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Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq

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Christian Alfonsi is either brilliant, extremely lucky or both. This book is unique to other recent releases such as "Fiasco" and "Hubris" in that it is evenly divided in covering both Iraq-related conflicts. Mr. Alfonsi's timing couldn't be better considering the sudden influx of old school George H.W. Bush advisors/cabinent members brought aboard to redirect the current conflict. The first half of this book takes a well balanced look at the planning and execution of the first Gulf War. Names that have been in recent headlines such as James Baker, Robert Gates, Richard Hass and Brent Scowcroft appear prominently in the account of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
The contrast between the two adminstration's handling of the situation couldn't be clearer. While the first Bush administration used their own elements of deception to engage Saddam Hussein, it is clear that his administration was working with a very realist approach that included detailed planning and input from other nations. This is in great contrast to the "cowboy diplomacy" seen coming from George W. Bush and the neoconservative architects of the second war.
I would recommend this book to any student of American miltary escapades abroad. Mr. Alfonsi should be commended for how well his narrative shows the different approaches of two different administrations, and their outcomes.

Alfonsi's "Circle in the Sand" reveals a number of parallels between Bush '41 and Bush '43 vs. Iraq. Both had major problems with CIA information (Bush I was told Iraq would not cross into Kuwait; Bush II heard that the proposition that Iraq had WMD was a "slam dunk"), achieved military triumph easily, incurred serious post-war problems due to lack of planning, utilized Secretary Baker to attempt to bail themselves out of the ensuing problems, had Dick Cheney play a key role in putting positive spin on the outcome, and subsequently endured serious questioning regarding the rationale for beginning hostilities (Bush '41's pre-war messages to Hussein have never been revealed - detractors believe he had "approved" Hussein's initial incursion into Kuwait; regardless, the much-hyped claim that Iraqi soldiers evicting newborns from incubators was proven to be fabricated).

9/11 offered a chance for the frustrated leaders of Gulf War I (Saddam continued to flaunt the U.S., while the sanctions we sponsored irritated the entire Arab world and possibly even strenghtened Saddam's control as he now had greater control over food, etc.) to take eliminate these problems forever. And so, the U.S. returned to Iraq and repeated many of the same mistakes.

The most serious blunder was Bush I's post-war encouragement of Iraqis to overthrow Saddam. This initially led to a bloodbath of Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north, then the rationalization for no-fly zones in both areas to protect those peoples, and then the retention of thousands of American forces in Saudi Arabia to support no-fly efforts. The latter, in turn, became Osama bin Laden's main motivation for attacking the WTC on 9/11. In addition, Alfonsi states that Bush's call for Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands may even have saved Saddam - Iraqi generals (almost all Sunni) preferred more of the same to rule even shared with Kurds and Shiites.

The final post-war error was the U.S.'s decision, announced by then Secretary of Defense Cheney, to reduce our armed forces by 25% as part of an effort to address a growing budget deficit. This act later fed into the need to short-staff the following Gulf War II by Bush II.

Interesting Sidelines: Both Bush I and II also bungled the response to major hurricanes (Andrew, Katrina), and the contrast between V.P. Quayle and Cheney could not be more extreme - Quayle played almost no role whatsoever in Alfonsi's account of Gulf War I, while Cheney's role in the Gulf War II was enormous. Finally, Richard Hass (formerly head of policy planning at the State Department) points out that the first war in Iraq marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East, while the second precipitated its end.

With deliberation, Christian Alfonsi traces events preceding and following the first Bush's 1991 war to force Iraq out of Kuwait and proceeds to analyze how his administration's policy weaknesses and "victory fatigue" led to the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq on George W. Bush's watch.

