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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A significant addition to the history of the cold war.,
By A Customer
This review is from: City Under Siege: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949 (Hardcover)
Michael Haydock provides a significant addition to the history of the cold war. This book is a seamless review of the role Berlin played during the critical years that ran from the end of World War II until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Haydock mirrors Berlin against the larger global events of the period. The central focus of the manuscript is, simply, how a city the size of Philadelphia survived complete destruction by the Soviet Army and rose again from the ashes in search of self determination.With Berlin as the backdrop, the author uses three themes in weaving the story. The first theme outlines the strategic decision making which contrasts the leadership of the Allies and the Soviet Union during the Berlin crisis. A stark difference emerges immediately. The democratically elected leaders of the Allies set the strategy. For example, President Truman said, "we stay," and turned the formation of policy over to his appropriate cabinet members. General Marshall, Secretary of State and James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, set broad policy which protected the strategic interest of the United States and delegated operational decisions to command officers in the field. Generals Clay, LeMay, Tunner, and their staffs made the tactical decisions while keeping Washington briefed. The author goes to great lengths to show how those in the field made the big decisions with minimal interference from the highest level. Decision making by the Soviet Union was the opposite. Haydock uses extensive documentation from a variety of sources to illustrate Soviet decision making as a highly rigid, centralized system that required all matters to be cleared with Moscow - that is, with Stalin. Such tightly controlled decision making begged for delay as every action went back to Moscow for a reaction. The second theme is operational or tactical. Haydock goes to great lengths to describe the birth, growth, and triumph of the Berlin Airlift. As the Soviets closed the surface routes to Berlin, a hasty effort to supply the city by air was made by the area commanders. The question, "can it be done?" was not addressed; however, the question, "how can we do it?" was a constant for the next six months. One could classify the beginning air supply effort as long on optimism and short on reality. On Saturday, July 26, 1948, a collection of C-47s made thirty-four flights into Templehof with 80 tons of food and medicine. The Berlin Airlift had commenced. Manpower and material began to flow to the operational bases in West Germany. General Tunner arrived to provide leadership. The C-54s began to arrive from bases all over the world. The "bicycle chain" was applied to the corridors which kept a steady stream of aircraft moving toward the landing fields in Berlin and back to the supply airfields. January, 1949, was a critical month. The weather was bad and the City was down to twelve days of food and coal. On Easter Sunday, 1949, flying at one minute intervals, 1,398 flights, lifted 12,941 tons into Berlin in a twenty-four hour period. The Soviets lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949, but air operations continued until September. One could argue that the Airlift was the greatest humanitarian effort the world has seen, demonstrating good leadership, diplomatic steadiness, and peaceful use of airpower can advance the strategic interests of a nation. The third theme weaves human interest stories into the larger mosaic of the Airlift. Into every day of this monumental effort, Haydock finds a story that brings this huge operation down to the human level. For example, Lieutenant Gail Halverson's dropping little parachutes containing chocolate candy to the chldren of Berlin - and going down in history as the "Candy Bomber." Or Ruth Andreas-Friedrich describing the Soviet sacking of the city and the associated fear as the survivors hovered in the bombed out buildings. City Under Siege is a well documented, clearly written description of one of the great events of the century. Highly recommended reading for those interested in history, foreign policy, humanitarian efforts, and especially for those who participated.
