China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-1959 (Contemporary China Books) [Hardcover]

Frederick C. Teiwes (Author), Warren Sun (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

Two authorities on Chinese Communist politics and economics (The Tragedy of Lin Biao, Univ. of Hawaii, 1996) present challenging new explanations for the failures of the Great Leap Forward using original Chinese sources and official papers. Jasper Becker's Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine (LJ 1/97) graphically depicted Mao's failures and the horrifying effects of a famine that killed 30 to 45 million people. Teiwes and Sun focus on the first steps along the road to disaster, analyzing Communist party leadership and politics from the late 1950s on, including Mao's shifting and sometimes ambiguous viewpoints, the role of Soviet communism, local political appeals, utopian delusions, and the failure of high Communist officials to curb Mao's flawed plans. An appendix of Chinese primary source material, an extensive bibliography, and a chronology complement this important text. Highly recommended for academic and large public libraries.?Margaret W. Norton, IMH High Sch., Westchester, IL
Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 376 pages
• Publisher: East Gate Book (August 1998)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0765602016
• ISBN-13: 978-0765602015
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #10,559,321 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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4.0 out of 5 stars Revisionism in the Best Sense of the Word, January 5, 2009

By 

Andrew C. Mertha - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward 1955-1959 (Studies on Contemporary China) (Paperback)

The other review (above) makes no sense. Either you deify Mao, or you hold him solely responsible for the Great Leap Forward disaster. Moreover, it represents a poor understanding of the book it is reviewing, as Teiwes and Sun do not make either claim. Rather, this book fits into their revisionist (in the best sense of the term) framework in arguing that Mao did not achieve greater power in the 1960s, but rather held at least the same degree of authority (and arguably even more) but decided that democratic centralism was the best way to discuss and implement policy while maintaining Mao's own power. This, as many know, ended in 1959, at the Lushan Meeting. Teiwes and Sun argue that things went the way they did because that is how Mao wanted them to be (of course, in doing so, Mao unleashed, and animated, forces that were ultimately beyond even his control, and which made a stupid policy a devastating one). You might say that this is the same as saying that "it is all Mao's fault." But such a statement makes for a bumper sticker, and does not reflect a carefully grounded reading of this scholarly work. And, granted, Teiwes and Sun make a nonfalsifiable argument, so we have to evaluate Teiwes and Sun on their research, which is extraordinarily meticulous, thoughtfully interpreted, and stimulating (even when wrong). There are other attempts to try to make sense of the GLF (Domenach, Yang, Bachman). This is as good as the best of them (i.e., MacFarquhar).

5 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Deification of Mao, January 31, 2002

By 

Larry Yeo (Bethesda, MD) - See all my reviews

This review is from: China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward 1955-1959 (Studies on Contemporary China) (Paperback)

This book represents a credible attempt to add new perspectives (in many cases revolutionary ones) to a significant era in the Chinese political, military, and social landscape.

In my opinion, it fundamentally flawed in that the foundation of the entire work is the fervently-held premise that Mao was omnipotent during this relevant period. In attributing God-like qualities to this one mortal politician/demagogue, Dr. Teiwes and Dr. Sun create the universe of possible conclusions in advance of the critical analyses. Therefore, a tragedy of incredible magnitude (starvation of +35 million Chinese) is attributed not to a convergence of critical events (including environmental, political, and social) but instead to the actions or inactions of one man. Dr. Teiwes is known as a strong proponent of Mao-centrist philosophy so it is understandable that he holds Mao in this true sense of filial piety. Mao truly would be proud.

I think that this book has some value to the scholar of Chinese history and the legions of Mao proponents worldwide.