens with a brilliant juxtaposition between the two, and proceeds to analyze the showdown during the Long March in which Mao gained primacy in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CCP escaped certain extinction during Chiang's Fifth Extermination Campaign in Jiangxi. He attributes the CCP's success in escaping to Yan'an, not as the result of a secret deal Chiang brokered with Moscow to guarantee the return of his son Chiang Ching-kuo, as argued by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday in their biography of Mao, but to the superior strategy of Mao and Zhu De: they planned the route through areas of the country largely held by warlords who often actively assisted the Red Army in getting through their territories, or gave passive half-hearted chase, because the last thing they wanted was Chiang coming in with his huge armies and wresting political control away from them.

The book does have two important weaknesses, one minor and one major. First, Fenby provides little insight into what I think would be one of the most important and intriguing relationships of Chiang's life, that with his son Chiang Ching-kuo. Ching-kuo, after all, publicly denounced his father after the 1927 White Terror purges in Shanghai and Guangzhou, and attempted to join the Communist Party while living in the USSR. However, Fenby spends hardly any time at all with them. Considering the role that Ching-kuo played later in the democratization of Taiwan, this is unfortunate.

Fenby devotes three chapters and 65 pages to the stormy relationship between General Joseph Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. It is in his negative assessment of General Stilwell where his normally astute and deft powers of analysis fail him when he needs them most. It is not my desire here to delve too deeply into Stilwell's legacy or become embroiled in the Stilwell vs. Claire Chennault debate, but as Fenby comes perilously close to maligning Stilwell's military competence, I feel I must come to his defense, because for all his faults, General Stilwell was truly a great American and a first-rate military mind. He earned the trust and respect of the highest leadership in the US military and received promotion over those much senior to him, at the insistence of no less than Marshall and Eisenhower, two of the finest generals America has ever produced.

When describing Stilwell's march of his command out of Burma into India, an epic journey of over 150 miles taken under extreme conditions and threat of imminent discovery by the Japanese imperial army, Fenby terms it a `grave dereliction of duty', because he argues that Stilwell should have stayed behind to organize the retreat of other Chinese units in the theater. It is important to realize the true situation: the Japanese had put the Allies to rout. Commands and units had completely disintegrated by this point. Indeed, Fenby notes just a few pages earlier that before the main Japanese advance had even begun, Chinese commanders refused to obey Stilwell's orders (almost certainly under instructions from Chiang) and rather than send needed supplies and materiel to units on the front lines, Chinese commanders were hoarding these and trucking them back to China to sell on the black market. Once the Japanese began their assault, there was soon no `retreat' left for Stilwell to organize. In this case, he did what duty required of him: save his personal command. This he accomplished admirably: not one of the persons in his care perished or fell into Japanese hands.

Fenby seems to have bought into Chennault's air-intensive strategy as the way to defeat the Japanese in China, yet he never does manage to explain how air power can be the decisive factor when there is no means to defend air bases with no adequate ground support, and there would be insufficient supply lines for fuel and parts without ground troops defending the major supply routes from India. These were Stilwell's main arguments as to the necessity to win back Burma. Fenby overstates the effectiveness of Chennault's air battles, not surprising since his sources on this come only from autobiographies by Chennault himself and one of his men. This is a disappointing lapse of scrutiny by Fenby.

It is also important to note that on practically every point concerning Chiang, his military ineffectiveness and strategic incompetence, his regime, the venal corruption of the KMT and its likelihood of success in a civil war against the CCP, subsequent events proved General Stilwell correct, and Chennault, Henry Luce and countless others wrong. In fact, Fenby even quotes Chennault as absurdly saying that "I think the Generalissimo is one of the two or three greatest military and political leaders in the world today."

Notwithstanding these faults, Fenby gets the big picture right. His depiction of China's domestic situation and the political machinations of the KMT and CCP is compelling, absorbing history. He is fair-handed in his treatment to both sides, and is horribly effective in revealing the brutality of the Japanese occupation. Fenby manages to present a sympathetic portrait of Chiang, at his heart a true nationalist and personally incorruptible, but a man too bound by his steeply conservative Confucian tradition, enamored with fascism, and blind to the corruption of his family and associates, to ever have a hope of realizing his ultimate ambition.

