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Clausewitz's on War (Books That Changed the World)

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Professor Hew Strachan's Clausewitz's On War is a worthy companion to the "Books that changed the world" series. His biography of Clausewitz and his magnum opus describe well the complexity and evolution that existed/developed in both author and work through the Napoleonic wars and up to Clausewitz's death in 1831.

Professor Strachan is of course the author of the current standard work on the First World War and his obvious effort to comb through and digest a work like On War is impressive.

Clausewitz attempted to accomplish two very ambitious goals in On War, the first was to write an art of war for his own epoch, and the second was to construct a general theory of war which would be able to cover all wars. This lends a certain duality to the work and promotes analysis from at least two distinct perspectives. The problem is of course that some parts are more heavily influenced by the Napoleonic art of war theme and others by the general theory of war theme. Parts of the Napoleonic art of war theme are still applicable today, but one must of course take Clausewitz as a man of his times who was writing to an audience of that time, not to us today. In normal historical works it is up to the reader to judge what is still relevant, but with Clausewitz this becomes even more difficult since the general theory comes also into play and has to be judged on its own merit. .

Strachan has attempted to do justice to both themes and in addition take on the necessary topics of the difficulty of translation from the original early 19th Century German and the book's unfinished condition. Overall I think the historian's view predominates which is to be expected. My only point in this regard is that if a great theorist (instead of a great historian) had written this book it would have been different, not necessarily better, but different.

Several points that really stand out for me:

First, the concept of "absolute war" can be seen as a Weberian ideal type, or as something "complete in itself" that "belonged in the real world" (page 148). This second concept sees war as a separate entity, that is no longer subordinate to politics but reacting to its own laws, possessing its own "Geist". That is capable of becoming in effect autonomous, like the Thirty Years War, a social phenomena propelled by ever increasing levels of hatred fuelled by seemingly limitless and lawless violence, The total destruction of a resisting society/community.

Second, the influence of Clausewitz on the course of the First World War has been hotly debated since the 1920s. Strachan argues that Clausewitz was saying that should the initial campaign fail, a war of attrition is called for, but I can't help but see this more in terms of war's reciprocity, that is Clausewitz arguing the defense, attrition being a means in which the defence gains time, preserves itself and attains its "negative purpose" by various ways. One must also remember that Clausewitz writes that, "One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place, but had merely been offered. In that case, it will be argued, the strategic planning of these engagements, rather than the tactical decision, should be considered the operative principle." (Book 6, ch 8). For the mature Clausewitz, the theorist, the political purpose would dictate whether the war should continue after the culmination point had been reached. For Clausewitz, the patriot of 1807 war was more the means of retaining his country's lost honor and independence. Strachen notes that it was this Clausewitz who inspired the Nazis, but his political writings and Book 6, Ch 26 (The People in Arms) would also inspire any national liberation movement fighting a foreign occupation.

Strachan concludes his chapter "The Nature of War" with, "Those who blamed Clausewitz for the slaughter of the First World War were not guilty of finding things in the text of On War that were not there", which of course leaves the actual question of influence open. That question in my mind concerns more how Clausewitz was posthumously interpreted by Moltke; Schlieffen, Goltz, and others.

Third, Strachan describes Clausewitz's concept of theory well, "The role of theory was to elucidate events, and so reason alone was insufficient. Detailed military history s required to evaluate an understanding of the true nature of war . . . Theory has to be concrete and circumstantial, not dogmatic and prescriptive. (page 41).

Finally, Strachan makes very important points concerning the relationships between "tactics" and "strategy" and "politics/policy" and "war". By avoiding the intermediate concept of "operations" as existing between tactics and strategy, a conscious decision of Clausewitz's according the Strachan, he was able to avoid "an obstacle to conceptual clarity" (page 110). Also in regards to the two ways that the German Politik can be translated into English, Strachan points out that in On War Clausewitz deals with policy as representing all the interests of the political community (Bk 8 Ch 6B), but also in his analysis of the campaigns of 1814 and 1815, saw French party politics as having a negative influence on Napoleon's decisions (pp 164-5). In other words in strategic theory terms war's subordination to politics can be either rational and "subjective" as in policy, or irrational (in terms of military force being an instrument) and "objective" as in politics. This is important to keep in mind when considering Clausewitz's continued relevance, since we can see the collapse of the publically proclaimed policy goals in the current Iraq war as being replaced by domestic US political considerations and interests (party politics and their associated investors).

