Most Helpful Customer Reviews
47 of 51 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
China at Times Its Own Worst Enemy, July 9, 2007
This review is from: China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (Hardcover)
Susan Shirk gives her readers some useful tools to better assess the future behavior of a fast-resurging China after being "humiliated" for a century and a half (pp. 153 - 55, 185 - 87). Shirk clearly explains that Chinese communist power has two faces. China wants to be seen as behaving responsibly to foster economic growth and social stability (pp. 105 - 139). Shirk correctly states that actions rather than words will make it more credible. Establishing this reputation requires China to accommodate its neighbors, to be a team player in multinational organizations, and to use economic ties to make friends (pp. 109, 199, 223, 257 - 61).
In case of a major crisis, especially one involving Taiwan, Japan or the United States, China could show its other face by acting irresponsibly due to the absence of effective checks and balances of the Chinese system. Party leaders could recklessly play the nationalistic card again as they did with Taiwan in 1996 or with Japan in 2005 if they need to look strong domestically with other leaders, the mass public, and the military (pp. 10 -12, 43, 63, 69, 77, 139, 151, 173, 179 - 80, 186 - 90, 197, 205, 219).
The Communist Party has bet on jingoism since the 1990s because communism in China is a dying ideology in which almost no Chinese believes (pp. 11, 63 - 64, 145, 148, 164 - 70, 186). The Party implausibly claims that ordinary Chinese are unworthy of Western democracy because their country, unlike India, does not have religion to manage them responsibly (p. 53). Chinese leaders know that Chinese nationalists can turn against the Party if they appear too weak to deal with foreign pressures (pp. 61, 66, 173, 180).
Economic interdependence has had a somewhat moderating effect on the relationship of China with the outside world, including Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S. (pp. 24, 96, 145 - 46, 190, 195, 233, 241, 247). Due to their fear of widespread instability and their lack of political legitimacy, Party leaders, however, have not displayed much courage in taking unpopular measures such as enforcing intellectual property rights or stopping currency manipulation in trading abroad (pp. 26 - 27, 53 - 54, 60, 73 - 74). Chinese leaders are well aware that the increased protectionism in the U.S. against the fast-growing trade deficit with China and the rampant piracy of U.S. products in China are not politically sustainable, especially in case of a majority change in Washington in 2009 (pp. 25 - 26, 248). At the same time, Shirk correctly points out that the ongoing fiscal profligacy of the U.S. is weakening the country at the profit of China (pp. 26, 249).
Of all China's challenges, the need for "social stability" overrules all other considerations, even it means sacrificing long-term diplomatic objectives for short-term domestic political gains (pp. 38, 52 - 54, 109, 148, 183 - 87, 197, 224, 234, 254 - 55). For the Chinese communist leaders and their families, losing power could result in the loss of their possessions or even their death (pp. 7 - 9). To keep its authoritarian grip on power, the Communist Party has articulated a three-pronged policy (p. 39):
1) Avoid public leadership splits
Shirk gives a useful overview of the "selectorate," the group of Party members who have the power to choose the leaders, and the modus operandi of the Party (pp. 39 - 52). The Communist Party is not known for its openness in framing domestic and foreign policies (pp. 43 - 44). Patronage is essential for keeping the Party in power, which feeds an endemic corruption from which many communist bigwigs enrich themselves at the expense of ordinary Chinese (pp. 60, 68 - 69). Party leaders learn from the Tiananmen fiasco that destabilizing internal dissent can undermine the Party's grip on power (pp. 48, 53, 162). Keeping elite contests for power hidden from the public is increasingly difficult as the audience-driven media are testing the limits on what can be reported (pp. 39, 50, 52, 55, 78, 183). Although China is a still a long way from having free mass media, resourceful Chinese increasingly give the Communist Party a hard time for censoring "undesirable news (pp. 82 - 83)."
2) Prevent large-scale social unrest
Shirk demonstrates with conviction that Communist China's obsession with internal stability paradoxically makes the Party very sensitive to public opinion due to the lack of any democratic institution to allow ordinary Chinese to express themselves peacefully (pp. 52 - 53, 66). Shirk overviews with mastery the multiple possible threats to one-party-rule and which means the Party uses to either neutralize or reduce these threats (pp. 52 - 69). Paradoxically, the more developed and rich China becomes, the more insecure and threatened Communist Party leaders feel (p. 5).
