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The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature

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Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault are arguably two of the most influential thinkers of the late twentieth century - important contributors to Western intellectual history. Despite their significance, however, this small text has limited value. It is a hodgepodge of loosely related and previously published material much of which is available on line for free.

The book, as its title suggests, is notionally centered on the 1971 Dutch Television debate between Chomsky and Foucault moderated by Edlers on the question of whether or not there such a thing as an "innate" human nature. While the `debate' is largely an exercise in the two protagonists talking past each other; it is nonetheless an interesting small episode in contemporary intellectual history. The video and transcript have been available on-line for years. Had the remainder of the text been post-debate reflections or new analysis of the issues raised in the discussion the text could have been quite interesting. Sadly, this is not the case.

The remaining four essays are transcripts of interviews and presentations by Foucault and Chomsky on other subjects - Chomsky does offer a few small asides on the debate at the end of one interview. The two chapters on Chomsky are transcripts of 1976 interviews with Ronat. `The Philosophy of Language' is a collection of Chomsky's musings on the modern intellectual project while `Politics' provides a feel for his well known political views which range from insightful reflections on the nature and function of societal power structures to his more fringe conspiracy-type views. While interesting small pieces they have been previously published and have only a tenuous link to the earlier debate.

Michel Foucault's `Truth and Power' is a transcript of an interview with Fontana and Pasquino in the mid 70s that focuses on the evolution and focus of Foucault's thought. While "Omnes et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Rason is based on lectures Foucault gave at Stanford in the 80s discussing power and reason in modern society (available on line). Again these are fine small pieces, however, in the current text they feel like filler.

Chomsky and Foucault are important and interesting thinkers. That said, I do not see the value of this text. Some original analysis of their debate could have been interesting.

The Chomsky-Foucault Debate On Human Nature collects and presents an integral debate held between two of the world's top intellectuals, Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, held in 1971 (during the height of the Vietnam War) to wrestle with the ancient question: Is there such a thing as "innate" human nature independent of our experiences and external influences? In addition to reproducing the debate verbatim, The Chomsky-Foucault Debate On Human Nature includes later writings by each speaker: "Politics" (1976) and "A Philosophy of Language" (1976) by Noam Chomsky, and "Truth and Power" (1976), "Omnes et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Rason" (1978) and "Confronting Government: Human Rights" (1984) by Michel Foucault. "The concept of legality and the concept of justice are not identical; they're not entirely distinct either. Insofar as legality incorporates justice in this sense of better justice, referring to a better society, then we should follow and obey the law... Of course, in those areas where the legal system happens to represent not better justice, but rather the techniques of oppression that have been codified in a particular autocratic system, well, then a reasonable human being should disregard and oppose them, at least in principle; he may not, for some reason, do it in fact." Highly recommended, and a welcome contribution to library philosophy shelves.

I wish there were more such confrontations between thinkers of Foucault and Chomsky's stature. Regardless of whom you favor, at least they managed to wrangle over serious issues, such as whether there is an absolute justice and whether we share an independent human nature or essence. In this exchange, Foucault seems to undercut Chomsky repeatedly, first moving Chomsky to concede that issues of injustice and oppression would occur even in conditions of relative anarchy, and then pinning Chomsky to a notion of absolute justice that Chomsky admits he cannot articulate. The supplementary readings in this text are, I believe, necessary to get an accurate picture of Foucault's considered position, which is not clearly represented in the exchange (where he is playing something of a devil's advocate). While this does not amount to anything like a demonstration that Chomsky was wrong--and Foucault would not have claimed to demonstrate such a thing--it does show, I think, that defenders of Chomsky's positions have some rather heavy lifting in store.

A wonderfully illuminating discussion between two great thinkers of the latter half of the the twentieth century. This slim volumes contains a transcript from the debate as well as selected interviews and essays by both philosophers. As a fellow who has struggled with Foucault's writings in the past, I found this an excellent introduction to the works of both men.

Helps the reader easily grasp both authors divergent and convergent insights on language. The material on politics was enlightening.

It is now widely conceded among post-modern/post-structuralist circles that Foucault broke the back of linguist-political scientist Noam Chomsky in this televised debate on Dutch television. Perhaps this conception further contributed to Chomksy's disdain with the French intellectual community entire in subsequent years. Nevertheless, regardless of one's political/philosophical disposition, this is an endlessly fascinating debate, between two thinkers working as "tunnellers through a mountain working at opposite sides of the same mountain with different tools, without even knowing if they are working in each other's direction" (2), to use the moderators' description.