This is a fascinating and very readable story about an extraordinary man living in one of the most exciting periods of history in the 20th century, with lots of adventurous passages and some amazing characters like the warlords and the drug Godfathers and Madame Chiang who just died at a very old age. The information about Chiang's private life is really quite scandalous!
Apart from that, what made it an important book for myself was three elements:
1. The chapters telling, for the first time in my experience in such vivid depth, just how Japan behaved in China between 1931 and 1945. The descriptions of what the Army did in China make this an important historical document.
2.In the context of the current situation in Iraq, the account of US involvement in China has major significant lessons for today.
3. Given China's emergence as a superpower in the next few years, this is the first book I have seen which tells readers what happened before the Communists won power - and draws quite important parallels between the past and the present from which I drew interesting lessons to analyze what China is becoming.

Fenby's remarkable biography pulls no punches. CKS, so promising at the start, and so brave when he is kidnapped (told at the start of the book), turns out to be like all dictators: all send and no receive. Fenby opens the book with the kidnapping and this gets us off to an exciting start with our sympathies firmly in the CKS camp. But the apalling relationship with Stilwell and the failure to take advantage of the ending of the war against the Japanese show him in his true light; a great man of his time but time moved on and left him behind.
Fenby's book is full of fascinating detail. Even though I had recently read Tuchman's "Stilwell", his portrait of the relationship with CKS brought out new shading and gossip. Meiling also is portayed in a new and more mysterious light.
A great read for anyone who wants to understand why modern China is so thoroughly confused about its past.

Fenby is excellent in the early life of Chiang and the war years in Chungking--lots of anecdotes and tidbits. However a lot happened after 1950 when he installed himself in Taiwan and proceeded with a land reform that ultimately helped save his regime. He also steadfastly defended the island against communist threat-with US help- which under an alternative regime might not have survived. This post-war period is totally missing from Fenby's account, which does not mention that when he died there was a massive outpouring of sentiment from the people. The irony is that he is more revered today in the China he lost than in the Taiwan he helped save!

Chiang Kai Shek was one of the worlds longest serving leaders in the 20th century. From the early 1920s he consolidated China under his military rule and defeated the warlords who had sprung up under Sun Yat Sun. Chiang went on to fight the Japanese as they invaded China and unleashed genocide against the Chinese people in cities like Nanking. This wonderful book finally bring Chiang to life. Few biographies exist of this important 20th century leader and even fewer biographies do him any justice. This Book tells the story in full. From the collapse of China in 1949 to Chiangs defiant stand in Taiwan where he widdled his nation into the U.N and garnered support from America. A very important study of an important leader, not to be missed by anyone interested in Taiwan, China or Cold War politicians.

Here in China, I have met more than one young person from Europe or America, who has come to China to study the history and language of this country. I, myself am interested in the history of China, so I naturally begin to discuss the subject, and try to get their thoughts on some issue or another. But if I refer to something that pertains to the many dynasties of China, the response is always the same, "Oh. I'm only interested in modern China." I am always intrigued by this comment, because I don't think it is possible properly to understand modern China without knowing something of what went on before. But certainly the predominant interest of those from the West who write about China, is the history of "Modern China," which I date from the Macartney Mission in 1793.

This new biography by Jonathan Fenby, former editor of the South China Morning Post, promises to be the definitive work on the subject for years to come. There are several reasons why I like his book. I will try to elucidate the most important. First of all, Chiang Kai-shek has often been seen by westerners as the person who "lost" China because of his refusal to fight the Japanese. Much of this view came from Barbara Tuchman's biography of Joseph Stillwell, which came out in '70 or '71. Stillwell was protrayed as the hero who tried to save China, but was prevented from doing so by Chiang. In actual fact, Stillwell was a jerk, who according to one of his strongest supporters (Marshall) was "his own worst enemy." He referred to Chiang Kai-shek as "Peanut," and FDR as "Rubber Legs." Jonathan Fenby sums up Stillwell with one simple statement: "He was the wrong man at the wrong time." Very well put.

But getting back to Chiang Kai-shek. Should he have concentrated more on fighting the Japanese, and not so much on fighting the Communists? Probably so. Chiang always said that the Japanese were a disease of the skin, and the Communists were a disease of the heart. In some ways, you could argue that history has supported his approach, because the Japanese were ultimately defeated, not by the Communists or the Nationalists, but by the Americans, when they dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the problem is that the Americans made Europe a priority. Asia came second. And by the time the Japanese were finally defeated, too much damage had been done in terms of the relationship between the Nationalists and the laobaixing (common people) of China. If Chiang Kai-shek had fought more vociferously, he would certainly have prevented the Xi'an Incident, and may have been more likely to have the people with him by the time the Americans finally did what they had to to put the Japanese out of business. At least that's the thinking. It is very hard to say for sure.