3) Keep the People's Liberation Army on the side of the Party
Unlike their predecessors, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Communist Party leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are less politically secure and have a greater need to keep the military satisfied to safeguard them from domestic rebellion (pp. 46, 73, 77, 158 - 60, 202). Communist Party leaders seem to have a harder time saying no to the military demands for weaponry buildups and aggressive policies (pp. 70, 75 - 76, 222 - 23). The senior leadership of the PLA uses the Taiwan issue as the paramount factor for getting more "toys" approved (p. 74). By covering foreign policy, audience-driven media are making it harder for Communist Party leaders not to treat foreign policy as domestic politics (pp. 78 - 104, 140 - 254). Furthermore, history is not on the side of China because rising powers are likely to provoke war (pp. 4, 9 - 10, 210 - 11, 219, 243 - 45, 261 - 69). All of these factors undermine the credibility of the "peaceful rise" that Jintao - Wen Jiabao have promoted since 2002 (pp. 108 - 09, 252).
To summarize, China's behavior cannot be correctly understood without a proper grasp of the tectonic forces that have molded the country's history, geography, and culture.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
39 of 44 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
China's fragility lies elsewhere, September 9, 2007
This review is from: China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (Hardcover)
Honestly, China - Fragile Superpower caught my attention as well as curiosity. How fragile is China? This is my very first question before reading the book. The poor rural peasants, increasing laid-off workers, the rise of civil and democratic consciousness among Chinese citizens, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)...? I have thought about various reasons for a fragile China.
Unexpectedly, a "fragile China" is not the comment or viewpoint from the west, but from the Chinese president Hu Jintao, "although China looks like a powerhouse from the outside, to its leaders it looks fragile, poor and overwhelmed by internal problems". Indeed, everyone knows that the Chinese leaders are facing numerous internal problems, apart from dealing with poor peasants and laid-off workers, environmental degradation, the Chinese product safety, the gap between the rich and the poor as well as the income gap between coastal and inland are also the imminent challenges to the rise of China.
Susan L. Shirk is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in managing US-China relations. She has another perspective towards a "fragile China" - the rise of internet and mass media. The whole threatening mechanism begins with the young "netizens". The "netizens" search the foreign website in getting the uncensored international news and post it to the local forums. Other "netizens" start to discuss the issue and post some radical responses like protesting the Japanese prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Shirk also studies the similar cases such as the US bombardment on Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the clash of aircraft between China and the US near South China Sea in 2001 and the provocative issue such as Taiwan. Since the Chinese leaders seek to get the collective consensus (to avoid personal responsibility) before formally reacting to international crisis, their replies always come late. In the meantime, the Chinese leaders cannot control the spreading news, especially those from the internet. In order to remain the legitimacy of the government, the Chinese leaders are forced to address according to the public opinion. This is the reason why China reacts toughly towards Japan, the United States and Taiwan even though the Chinese leaders treasure the economic interdependences between China, Japan and the United States as well as the positive image of mainland China among Taiwanese.
Besides, by interviewing some Chinese military generals, Shirk finds that the Chinese leaders have compromised to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for regime security. Some PLA generals heavily criticized Jiang Zemin's leadership in dealing with foreign countries. For example, Jiang is regarded as too pro-American, too soft on Japan while too optimistic towards the unification of Taiwan. To pacify the discontents among the PLA generals, Jiang enlarged the PLA's budget with an increase of double digit percentage annually. Not surprisingly, the west believes that the rise of Chinese military power is a potential threat to the Asia-Pacific region, not because of the modernization of the PLA, but for the growing influence of the Chinese military generals who are not accountable to the civilian government.
Therefore, according to Shirk, China is a fragile superpower because there are too many constrains on the Chinese leaders in making both their domestic and foreign policy. Even worse, as Shirk writes, "The CCP's ability to control the information that reaches the public is declining at the same time as the country's military capabilities are improving. And these two trends combine dangerously to intensify the pressure to use force to defend China's honor".
