Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 [Illustrated] [Hardcover]

Marshall L. III Michel (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 1997

A retired U.S. Air Force fighter pilot and Vietnam veteran makes full use of recently declassified U.S. documents in this first comprehensive study of fighter combat over North Vietnam. His balanced, exhaustive coverage describes and analyzes both Air Force and Navy engagements with North Vietnamese MiGs while simultaneously discussing the SAM threat and U.S. countermeasures, laser-guided bombs, and U.S. attempts to counter the MiG threat with a variety of technologies. Accessible yet professional, Clashes is filled with valuable lessons that are as valid today as they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Some sixty-five photographs, tables, pie charts, maps, and diagrams of American and North Vietnamese formations and tactics are included. Beginning with the first air-to-air engagements of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965, Marshall Michel describes the initial American successes against the MiGs and the stunning turn of events in late 1967 when the North Vietnamese began shooting down more U.S. aircraft than they lost. He explains how in 1968, at the end of Rolling Thunder, the U.S. Air Force ignored problems with their tactics, formations, and missiles, while the U.S. Navy undertook a complete reassessment of its air-to-air operations and formed its famous Topgun course. The second part of the book, covering Operation Linebacker in 1972, examines the results of these two approaches and how the Navy scored heavily against the MiGs while the Air Force continued to suffer losses to MiG-21s. Michel offers extraordinary insights into events that led to this situation and the Air Force's efforts to reverse the trend. This combination of descriptions of actual dogfights with authoritative analysisof the tactics, pilot skills, high-level decision making, and shortcomings - more than 57 percent of U.S. air-to-air missiles malfunctioned and less than 13 percent scored a kill - will prove indispensable to everyone with an interest in an combat, the war in Vietnam, and Navy an

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About the Author

Marshall Michel retired from the U.S. Air Force in 1992 after 26 years of service. He flew 321 combat missions over Vietnam. He now lives in Brussels, Belgium, and New Orleans, Louisiana.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 336 pages
• Publisher: US Naval Institute Press; 1 edition (January 1997)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1557505853
• ISBN-13: 978-1557505859
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.2 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (21 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #415,386 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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36 of 37 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars One of the best books on SEA air combat, June 17, 1998

By 

T. Whigham (Tampa, FL USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Hardcover)

This is the best book on air combat in SEA during the VietNam War that I've ever seen (and I've seen a few). Michel mixes discussion at the strategic level (the decisions about what targets to hit and how hard)with the actual pilot-level action that occurred. Mr. Michel unashamedly approaches the two disparate theories held by the USAF and the USN in how to handle air-to-air combat and strike mission planning. The USAF saw the air-to-air loss rates as a problem with the technology. The USN saw the loss rates as a problem with pilot training. Not surprisingly, the USN loss ratios improved dramatically a year after the creation of its TopGun air-to-air combat academy, whereas the USAF saw only a minimal improvement in its missile technology.

One interesting point is this: even though both the USAF and the USN flew the F-4 Phantom, the Navy missiles wouldn't work on the USAF planes because of a difference in the launch rails. The problem was in the way that the Sidewinder seeker was cooled prior to launch. The Navy took one approach to solve the problem and the USAF took another. The Navy did indeed have a better missile, and when one USAF wing commander demanded that he be supplied with Navy Sidewinders for air-to-air combat, he was severely disappointed to find out that he couldn't have them due to disparate technologies.

This isn't a "There I was at 20,000 feet.." type of book. Its more of a "Oyster Flight was on BarCap at 20,000 feet on Route Package VI when Red Crown vectored them to a pair of MiG-21s launching from Phuc Yen..." type of book. Still, it is very exciting reading for avaition enthusiasts and air combat students. There is a careful analysis of each engagement and diagrams are included to illustrate typical strike formations and ECM coverage zones. Very well done.

31 of 32 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Not the Party Line, August 23, 2001

By 

J. Gilbert (Santa Ynez, CA USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Hardcover)

This book is an excellent account of the "corporate" deficiencies of the USAF in the late 60's and early 70's. The deficiencies of the air-to-air missiles in the Vietnam war are strikingly similar to the deficiencies of the torpedos in the USN in the first two years of WWII. Equally striking was the smug attitude of the service about the superiority of US aircraft ("The F-86 had a 13:1 kill ratio over the MiG-15. Who cares that they slaughtered the F-84s?") and the poor pilot training that occurred for both USAF and USN F-4 drivers. The MiG-21 was indeed a nasty surprise. With a higher thrust-to-weight ratio and a lower wing loading, it could both out-accelerate and out-turn F-105s and F-4s. The only American advantage was a higher clean top speed, and external ordinance stores and fuel tanks often abrogated this. The MiG-21 had poor visibility, and a short range, but was an excellent point defense interceptor that transitioned well from bomber defense to dog fighting. (As an aside to the book, with modern electronics, the MiG-21/Lancer and MiG-21/2000 are excellent low-cost fighters today, but each air-air missile will cost you as much as the airframe!) The book details both the combat adaptations that worked (jamming pods, IFF interrogators) and the effective efforts of the USN and criminal negligence of the USAF (and I write as an ex-USAF officer) to improve dog fighting capabilities between the end of Rolling Thunder in 1968 and Linebacker I/II in 1972. The Navy instituted the Top Gun school and made effective modifications to the AIM-9 Sidewinder - the Air Force made a couple of ineffective changes to the AIM-9 and some moderately good ones to the AIM-7, though much of the better performance of the latter during Linebacker was due to higher engagement altitudes resulting from the use of laser guided bombs for the strike packages. He does make the point in the end that the USAF attitude improved after Vietnam when the junior officers of that war increased in seniority and that the introduction of AWACS and trading top speed for maneuverability and visibility in the new generation of fighters cured many of the deficiencies seen in the Vietnam war. A minor objection is that the book does not refer to officers below general rank by name.

19 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Good on the "bad guys" as well., April 15, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Hardcover)

Michell not only covers the US effort, he also reports on what the North Vietnamese did. Though this story is not part of his main narrative, he shows that the NVN Air Force fought hard, learned from their mistakes, and tried to make the best use possible from their MiGs and SAMs. Two points Michell never makes : first, any NVN pilot who successfully bailed out would land in his home country and would be able to get back into a cockpit; US pilots could only do so if they were rescued, a very complex operation that might involve additional losses. Second, if any NVN pilot did decide to go beyond the GCI-controlled airspace, they might be tempted to defect. Possible? Couldn't rule it out : NVN ground troops defected, and a couple of North Korean pilots have done so over the years. This book is highly recommended not only for those interested in the Vietnam War, but also those interested in the development of aerial tactics and weaponry.