Customer Reviews

China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (Cambridge Modern China Series)

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

'China Since Tiananmen' begins with the back and forth post-Tiananmen Square (TS) 1989. Deng's reform movement essentially stagnated for three years after that point until after Deng undertook his 1992 'Southern Tour,' revisiting China's original SEZ and blasting reform opponents as he went from site to site. Deng also contended that without the ten years of reform and opening up prior to TS, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would not have survived that situation; his opponents, naturally, countered that Deng's reforms created TS and would eventually bring the CCP's downfall, just as in Eastern Europe. Some opponents even called for rolling back all Deng's reforms, but most realized this would not be accepted.

Deng called on the SEZs to catch up to the 'four small dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) in 20 years.' Deng's continued criticisms, along with adding top PLA attendance and support and endorsing Zhu Rongji (former Shanghai General Secretary) for his current post as vice-premier (and potential replacement for Premier Jiang Zemin finally stirred action. The month of May saw the Central Committee endorsing 44 new SEZs, and betting behind Deng's 2000 goal for the original SEZs. In October, 1992, the Party Congress also endorsed Deng's concept of 'socialist market economic system,' replacing their prior focus on a 'socialist planned economy.' Deng also managed to have several reform opponents replaced on the Standing Committee. Finally, growth targets were also raised.

In 1994, China's inflation rate jumped to 21.7%, 44% of its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were losing money, and 80% of SOE income went to debt service.

Fewsmith also points out that despite Chinese youth having a very positive opinion of the U.S. during TS, this turned negative after the Gulf War, U.S. opposition to China's 2000 Olympic bid (lost by two votes), U.S. involvement supporting Taiwan and Tibet, U.S. impediments to China joining the WTO, and our constant carping about human rights, which the Chinese began seeing as a smoke-screen hiding other U.S. interests.

This is an in-depth look specifically at the political situation in China in the ten years following the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The book traces all of the power-players in high-level Chinese politics and attempts to analyze the reactions of the intellectual and political communities as well as the growing role of public opinion.

This was a challenging read for someone like myself, who came to it with only minimal knowledge of Chinese politics. By the end, however, I felt that Fewsmith had done an excellent job with explaining and analyzing the backgrounds and motivations of the major political power players. His descriptions of the infighting and political maneuverings kept the book interesting, and his writing was focused and well organized.

I did find occasions where I was being thrown off by terms like "leftist", "rightist", "liberal", and "conservative", which take on decidedly different meanings in the Chinese political spectrum than their more familiar applications to American politics. Some of the political science jargon can be a bit overwhelming as well.

The book is somewhat dated. By ending around the time of the incident in early involving the forced landing of a US surveillance plane following a collision with a Chinese fighter jet, the author has inadvertently left off the narrative just before the major shift on global politics that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US. Thus some of Fewsmith's projections of future trends in global politics seem unrealistic in light of the events of the last eight years. But Fewsmith doesn't spend much of his narrative projecting the future. He has an excellent grasp on the delicacy and the complexity of China's relationship with other nations, particularly the US.

If you're interested in Chinese politics, or in Clinton administration foreign policy, this is definitely worth reading. It chronicles all of the major events and personalities, and it is very thoroughly sourced and annotated.

the only deficiency is that he focuses too much on the top-level political struggles. it is okay for readers with general interests, but a closer view of Chinese society is absent.

Fewsmith has produced a truly magnificent book. For anyone interested in modern China, this book is a valuable asset. His new book is a detailed and thorough examination of the political and intellectual currents shaping Chinese society since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. Few other authors so ably present the intellectual and social debates with China - conflicts over how should China view the United States, the international economy, its own political conditions, and China's conception of itself in a globalizing, yet unipolar world.

Fewsmith does accurately capture the different sentiments of average Chinese (contrary to another reviewer's estimation). There was a spontaneous outpouring after the 1999 embassy bombing, and understandably so as many Chinese were scared and uncertain by the event.

In short, Fewsmith has made an extremely valuable addition to our understanding of the complex and evolving social, culutaral and political aspects of modern China.

Joseph Fewsmith has produced an excellent work that provides a thorough survey and cutting analysis of modern China. Readers interested elite politics, intellectual currents, and varieties of Chinese nationalism would be well advised to turn here for information.

An impressive survey of Chinese intellectual development in the 1990s.

It's quite obvious that Professor Fewsmith never left the clostered chambers of Boston University. His sources are chiefly those of speeches and reports of China's dictatorial rulers.If he had visted Beijing's universities and spoken with the students and instructors he'd have gotten a much different impression. For example he was of the eroneous opinion that the protest of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was a spontanious outpour of national sentiment. If he'd been at Beijing University he could have seen how government agents paid students to participate in a government orchestated demonstration at the U.S. Embassy.

The Taiwan issue is another of his numerous misinterpretations.
Thousands of wealthy Taiwan merchants and corporate magnets are investing millions of dollars into the Chinese economy. Their bribery has essentially gained control of the Chinese leaders. It is Taiwan who is conquoring China.