Customer Reviews

China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward 1955-1959 (Studies on Contemporary China)

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The other review (above) makes no sense. Either you deify Mao, or you hold him solely responsible for the Great Leap Forward disaster. Moreover, it represents a poor understanding of the book it is reviewing, as Teiwes and Sun do not make either claim. Rather, this book fits into their revisionist (in the best sense of the term) framework in arguing that Mao did not achieve greater power in the 1960s, but rather held at least the same degree of authority (and arguably even more) but decided that democratic centralism was the best way to discuss and implement policy while maintaining Mao's own power. This, as many know, ended in 1959, at the Lushan Meeting. Teiwes and Sun argue that things went the way they did because that is how Mao wanted them to be (of course, in doing so, Mao unleashed, and animated, forces that were ultimately beyond even his control, and which made a stupid policy a devastating one). You might say that this is the same as saying that "it is all Mao's fault." But such a statement makes for a bumper sticker, and does not reflect a carefully grounded reading of this scholarly work. And, granted, Teiwes and Sun make a nonfalsifiable argument, so we have to evaluate Teiwes and Sun on their research, which is extraordinarily meticulous, thoughtfully interpreted, and stimulating (even when wrong). There are other attempts to try to make sense of the GLF (Domenach, Yang, Bachman). This is as good as the best of them (i.e., MacFarquhar).

This book represents a credible attempt to add new perspectives (in many cases revolutionary ones) to a significant era in the Chinese political, military, and social landscape.

In my opinion, it fundamentally flawed in that the foundation of the entire work is the fervently-held premise that Mao was omnipotent during this relevant period. In attributing God-like qualities to this one mortal politician/demagogue, Dr. Teiwes and Dr. Sun create the universe of possible conclusions in advance of the critical analyses. Therefore, a tragedy of incredible magnitude (starvation of +35 million Chinese) is attributed not to a convergence of critical events (including environmental, political, and social) but instead to the actions or inactions of one man. Dr. Teiwes is known as a strong proponent of Mao-centrist philosophy so it is understandable that he holds Mao in this true sense of filial piety. Mao truly would be proud.

I think that this book has some value to the scholar of Chinese history and the legions of Mao proponents worldwide.