Customer Reviews

The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward)

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

I found this book to be very confusing to read. The initial premise seems sound: namely, the U.S. Military, after the Vietnam debacle, lost its way and is now confused as it relies on early 19th century Clausewitzian thinking which does not apply to the U.S. So far, so good, but then the author expands his argument: First, he defines a taxonomy of different kinds of wars and introduces the concepts of Offensive War; Defensive War; and Limited War. He then claims that America has a 300 year long successful streak of winning Offensive Wars that had been stopped by Vietnam. Further he claims that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are also Offensive Wars, but due to the U.S. Army abandoning its traditions due to Vietnam, it is now conducting the war in a wrong way and therefore is losing them - or, at least, not sure how to proceed with them.

These arguments are made in a relatively straightforward way and one can see the internal logic that the author has as he makes his case. The main point is that the U.S. won World War 2 and before because it understood what to do after the battles are over and prepared for it with thousands of troops dedicated to governance after the fighting; and a good method for re-establishing civilian societies once the active warfighting was over. By contrast, during the Iraq war, nobody planned for what to do after the fighting was over and we took over Iraq and consequently we left a huge power vacuum behind; lost the momentum; and were quickly seen as the aggressor occupiers who wanted to take over Iraq and therefore allowed and even encouraged the genesis of the insurgency that we've been fighting ever since.

As long as the author stays on that track, his arguments make sense and his various statistics and historical references and anecdotes contribute to the discussion. Assuming that what he relates about the lack of preparations for the aftermath of the war is correct, then it is a real black eye for the U.S. Army and the whole American government across multiple administrations. The author provides a set of recommendations that he believes will allow the U.S. Army to be better prepared to wage Offensive Wars and win their aftermaths.

Where I think the author loses his thread is in his constant harping about how the U.S. Army lost its way by relying on Clausewitz's writings. He points out that Clausewitz was theorizing about limited wars waged between European monarchies for limited objectives and that the way the U.S. fights its wars is different. But then he muddles that argument by pointing out multiple recent cases where the U.S. Army fought a war for limited objectives and succeeded. Even more confusing was that he states that relying on Clausewitzian thinking lead the U.S. Army astray at the same time that he tells us - repeatedly - that there is no power on earth that can stand and fight against the U.S. Army due to how strong it is and how well it fights. Citing statistics that show that the combat kill rations between the U.S. and its enemies has been 10 to 1 or better for over a century does not align with the argument that the U.S. Army lost its way by reading Clausewitz.

There is a further section that acts as a warning to Americans that the direction in which the military is moving is tending more and more towards becoming a professional force intent on carving out an American empire in the world. Good and thoughtful arguments are presented here with reliance on the historical antecedent of Rome and its fall from Republic to Empire and dissolution due to a similar move by the professional army of its time. This section is very interesting and illuminating, but one has to wonder what that has to do with the rest of the book?

For all these reasons, I find myself rather confused as to what it is that the author is actually trying to achieve? Hodgepodges of ideas - some of which contradict themselves - are thrown together. For these reasons I gave the book only three stars. Nonetheless, there is much in this book that is worth reading, pondering, and understanding.

The more appropriate subtitle for this book is: "...and the Precious Lessons Lost on How to Win the Peace".

As a retired senior military officer of nearly 30 years service - I am truly impressed by Melton's work. If you read Clausewitz's own self-criticism in detail - Melton is only doing what Clausewitz himself believed in. For we WILL fight wars differently under different realities as the times change - we are already doing so - and the times have changed so our thinking must change! Melton's work is an integral part of that critical change in thinking.

Without doubt, Melton is very successful in using historical examples to press his point that Clausewitz is totally passé as a valid guide to modern strategic operations, much less so for guerilla operations - and virtually nil as a useful guide or winning the peace. Melton's use of historical examples is exceptionally clear, concise, and highly potent to his general argument to dismiss Clausewitz as a valid guide for strategic operations. Melton literally destroys such worn out stale notions of center of gravity, military genius, decisive battle - just to name a few of the archaic, decayed Clausewitzian bones that still rattle around in today's in the skulls of military thinking.

However, let's not throw out ALL of Clausewitz with the bath water just yet. Albeit what Melton proffers is highly potent, there is still much more to discuss as to what pieces of the Clausewitzian mantras are still valid timeless elements in understanding insights beyond strategic operations but rather into the broader phenomenon of war - e.g. war as a political policy tool. In summary, we should hope that Melton's work here is just the tip of the iceberg - and we should expect much more from him in the future. Melton should be mandatory reading and discussion material at all Staff and War Colleges thoughout the western world.

I waited months for this book to be released, shipped and delivered - and IT WAS WORTH THE WAIT!! You don't have to agree with Melton's views - but at least you will obtain some honest original thinking that does NOT conform to the tired, old, stale military mantras. As a senior officer of 28+ years, I honestly believe we are at a serious inflection point within the US military. We need to thoroughly re-evaluate our public military doctrines and our strategic perspectives - and even more so, what our hidden paradigms are. Thinking determines behavior - individually as well as institutionally. Melton makes an honest attempt to provide true original thinking in what has become an otherwise droll, redundant military genre of decreasing value due to a severe shortage of originality. I am purposely NOT providing an opinionated regurgitation of Melton's material - you can get that anywhere. Read Melton for yourself - make your own opinions. I am simply claiming that there are precious few original military thinkers out there - and Melton appears to be an honest one. So if you tend to not only read but reflect as well, then I strongly recommend this book to all military "thinkers".

The authors' objection is really against the "neo-cons" that is where it should be directed not against Carl von Clausewitz. It is like blaming a poorly designed bridge on the use of calculus.