Some points that Strachan makes I find stimulating in that they invite discussion. For instance he criticises Clausewitz on his handling of logistics, arguing that Clausewitz believed "that war had been liberated from logistics . . . Book 5 treated the 1812 campaign in Russia, a country too backward to sustain a large army by requisitioning, as exceptional, whereas in Book 6, on defence, took the same campaign as characteristic. This was a contradiction which he never reconciled . . . Clausewitz's determination to set strategy free from its logistical constraints was reflected in German planning in 1914 and in 1941, with terrible consequences" (page 122).

Napoleon had been able to use requisition to supply his armies, which is Clausewitz's point, that being that this ideal type of warfare had achieved this, but this was not something that could be assumed in the future, since it had not always been that way in the past. Strachan mentions 1914, but not 1940 where the German Army was able to cover even greater distances in the West and defeat the allies whereas logistics had been one of the reasons for the lack of German success in the West in 1914. As to Russia being an "exception" in terms of logistics, there is a reason for this, as Clausewitz writes, "It is rare after all, for an army of 300,000 men to advance for 650 miles on practically a single road, to do it in countries such as Poland and Russia, and just before the harvest" (book 5, ch 14). In fact such a feat doesn't come up again until 1941 (Russian-gauge rail lines having replaced single roads), if one discounts the German advance into revolutionary Russia in 1918. Strachan's "contradiction" doesn't seem like a contradiction at all, but rather a switch in emphasis, for logistics Russia is an exception since "Russia is not a country that can be formally conquered . . . Only internal weakness, only the workings of disunity can bring a country like that kind to ruin." (Book 8, ch 9). So instead of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Lenin in a sealed train in 1917 would be the Clausewitzian method of dealing with Russia as an enemy. It is this very strong defensive status that Russia enjoys that allows for such analytical diversity and leads various elements/means/methods of defense characterised by the campaign of 1812 to be "characteristic". Also Clausewitz repeatedly mentions that it was Napoleon's failure to prevent the wastetage of his army on the advance (that would include logistics) that led mostly to his failure in Russia (Bk 3, Ch 12, Bk 5 Ch 14). Linking Clausewitz to 1941 is dubious in my view given what should have been seen as a flashing red light in regards to defeating Russia in a single campaign through exclusively military means.

Something I did find a bit of a disappointment was Strachan's handling of Clasusewitz's concept of the balance of power (pp 164-5 and in On War, Bk 6 Ch 6). He provides no analysis of the situation in August 1914 from this perspective, and what better historian to do so than Hew Strachan?

One point needs to be kept in mind throughout, when reading Hew Strachan's great biography, or Michael Howard's Clausewitz - A Very Short Introduction (which I also recommend) or On War. As Herbert Rosinski wrote in the 1930s:

"Clausewitz grasped the idea of war as a coherent, continuous whole, directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy's power of resistance. This brilliant inspiration transformed his investigation from the naive brilliance of his earlier studies into the philosophical profundity of his mature work. Yet this very conception of the "military act" as a continuous, coherent whole - the truth of which he found confirmed by the concrete example of Napoleonic strategy, but which he did not deduce from it - was to lead him into a perplexity that later military thought completely ignored and that forced him in the last resort to emancipate his theory from the "Napoleonic " model altogether.

"For Clausewitz never forgot that this coherent form of strategy directed to the overthrow of the enemy's power of resistance, although it formed the realization of the "innermost nature" of war as an "act of violence," was by no means universal to war; it represented, on the contrary, a highly complex from of warfare, dependent for its realization on a number of presuppositions, which had been found combined only on very rare occasions in the course of military history. He believed in the essential superiority of that form of mobile, decisive warfare reintroduced by Napoleon; but he never lost sight of the fact that the indispensable conditions for it might again some day no longer exist, less rational forms of warfare besides the ideal"Napoleonic" type . . . and to set in its stead an infinately wider and more elastic theory, capable of embracing every conceivable form of war or strategy."

The German Army, 1966 Edition, pp 110-111.

The book primarily covers three subjects in a manner interspersed throughout the book (as opposed to broken out into separate chapters explicitly). First and foremost a detailed analysis is Clausewitz's book itself. This is provided, in particular, to warfare in Clausewitz's time (i.e., French Revolutionary Wars, Napoleonic Wars) as well as to the period that most influenced Clausewitz (i.e., period from the War of the Austrian Succession to the Napoleonic Wars). This is of importance as Clausewitz's himself had stated that it is the most important period from which the relevant lessons can be learned due to their "modernity". Hew Strachan, the author, meticulously provides this through his research.

