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The Choices Justices Make

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The basic accepted truth of modern political scientists (though not always lawyers) is that judges decide cases based primarily upon their policy preferences. The most extreme scholars argue that judges' decisions are based solely on this concern and no other. In their wonderful study, Epstein and Knight contend that this attitudinal model is too simplistic; it ignores that basic fact that justices must gather 5 total votes to enact their policy. This fact, they argue, requires justices to engage in strategic interaction that accounts for the choices of others and the institutional context. Thus, they study three different ideas: that justices' actions are directed toward attaining some policy; justices' are strategic; and institutions structure justices' interactions. Epstein and Knight test their contention through examination of the papers of various Burger Court justices. Their findings tend to support the strategic view of judicial behavior. What is important to remember, is that this book is not meant to be the end of the discussion, but rather the beginning. The authors candidly admit that this is meant to open up new avenues of judicial behavior research. This is a central text of modern political scientists and should be read by any serious student of the Court.

This book came super fast. Has some usage but still in great condition. Thank you.