Though Shirk develops a model in explaining the dilemmas of the Chinese leaders in facing the demands of public opinion and the belligerence of military generals, it seems that the role of the internet in China is a bit exaggerated. In fact, many foreign websites are blocked in China. Even though there are limited occasional cases which the "netizens" posted uncensored news on local website, these news were removed within hours. There is a doubt whether a concrete public opinion can be formed within a few hours via internet. Shirk also admits that the huge Chinese demonstration against the US for the bombardment of Belgrade in 1999 and the clash of Chinese and American aircrafts in 2001 were acquiesced if not encouraged by the Chinese government. The Chinese government kept the demonstrations under control in order to get better bargaining position over the US. However, Shirk should also take into account that there was a call up of anti-Japanese demonstration in April 2005 on the internet for the Japanese prime minister Kozumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. But this time, the Chinese government firmly prohibited the demonstration since the previous anti-Japanese demonstrations went radically by attacking the Japanese stores. Also, the Chinese leaders want to send a signal to Japan that China is willing to restore their bilateral relations. The point here is that no demonstration can be appeared without the consent of the Chinese government, no matter the demonstration is called up through the internet or not. Besides, Shirk believes that the CCP will stand firm towards Japan, Taiwan and the US because the Qing and the Kuomintang government lost their regime for failing to expel foreign aggressions. It is indeed too early to justify whether the ordinary Chinese will overthrow the CCP only because of its soft stance towards Japan, Taiwan and the US, given that the situation is not the same for the CCP now when compare the previous regimes.
China is a fragile rising power, but its fragility lies on the peasants who have no land to farm and the laid-off workers who have no social security net to rely on rather than the public opinion on the internet.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Assumptions, Analysis, Thoughts., October 6, 2009
Susan Shirk is one of the top foreign affairs gurus in regards to US-China relations. Her tremendous experience with Chinese internal politics is evident throughout the book. She brings a vivid and shocking reality of Chinese politics to readers who know little or nothing about the subject. However, while well written and thoughtfully considered, her conclusions are based on unfounded and unjustified philosophical assumptions that she proposes without second thought. The book lacks quantifiable proof and seems to reflect Shirk's own personal observations and musings instead of political analysis and fact. The following are a few of the weaknesses.
1. The primary assumption that Shirk makes is, the Chinese Governments overarching objective is to STAY IN POWER. There is no other goal greater than retaining control for the CCP, this is where it starts and ends. She starts her argument from this point, but fails to argue why this is so. It is merely an undeniable fact in her world. All political maneuvers are rationalized through the ideal of "maintaining power". Perhaps the CCP leadership really care for the people? Perhaps their goals are more noble?
2. She argues that the protests against Japan and the US, were not really protests that focused on the offenses of the two offending countries, but rather a show of political power by the people, who were really protesting against the Government. They protested on these occasions, because it was something the Government would allow (to an extent). This is an unfounded claim which Shirk backs with anecdotal examples. This analysis screams of Orwell influenced thought, 1984 anyone? In the first chapter of 1984, readers are introduced to the "Two Minutes Hate", and the protagonist, Winston Smith, finds himself seething at Goldstein along with the rest of his colleagues, but his hate was really directed towards Big Brother. Protests and demonstrations of anger are only expressions that can affix on any target at a whim. I think Shirk has been reading a little much Orwell and fantasizing about the overreaching grasp of authoritarian government rather than focusing on real issues.
3. Her overwhelming American prejudice towards the situation in China is felt throughout the book. The book is lacking a comparative analysis that would really open eyes. While the Nationalism of the Chinese is dangerous, it is nowhere near as explosive and destructive as the Nationalism (or some would say, Patriotism) of Americans. China's collapse or transformation into a Nationalistic State would NOT endanger the world militarily. The only "country" in danger, is Taiwan. China lacks the military capabilities to seriously disrupt world peace. Only America has the Aircraft Carriers, Stealth Fighters, C4I capabilities, and other modern fighting equipment to wage war effectively anywhere on the planet. If the American public and leaders are provoked enough (9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq), then serious instability would occur. China just wants what is hers. America wants the world.
Overall, her book is a great introduction to Chinese politics for the uninitiated. Take caution though, and read critically, without swallowing every one of Shirk's claims.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
|
|
Most Recent Customer Reviews
|