But Fenby is fair. He shows that the Communists employed basically the same strategy--avoiding conflict with the Japanese to save themselves for the inevitable showdown with the KMT. So what is the truth. T?e fact is that both the Nationalists and the Communists fought the Japanese, but probably not as well as they could have if they had not been fighting each other. A nation divided against itself cannot stand. And then there is the matter of opium. It is well known that Chiang Kai-shek was supported by Big-Eared Du, who controlled the opium trade in Shanghai. But what is not commonly known is that Mao had a production facility for opium set up in Yanan. He fully intended to wipe out opium after the Communists were in power, but he could not resist the temptation to benefit from the sizeable revenue this drug brought in during a time when the fledgeling Communist Party desparately needed cash. According to Fenby, the production and sale of opium in Yan'an by the Communists brought in billions of dollars, and at one point constituted 40% of total revenue.

This is a sad book. But it is a very important one, because it deals so completely with a very important time in China's history. It is also important because it is missing much of the bias one way or another that characterized stuff that was written about Chiang Kai-shek during the cold war period. I don't know that it would be easy to follow for someone who is completely unfamiliar with 20th Century Chinese history. When you're reading this book it definitely helps to have some familiarity with the dramatis personae. That being said, it is a significant addition to the study of this period. And although it will probably not be sold openly on the mainland for a long time, it will definitely redefine the way this period is viewed, both by supporters and detractors of this most unusual figure in the history of modern China. Five stars without any hesitation.

This book is thoroughly researched but bone dry. This book is for you if you want a list of facts: this happened, then this happened, then this happened....

What this book doesn't do is to make an interesting story out of the history. The book doesn't discuss why certain things happened or the motivations of actors to do what they did. The book doesn't touch upon the consequences of the decisions that were made. In short, this book gives the "what" but not the "why" or "how" that would transform the book from a list of events into a narrative.

I started this book with minimal knowledge of China in the first half of the 20th century, beyond a knowledge of the key events. After reading Jonathan Fenby's magnus opus at 500 pages that gap in my knowledge has been very well filled. Using the life of Chiang Kai-Shek (CSK) up to his establishing of the National government in exile in Formosa (now Taiwanbthis book is an excellent coverage of the history of China to 1950, very well wrtitten and great command of many sources and consistent probing analysis of the issues and problems CSK and China faced.

The sub title of the book "And the China he lost" is the key - Fenby uses the life of CSK from humble beginnings to show that while he may have had a major impact in uniting post Manchu China, he consistently by personal failings and lack of realism to see himself as other than the divine national leader of China whose word was law and to delegate power, left it open to the eventual communist takeover under Mao, a man who operated a similar autocratic approach but was pragmatic enough to create the rural revolution needed.

The first half of Fenby's book is about CSK's success at overcoming the various regional warlords whose feudal approach to local power and unwillingness to accept central government reads like England in the Middle Ages. However while this may count as CSK's great success it
also showed many of the issues to come. CSK's military prowess was based on a mix of foreign military advisers (first Russian then German) and the use of bribery rather than personal military skills to often win victories. While making certain initial military reforms, CSK was unable to accept the wider need to invest in a high quality army relying on size and loyalty rather than skill and focus.

Having formed a loose regional federation, CSK then failed to seize the initiative to introduce much needed rural reform and instead aligned himself by marriage with corrupt urban wealthy families and launched a series of vicious attacks on the infant Communist party. His near success in eradicating the Communists was devastated by the Japanese invasion of China and the continual loss at great cost in lives of large and important areas of China to Japanese rule.

Even when presented with the golden opportunity of USA support post Pearl Harbour the opportunities were spurned due largely to CSK's nationalist attitude and lack of pragmatism and reality as to what was happening in China plus endless arguing with his US advisers who he saw threatening his authority. His endless meddling in military matters by issuing numerous orders when he was far from the front or executing a sound strategy plus the increasing corruption of his close followers meant that the Japanese were not pushed back and the Communists were able to survive and prosper.

With the end of WWII, CSK again took a gamble in the hope of playing off Russia and USA influences under the Cold War to survive but underestimated their lack of support based on his WWII performance - once his armies had to face down the communists his poor military skills became clear and the end was quick. Consistent to the end he ensured a retreat to exile in
Formosa with troops and gold leaving Chian to its fate but only after wreaking his final vengeance in murdering Chinese allies whohe felt had betrayed him.

One finishes the book clear that whill CSK may have had a major impact on China it came at a great cost and with little real chance of long term success given his inability to react correctly to changes in Chinese society and economy and foreign forces.