Alfonsi cites mainly public sources in his Notes, supplemented by some material from interviews he conducted, and with these he does a creditable job supporting his depiction of crucial developments. For example, he documents how the U.S. ended up keeping troops stationed in Saudia Arabia after cessation of Gulf War combat even though the kingdom had been promised all American military would depart. And, the author emphasizes that pressures on the Bush administration to do something about ethnic cleansing in the Balkans distracted American officials to a point that Saddam could take advantage. However, despite a fluent treatment of what actually happened, Alfonsi tends to stay on the surface. Apparently, he doesn't have evidence for a deeper dig into the reasons people such as Defense Secretary (later Vice President) Dick Cheney did opinion 180s: Cheney stated in April 1991 that "It makes no sense at all" to embroil American troops in "a civil war inside Iraq." He said it would "literally be a quagmire." Yet, Alfonsi relates that in 2000 just after Bush and Cheney were declared the official winners of the election, Cheney said at a celebration dinner that now something could finally be done about removing Saddam Hussein. Huh? True, Saddam had been a thorn in the side of American power since the Gulf War, but the rising conviction of neoconservatives and those they could persuade that Iraq must have a new leader seems disproportional to his provocations. Perhaps the neoconservatives presumed that U.S. military power was so overwhelmingly superior that any target could be permanently vanquished without much American bloodshed or lengthy engagements. But -- again, probably because evidence is not readily available -- Alfonsi documents the jumps in key officials' (such as Cheney's) thoughts without thoroughly dissecting how they evolved.

CIRCLE IN THE SAND is, therefore, not a complete study of "why we went back to Iraq." But it does shine a steady light on some vital causes. And Alfonsi does not shrink from pointing out that al-Qaeda was born at least partially due to American activity in Saudi Arabia during the Bush I years, and that after 9/11 the Bush II administration allowed the chance to corner Bin Laden and other top-level al-Qaeda members to slip through their fingers largely because they considered Saddam Hussein and an invasion of Iraq a higher priority even though Iraq could not be convincingly connected to the 9/11 attacks.

Recommended.

This is a superb account about how George H. W. Bush and his team won the 1991 Gulf War, and how (and why) Saddam Hussein prevailed in the subsequent decade. Alfonsi's intent was to write a book on the 1991 Gulf War; not only did he have access to recently unclassified material, but he received cooperation from most of the architects of the Bush I Adminstration's foreign policy. Because he did the bulk of his research well before George W Bush became president and at a time when the architects of the 1991 Gulf War thought their public service was over, those he interviewed were undoubtedly more candid and less concerned with a "CYA mentality" than they would be if interviewed today. His sources consist primarily of the recently unclassified memoranda and interviews. The heroes of his recounting are George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft.

I do not know why this account of the relationship between the 1991 Gulf War and the current War in Iraq has not received more publicity and a wider audience, but his conclusion is well supported by his sources: "All wars are inherently political acts. But the Bush Administration decision to invade Iraq in 2005 was more political than most, a war of choice waged by a generation of officials who had been indelibly scarred by their experiences in an earlier Bush Administration. . . . . The war against the Taliban and al-Queda in Afghanistan was a just, necessary war and proportionate response to 9/11. The war in Iraq was none of these things."

From Christian Alfonsi's lucid account of how Bush Jr. reprised and expanded Bush Sr.'s Iraq war, at least one horrifying lesson emerges: the dynastic obsessions of a family in power can throw the state into turmoil as easily today as in the days of the Caesars, Borgias and Hapsburgs. Conceived by a cabal of the father's consiglieri, whose self-serving and often self-deluding representations Alfonsi carefully recounts, this descent into the disaster belied all the safeguards of representative government as well as the inertial conservation of modern society's lumbering institutions. Historians in the 19th century wrote narratives of great men--heroes and villains alike. Although that type of history has gone out of fashion, it is still the right story in certain circumstances and this is one. Everyone should recall this book's story whenever families and their retainers seek power, regardless of their party affiliations.

Alfonsi was perhaps in a unique position to be researching the first Gulf War prior to and then during the planning of the second. In the 1992-2000 interim, the principals were accessible and open. Little did they know they would again be in a position to again affect policy in this region.

Alfonsi succeeds in his Woodward style reconstruction of Gulf I and its immediate aftermath. He informs, or reminds, of the time lines, April Glaspie's reports, the role of Joe Wilson, the build up, the acceptable range of Iraqi aggression, the support of the neighboring states, the diplomacy surrounding the Saudi bases, and the disastrous impact of Pres Bush 41's exhortation to the Iraqis to rise up against Hussein. The Gulf War I part of the book is 5 star and above for its documentation of history.

