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3.0 out of 5 stars
Interesting arguments but too many directions, January 6, 2012
I found this book to be very confusing to read. The initial premise seems sound: namely, the U.S. Military, after the Vietnam debacle, lost its way and is now confused as it relies on early 19th century Clausewitzian thinking which does not apply to the U.S. So far, so good, but then the author expands his argument: First, he defines a taxonomy of different kinds of wars and introduces the concepts of Offensive War; Defensive War; and Limited War. He then claims that America has a 300 year long successful streak of winning Offensive Wars that had been stopped by Vietnam. Further he claims that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are also Offensive Wars, but due to the U.S. Army abandoning its traditions due to Vietnam, it is now conducting the war in a wrong way and therefore is losing them - or, at least, not sure how to proceed with them. These arguments are made in a relatively straightforward way and one can see the internal logic that the author has as he makes his case. The main point is that the U.S. won World War 2 and before because it understood what to do after the battles are over and prepared for it with thousands of troops dedicated to governance after the fighting; and a good method for re-establishing civilian societies once the active warfighting was over. By contrast, during the Iraq war, nobody planned for what to do after the fighting was over and we took over Iraq and consequently we left a huge power vacuum behind; lost the momentum; and were quickly seen as the aggressor occupiers who wanted to take over Iraq and therefore allowed and even encouraged the genesis of the insurgency that we've been fighting ever since. As long as the author stays on that track, his arguments make sense and his various statistics and historical references and anecdotes contribute to the discussion. Assuming that what he relates about the lack of preparations for the aftermath of the war is correct, then it is a real black eye for the U.S. Army and the whole American government across multiple administrations. The author provides a set of recommendations that he believes will allow the U.S. Army to be better prepared to wage Offensive Wars and win their aftermaths. Where I think the author loses his thread is in his constant harping about how the U.S. Army lost its way by relying on Clausewitz's writings. He points out that Clausewitz was theorizing about limited wars waged between European monarchies for limited objectives and that the way the U.S. fights its wars is different. But then he muddles that argument by pointing out multiple recent cases where the U.S. Army fought a war for limited objectives and succeeded. Even more confusing was that he states that relying on Clausewitzian thinking lead the U.S. Army astray at the same time that he tells us - repeatedly - that there is no power on earth that can stand and fight against the U.S. Army due to how strong it is and how well it fights. Citing statistics that show that the combat kill rations between the U.S. and its enemies has been 10 to 1 or better for over a century does not align with the argument that the U.S. Army lost its way by reading Clausewitz. There is a further section that acts as a warning to Americans that the direction in which the military is moving is tending more and more towards becoming a professional force intent on carving out an American empire in the world. Good and thoughtful arguments are presented here with reliance on the historical antecedent of Rome and its fall from Republic to Empire and dissolution due to a similar move by the professional army of its time. This section is very interesting and illuminating, but one has to wonder what that has to do with the rest of the book? For all these reasons, I find myself rather confused as to what it is that the author is actually trying to achieve? Hodgepodges of ideas - some of which contradict themselves - are thrown together. For these reasons I gave the book only three stars. Nonetheless, there is much in this book that is worth reading, pondering, and understanding.
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10 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Lessons Lost to Win the Peace, October 29, 2009
This review is from: The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (Hardcover)
The more appropriate subtitle for this book is: "...and the Precious Lessons Lost on How to Win the Peace".
As a retired senior military officer of nearly 30 years service - I am truly impressed by Melton's work. If you read Clausewitz's own self-criticism in detail - Melton is only doing what Clausewitz himself believed in. For we WILL fight wars differently under different realities as the times change - we are already doing so - and the times have changed so our thinking must change! Melton's work is an integral part of that critical change in thinking.
Without doubt, Melton is very successful in using historical examples to press his point that Clausewitz is totally passé as a valid guide to modern strategic operations, much less so for guerilla operations - and virtually nil as a useful guide or winning the peace. Melton's use of historical examples is exceptionally clear, concise, and highly potent to his general argument to dismiss Clausewitz as a valid guide for strategic operations. Melton literally destroys such worn out stale notions of center of gravity, military genius, decisive battle - just to name a few of the archaic, decayed Clausewitzian bones that still rattle around in today's in the skulls of military thinking.
However, let's not throw out ALL of Clausewitz with the bath water just yet. Albeit what Melton proffers is highly potent, there is still much more to discuss as to what pieces of the Clausewitzian mantras are still valid timeless elements in understanding insights beyond strategic operations but rather into the broader phenomenon of war - e.g. war as a political policy tool. In summary, we should hope that Melton's work here is just the tip of the iceberg - and we should expect much more from him in the future. Melton should be mandatory reading and discussion material at all Staff and War Colleges thoughout the western world.
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10 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
ORIGINAL THINKING - and well WORTH THE WAIT !, October 27, 2009
This review is from: The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward) (Hardcover)
I waited months for this book to be released, shipped and delivered - and IT WAS WORTH THE WAIT!! You don't have to agree with Melton's views - but at least you will obtain some honest original thinking that does NOT conform to the tired, old, stale military mantras. As a senior officer of 28+ years, I honestly believe we are at a serious inflection point within the US military. We need to thoroughly re-evaluate our public military doctrines and our strategic perspectives - and even more so, what our hidden paradigms are. Thinking determines behavior - individually as well as institutionally. Melton makes an honest attempt to provide true original thinking in what has become an otherwise droll, redundant military genre of decreasing value due to a severe shortage of originality. I am purposely NOT providing an opinionated regurgitation of Melton's material - you can get that anywhere. Read Melton for yourself - make your own opinions. I am simply claiming that there are precious few original military thinkers out there - and Melton appears to be an honest one. So if you tend to not only read but reflect as well, then I strongly recommend this book to all military "thinkers".
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