Gen. Eisenhower was a student of Clausewitz and was, of course, influential on WWII strategy, and guided the US thru the Cold War. Col. Harry Summers book "On Strategy" applies the principles of Clausewitz to the US strategic failure in Vietnam.

Clausewitz would not necessarily have agreed with intervening in Iraq. The principle of "center of gravity" may apply here i.e. it was not Bagdad, but south-western Pakistan, and that is what should have been confronted, one might argue, in the threat (War on terror) from the Middle East.

US Army did not "bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz", and "screw up" and cause a US defeat.

For a history of "On War" in the US here is a link; [...]

U.S. Army was overwhelming successful in the first Gulf War, overwhelming successful in the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein thru aggressive use of force. And overwhelming successful in ousting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore the doctrine that was developed after Vietnam has not "failed in every real-life test of our day" at all. Gen. Shinseki advocated overwhelming force in our occupation of Iraq. One can't say that Clausewitz would have disagreed with this. It was the US political leadership that disagreed with that.

Obviously the use of AirLand Battle doctrine is not the right 'tool' in our occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. Petraeus and Gen. McChrystal have developed counter-insurgency tactics that will hopefully prove to be successful, and with a few other factors result in achieving US objectives in a very difficult situation in the Mid-East.

Stephan Melton offers fascinating insights into a key lesson unlearned over the American military's 200 year existence. In his book "The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars and Afghanistan (A Way Forward)", he examines how America learned, perfected, and then forgot the core competency of governing occupied territory.

Melton's provides the reader with the background on how a relatively unknown, 19th Century Prussian staff officer was thrust to the forefront of American military thinking in the 1970s. Later on in the book, he also puts Clausewitzian thought into historical perspective. In Clausewitz' mind, warfare was an extension of politics. A nation would use their military merely to force the opponent to accept your actions. The concept of using military action to dethrone a divinely appointed monarch would have serious repercussions on the entire monarchial system across the continent.

The author also provides a statistical analysis of the casualty levels that must be incurred before new policies imposed by warfare would be accepted by the society. Melton uses historic case studies to reinforce the theory of the casualty levels. He finishes his analysis by examining the effects of the American aversion to minimize "collateral" damage within this theoretical framework.

Melton uses the terms "Strategic Offense" and "Strategic Defense" to describe national military strategies. He describes the predominant Cold War strategy as being an example of "Strategic Defense," because all of the war plans focused on restoring the national borders to the status quo. Conquering another nation and deposing its leader would be an example of "Strategic Offence." Melton proposes that post World War II American strategy has always been focused on "Strategic Defense", and we have lost the competencies necessary for successful "Strategic Offense" campaigns required in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Melton concedes that America is experiencing limited tactical success due to individual initiative. However, this is more by luck than by design. Melton finishes his book with thoughts on how America can remove the element of luck, and make this a core competency once again. The only aspect Melton does not examine are the political effects of professional military courses that teach officers how to plan the governance of other nations once we have conquered them. Maybe this is one of the key reasons the courses were dropped from the military curriculum in 1947.

This was an absolutely fascinating book. I highly recommend it for any military officer or State Department member involved in operational planning.

Steve Melton has written a must read primer backed with the empirical evidence, to establish a framework of thought required for future strategic, operational and tactical doctrine. Melton's central theme is modern wars are not primarily about armies or campaigns, but rather about establishing long term peace. To enable a permanent peace, doctrine must address not only the type of military campaign to be waged, the chances for success but more importantly, the requirements for establishing governance on an population that may not desire the US military's occupation of their lands.

Melton calls into question the US Armies infatuation with Clausewitzian theory that focuses on centers of gravity and decisive battles. Although Clausewitz is relevant with regards to limited wars, as Melton points out, Clausewitz fails to address offensive wars whose primary aim is the removal of an existing regime by an invading power or the extent to which occupied populaces will fight an insurgency in order to maintain the status quo. Clausewitz never addresses the central issue of governance, the very heart of a lasting and permanent peace. All of this begs the question of the US military's infatuation with Clausewitz's theory in developing the current full spectrum operations doctrine.

Melton relies on various case studies with specific attention paid to the demographics of a country and the number of casualties, especially among the military aged males of a society, through death, disease or starvation that would force a country to submit or surrender to an attacker. One of the key points Melton makes is as long as the demographics will allow an occupied country to defend itself or wage an insurgency, governance or a permanent peace are not possible.

Melton then goes on to point out the short comings in the current US doctrine and the US Armies in trepidation with governance and nation building. Melton points out rather convincingly, that the greatest success of the US military, World War II, the military properly planned, resourced, and organized units, capable of military governance as a means to ensure a permanent peace. Melton constantly refers to the US Armies Doctrinal Manual FM 27-5 Military Governance, which was last published in 1947, as both a workable framework for current governance issues as well as the Militaries desire to not only update this manual, but its reluctance to even address the role of military governance.

The Clausewitz Delusion is a must read for professional military officers and more specifically, for senior leaders who are in position to develop frameworks for future doctrine writers. Basing new doctrine on historically proven facts backed up with empirical data would seem to ensure that we don't send our valiant young military men and women into situations that they are neither prepared for or capable of succeeding. Melton has opened the debate on the future of current doctrine and strategy. I hope the military takes up the debate and develops the strategic, operational and tactical doctrine necessary for the future defense and security of this nation.

John Smooth did not even read the book and reviewd it based on the advertising blurb and Cork complains about the binding - what does that have to do with the author's writing?
I gave the book a 4-star review to off-set your ratings.