The debate begins technically, Chomksy addresses his discoveries within the domain of cognitive linguistics, and Foucault outlines his historical research into the sciences in Western civilization. Chomsky is a self-described rational `Cartesian,' a philosophical disposition largely rejected by post-modernity after the detruktion of Western philosophy by Martin Heidegger. Foucault, on the other hand, (who began as a major Heideggerian) seems to adopt a Nietzschean disposition; he rejects Chomsky's assertion that a genuine concept of human justice is rooted biologically in the human species. Rather, that our knowledge of morality and human nature are always necessarily rooted in social conditioning. Chomsky actually fails (here as well as elsewhere) to really confront the philosophy of Nietzsche, who necessarily put a dent in all forms of socialism, whether democratic, libertarian, or totalitarian. To illustrate Chomsky's elusiveness: "FOUCAULT: it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it. CHOMSKY: I don't agree with that. FOUCAULT: And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice" (54-55). But Chomksy replies by reasserting his belief that there must be an absolute basis in which notions of human justice are "grounded" (ibid), however, he relies once again solely on his partial knowledge of what `human nature' is.

I didn't know about this debate between these two on this subject--what a find! I am reading it now, and a line of friends are waiting for their turn.

Regarding the so-called "power conspiracy" theories--which Chomsky has refuted several times, both in print and in lectures--proponents of those theories argue not, e.g., that there are meetings between the Board of Directors of Exxon-Mobil and their major stockholders--of which there certainly are. No. Conspiracy theorists argue the case for some grand, overarching subterfuge. That is, e.g., monthly meetings between the CEOs of the New York Times, the Washington Post, et. al., Exxon-Mobil and the other Fortune One-Hundred Corporations, and high-level D.C. administrators, etc., examining all of the data on dissident factions, major protests, D.C. legislators and jurists exhibiting opposition to status quo policy making, etc., and then plotting to coordinate counter-intelligence measures to maintain their own entitlements, etc.
And, all this, considering the fierce competition, and predatory tactics amongst the Players themselves, i.e., to, daily, unman--i.e., castrate, economically speaking--any (viable or not) competitors. And, we have not even touched upon security leaks, etc., the threat of which would be ever-present (consider the thoughts of a disgruntled Player who felt cheated in a recent "deal"), and which would prove calamitous, to say the least. Nor have we entered into the equation the very real presence of trans-national Players, whose interests impinge upon our own--from hour to hour, in fact, if one considers the realities of the various Exchanges in major world markets.
Is this possible? Consider the enormity of such an ongoing effort--and it would, of necessity, have to be ongoing, since the rank-and-file are in a state of information exchange, revision, flux, etc. Again--is it possible that a grand, overarching subterfuge does, in fact, exist? Well, since anything is quote-unquote possible, let us, then, consider--more practically--what is likely, i.e., within the context of: What is really needful for Power to maintain its prerogatives and entitlements? To differentiate Power from Player: Power itself, we would do well to remember, is no respector of persons. That is, Power will readily forego the participation of this or that particular Player, but Power itself will not be as readily undermined.

At this point, Players within the Market/State/Media complex do not need to "conspire" in order for Power to exist. That is, Power, in the parlance of Social theorists, is "libidinous." "Libidinous" is a Freudian term referring to the libido, the sex drive, or sexual desire--an apt comparison. Power is libidinous--an often mindless, material striving...for its own sake. "Libido" and "desire" can be subtle drives, but none the less real for their subtlety. And, similarly, Power, as an illegitimate (i.e., non-justified), entity--i.e., Power, as the exercise of self-serving control by the few over the many--that has not been successfully opposed, or contravened, once rooted, will continue. It's as simple as that.
At this late stage in the game no overarching conspiracy is needed--no upper-echelon "meetings," subterfuge, secret envoys, etc.--to sustain Power. Yes, the names and faces of the various Players may be variable--e.g., if the CEO of Exxon-Mobil dies tomorrow some other "suit" will take over quickly--and, this, despite the fact that they would that their own personal agenda be maintained. But--and, despite that variability (q.v., the meetings, the violent takeovers, the power coups, etc.)--Power itself rolls on.
Yet--and, returning to libidinous Power--just what is there to "desire"? That is, what are the Market, the State, and the Media in pursuit of--simultaneously--that might lead one to believe that there is a quote-unquote conspiracy which correlates all of their activities, somehow in tandem, one to the other? Again: What is there to desire? In a word: MORE. "MORE," that is necessary or needful? No--just "MORE" (this is akin to the difference between Marxian "exchange value" versus "use value"). And, the pursuit of "MORE" will never, in fact, be sated.
Power itself dictates terms to its Players, i.e., the particular Players are merely incidental to Power. And, just like someone suffering from a substance-abuse type addiction, Power-as-the-pursuit-of-MORE has to be contravened and stopped. To use another analogy, it's like a juggernaut--it's out of control, i.e., it cannot stop by itself. It has to be opposed...