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Churchill's Anchor

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This is the first autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy between July 1939 and August 1943. If you don't know the fate of the British ships ABOUKIR, HOGUE, and CRECY in August 1914, this book may not be for you. If you don't know what the difference between a battlecruiser and a battleship, skip it.

However, if you are reasonably well read about the history of the Royal Navy in the first half of the 20th century, I very much recommend this book. It provides a sound treatment of Admiral Pound entire career, an excellent commentary on high level decision making at the Admiralty during the critical defensive and first offensive phases of WWII, and good look at wartime political issues involving and dividing the Admiralty and the British government. It also provides insights into British Naval policy during WWI and during the inter-war years.

Most of the well known WWII controversies involving the Royal Navy are covered; From the botched Norwegian campaign, to the attack on the French fleet at Oran, the anti-U-boat war, the firings of Admirals North, Godfrey and Forbes, Force Z, the almost criminal withholding of British shore-based aircraft support to the navy, the channel dash by SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU, and the scattering of convoy PQ17. The author's interpretations are based on research into Admiral Pound's papers in various archives, interviews with the Pound family members, review and analysis of accounts by witnesses to wartime decision making processes at the Admiralty, and thorough study of the politics of the Royal Navy.

The author of the book, Robin Broadhurst, comes across as a Pound admirer, although he certainly is not one sided in his praise. The Broadhurst emphasizes Pound's absolute professional dedication to the Navy, and shows that he was very aggressive in training squadrons and fleets between the wars, stressing the importance of taking calculated risks even in peacetime training. These risks included training for night actions and the use of aircraft of shadow enemy formations. They helped to establish the aggressive character of the Royal Navy during WWII. Broadhurst gives Pound credit for being aware of the potential usefulness of airplanes to support the fleet as early as 1914, for being a strong advocate of expansion of the Fleet Air Arm while serving at the Admiralty in 1928, and emphasizes that he was fully aware of the Royal Navy's poor performance at anti-aircraft fire in 1939.

Broadhurst has reasonable responses to the many criticisms of Pound as First Sea Lord put forth during and after WWII. He blames Churchill more than Pound for the confusion of the Norwegian campaign, arguing that while orders from the Admiralty to ships at sea cutting across existing lines of authority may have been signed by Pound, they usually implemented Churchill's ideas.

The author emphasizes that the attack of the French fleet, although supported by Pound, was a political decision made by the War Cabinet which may well have been politically correct at the time, even if it was opposed then and later by many officers of the British Navy. He also points out that Force Z was itself a political decision - in this case a bluff, strongly opposed by Pound. As for the channel dash, Broadhurst lays the principal blame for the German escape on the RAF, and approves of Pound's refusal to risk a British capital ship in the channel to block the escape.

On the other hand, Broadhurst blames Pound's failure to properly use the intelligence information provided him for his disastrous decision regarding PQ17. In fact, according to the author, Pounds principal operational shortcomings were a failure to make proper use of Naval Intelligence and a failure to make proper use of his staff. Broadhurst argues convincingly that Pound did not delegate enough until late in his term of office, and that under the burden of overwork, sometimes simply made the wrong decisions. The author also argues that the frequency of interference in Naval operations at sea by orders from the Admiralty - whether right or wrong - created problems for many Royal Naval officers, to the point of causing some to refuse commands at sea.

Broadhurst gives very high credit to Pound as someone who was able to manage Churchill, while still successfully fighting the Royal Navy's side when the big decisions had to be made. The title "Churchill's Anchor" reflects the authors view that Pound managed to constrain many of Churchill's wilder ideas by intelligent procrastination, while still managing to get things done.

Churchill was not Pound's only burden. Pound also had to fight off interference from several prominent figures from the World War I Royal Navy, including Admirals Keys and Dreyer, and from the upstart Churchill favorite Mountbatten. If that wasn't enough, at various time he also had to fight Admiral King of the United States Navy, Portal at the Air Ministry, Sir Arthur Harris of Bomber Command, and during much of 1942, even the hostile lobbying of the Russian Ambassador.

For fun, the author occasionally lashes out at Roskill's official history of the British Navy in World War II, especially his claim that Pound was physically unfit in 1939. Broadhurst feels that Roskill had some perceived wrongs to right which biased the official history. Along the way, he also takes a few swipes at Churchill's "Second World War" and Barnett's "Engage the Enemy More Closely". Altogether, "Churchill's Anchor" is an enjoyable and informative book for anyone with the right background.