4 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
Too Shallow,
By "blnso36" (Colorado Springs, CO United States) - See all my reviews
This review is from: City Under Siege: The Berlin Blockade Andairlift, 1948-1949 (Paperback)
What a disappointment this book was. A subject so rich and so poorly presented. It was an empty account of history. For a layman hard to group into one of the greatest accomplishments of the United States. Too many loose ends, stories start and in the middle another subject is injected, a couple pages later you find the conclusion. The conditions of the city and the people from 1945 to 1948 not researched enough to give an understanding what really happen in the years before the Blockade. The currency reform was the final straw, but not the whole picture. The Kommandatura meetings the author refers to with the 4 powers don't shine any light on the subject. Also he never took the time to question the population of the city, the feelings, the hardships and how we accomplished our daily lives under conditions beyond imagination. Ruth Andreas-Friedrich was the only person to express some opinions, but she was not the mainstream of the 2 1/2 million people that lived in the city. She left Berlin in the middle of the Airlift for "Freedom", we had freedom in Berlin because of the support of the free world. I'm a born Berliner and lived through every phase. I worked for USGroupCC, Omgus and Special Troops in Onkel Toms Huette, also attended the performance of Bob Hope in the Titania Palast, what lasted over 4 hours, well past midnight. Have several excellent books on the subject to remind my children what was my life experience, but this one was written without understanding the whole picture, the sacrifices the men made to save a city and keep the iron curtain from descending all over Europe.
3.0 out of 5 stars
Cold start,
By
This review is from: City Under Siege: The Berlin Blockade Andairlift, 1948-1949 (Paperback)
Although it didn't seem like it at the time, the Soviet Union probably did the United States and Germany a favor by attempting the take over all of Berlin in 1948. Michael Haydock's "City Under Siege" tells the American side well, the German side adequately, the Russian side slightly and the British side almost not at all.It is unfortunate that a history published as late as 1999 makes no use of Soviet sources, although their actions were so transparent that there are hardly any historical mysteries about their behavior. The Americans and the British did not coordinate their postwar policies well, and the Americans were too eager to make nice, hoping that Europe could be reconstructed as a whole. Compromises and carelessness allowed the Soviets to obtain a veto in the four-power arrangements for control of Berlin, which made life more troublesome for the diplomats and military occupation forces, although presumably Stalin would have made mischief anyway. Haydock has a few errors in his book, some trivial but one important. It was not true that the Germans were worse off for food right after the war than the rest of Europe. As William Shirer indignantly reported at the time (repeated in his "End of a Berlin Diary"), the occupation, at least under the western Allies, allotted the Germans more calories than their victims, even though the Germans, by stealing food, were in better shape than other Europeans. The Germans, always easily aggrieved, did not see it that way, but that's how it was. In Haydock's retelling, the American government was too slow to realize that the Soviets were willing to expend resources to take over most of Europe. The USSR was too exhausted to fight an offensive war, but it was prepared to use terrorism, subversion and money to get the job done. Certainly Gen. Lucius Clay, the commander, stuck to the conciliatory policy long past the time his deputy in Berlin, Frank Howley, had figured out what was going on. It was Clay, not Howley, who fed information back to Washington, where the establishment was content to disbelieve "that the Soviets would actually condemn the two and a half million Berliners to slow death by starvation to further a political goal." One American besides Howley, however, got it right: President Harry Truman. The British, in no condition to resist really, were also staunch. Haydock has nothing to say about how much Britain had to sacrifice to stand firm. Nor does he have much to say about the excellent reasons the Russians had to not care whether all or any Germans starved. Comparatively little of the book is devoted to the airlift itself. There is not a word about the financial cost, which the Americans were able to bear but which was a tremendous hardship for Britain. The meat of "City Under Siege" concerns the military-diplomatic struggles of the Americans. Haydock is good on this. The other aspects of the story are not nearly so well related. The siege of Berlin can be taken as the start of the Cold War, although other starting points could be argued as well. But it certainly determined the course. The Americans proved they could stand up to the Russians, and that they could stand together. Stalin didn't get the last part. Probably he expected a change in administration after the elections of 1948 to give him a victory. The Republican leader, Thomas Dewey, deserves great credit for not taking the opportunity to grab partisan political advantage at the expense of national policy. Even more so because he had made the same noble choice in 1944, to his personal cost, by accepting George Marshall's cautions regarding the Manhattan Project. Too bad Ronald Reagan, presented the same choice in 1980, made the opposite decision. The lesson of the siege of Berlin is the same as the lesson of Munich: The time to take a stand against an implacable enemy is early. Too bad it wasn't learned.
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