Also given good coverage is the impact of this war and the situation in Bosnia and how the two converged in the 1992 presidential campaign from the point of view of the Iraq War principals.

Alfonsi's segue into the 2003 Iraq invasion is disappointing. This last arc of the circle takes less than 50 pages. He says "it was in the DNA" of the Bush 43 administration. This does not explain why we went back.

While in the part of the first Gulf War Alfonsi clearly defines the role of oil, the discussion of oil is totally absent from the second. Neither does he explain how the then Secretary of Defense and cheerleader for leaving SH in place at the end of Gulf I, totally changes to hawk as Vice Pres. These are only a few of the missing pieces that subsequent researchers will undoubtedly explore.

Circle in the Sand is reader-friendly research that brings some light on how the same folks that held Saddam Hussein in power after Desert Storm ended up involved in a civil war and a nation building effort a decade later.

The need to contain "estable" the Persian gulf, the distraction of the U.S. foreing policy on the Balkans crisis, the Republican defeat in 1992, the change of guard on the GOP leadership, the asscent of neoconservatives to power, the events of 9/11 and the perverse skill of an iraqi dictator to take advantage of the U.S. internal political conflicts are all combined to explain the constrast between the outcome of both wars.

Although comprehensive and convincing, Alfonsi's work omits an important force driving American troops back to Iraq. The quest for reliable and profitable source of energy as well as the defense industry interest on the conflict are not remotely mentioned as a reason on Why we went back to Iraq. Despite the omision, the book is worth reading not once but twice.

"Bush derangement syndrome"--the irrational hatred of George W. Bush and the embrace of conspiracy theories about him--has moved from fringe websites to mainstream publishing houses. Circle in the Sand seeks to show how the decisions and unfinished business of George H.W. Bush's Iraq policy shaped his son's decision to invade Iraq. Alfonsi, a New York-based writer trained as a political scientist, argues that Operation Desert Storm reoriented U.S. policy toward Arab states, reoriented Republican foreign policy, and made the second war inevitable. Furthermore, he argues, the first Iraq conflict's inconclusive end sparked a new generation of Al-Qaeda terrorists that led to 9/11.

For Alfonsi, none of these developments were inevitable but instead resulted from foreign policy decisions about which the American people are ignorant. With a tone of hubris, Alfonsi tells readers that he has pieced together the hidden record that others have ignored or failed to detect. What results might sway conversation in a coffee shop but will appear silly to anyone ever involved in policy.

Alfonsi writes well and his narrative flows. In order to develop his thesis, though, he glues together 80 percent truth with 20 percent supposition. He neither understands the complexity of policymaking nor how little power any single individual has in the process. He depicts the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act as a Republican and neoconservative plot but omits mention of overwhelming Democratic support for the bill. He ignores the National Security Council, Deputies Committee meetings, and Policy Coordination committees, which taken together might meet ten or fifteen times a week to hash out policy.

A close read suggests a tendency toward either omniscience or fabrication. Thus, when Vice President Dick Cheney told "a few close friends" that Bush's election victory opened "a whole range of new opportunities in foreign policy," Alfonsi adds darkly that he meant "opportunities to settle scores with old enemies." He transforms think-tank panels on how best to defend U.S. national security--daily occurrences in Washington--into evidence of a conspiracy of predetermined change.

Omission also plagues Circle. In Alfonsi's world, Al-Qaeda grew only because of Riyadh's decision to host U.S. troops to protect the kingdom and the region while Saudi funding of radicals had little to do with it.[1] Nor does Alfonsi explain what Washington should have done differently: Let Saddam annex Kuwait and perhaps attack Saudi Arabia?
U.S., Iraqi, and European documents show Circle in the Sand to be more wrong than right. With hindsight, it appears Alfonsi's chief sources--disgruntled officials such as Richard Haass, a former state department policy planning chief--merely use the author to settle scores or promote petty agendas. Vintage Press may not care, though, because nothing sells books like conspiracy.

Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2009

[1] For a better survey of Al-Qaeda ideology, see Uriya Shavit, "Al-Qaeda's Saudi Origins," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2006, pp. 3-13.