The author's analysis assumes that the reader already has a good knowledge of the geopolitical, military and diplomatic events of the time. For example, the battle of Jena's influence on Clausewitz is discussed but the author provides no background on the battle itself. Strachan, a Professor of History, assumes that the reader already has the requisite knowledge. This book is analogous to a lectures being given to upper-level undergraduates in history or international relations. The assumption regarding the reader's historical background is made by the author not only about the battle of Jena but other battles and events of the time (i.e., Battle of Leipzig, Napoleon's military and geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Allies in the 1813-1814 period, etc.).

The second function of the book is to provide a bibliography of Clausewitz. This is natural, as an understanding of the author's life as well as the events surrounding it, provide valuable perspective as to Clausewitz's work. Over and above this, however, Hew Strachan has done meticulous research on Clausewitz's other works (primarily short papers and his career as an instructor at Prussia's war college).

Thirdly, Strachan's book discusses the implications of Clausewitz's "On War" on later military, diplomatic and geopolitical thinking. He provides examples such as the differences in military and diplomatic thought between Moltke (the elder, not junior) and Bismarck, Liddell Hart's critique of Clausewitz as it applied to military strategy in WWI and the differences, in the U.S., between Weinberger and Collin Powell in terms of the applicability of military. Again, as in the other parts of book, the author does not provide even a brief history of these characters or their times. Strachan assumes that the reader is already familiar (or at the very least aware) of these. This is definitely not a book written for Sarah Pallin.

With respect to the audio book's specific qualities, due to the fact that the author is eloquent, never monotone and always enthusiastic, it makes for good listening. Strachan has also read the book and his lecture style is very similar to Simon Winchester (not surprising considering they both have had significant experience as Professors).

Book came in great condition and quickly. Strachan is an accomplished historian, and does a great job on Clausewitz. Many comparisons are made to later conflicts as well, citing possible reasons wars were fought the way they were. If you are a Strachan fan, be sure to read The First World War.

Never having read Clausewitz before, this scholarly book ties Clausewitz's books all together and puts them in context. Next challenge is reading Clausewitz himself. Most personally interesting observation is when Clausewitz states that war begins with defence. Strachan goes on to state that the offenseive does not lead to war unless the side which is attacked responds. Hence, what if you gave a war and no one came? Strachan concludes with the American Revolution being a terrorist sort of war which set the stage for current "wars on terror". One wonders, were Clausewitz alive today, what sort of general conclusions he would draw on fighting a terrorist war...or perhaps on not fighting at all.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) rose to major general and fought Napoleon, but never reached a high command. He never had a command of his own but served mostly in a staff capacity, distinguishing himself through his sound advice and bravery in combat. He was shy and sensitive by nature, and he often kept his ideas to himself.

Clausewitz was captured on October 14 of 1806 when Napoleon invaded Prussia and defeated the Prussian-Saxon army. At the age of twenty-six years, became one of the 25,000 prisoners captured that day as the Prussian army disintegrated. After his release, he was opposed to Prussia's enforced alliance to Napoleon, and he left the Prussian army to serve in the Russian army from 1812 to 1813. In the service of the Russian Empire, Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen (1812), which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom that ultimately defeated Napoleon I of France and his allies.

Clausewitz spent the latter part of his life writing and rewriting his massive work, Vom Kriege (On War), which remained unfinished and was published posthumously by his widow in 1832. Few paid attention to him or his work until Prussia's astonishing victory over France in 1870.

Although Clausewitz participated in many military campaigns, he was primarily a military theorist interested in the examination of war. Drawing on the experiences of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, Clausewitz tried to isolate the factors that decide success in war. His conclusions have remained generally applicable, and since his work contains a minimum of technical discussion, it has retained a wide appeal. Clausewitz produced no system of strategy, thus breaking with the more rigid and mechanistic concepts of his predecessors. Instead, he emphasized the importance of psychological factors that elude exact calculation.

Clausewitz's On War has been blamed for the unprecedented death tolls in the First and Second World Wars, but this accusation has often been debated by historians. On War is required reading at military academies to this day, and Powell often carried a copy around with him.

This is not a book about the future of war, but this is how it is read. He is not consistent in what he says. He often contradicts himself. For example, what Clausewitz declares in book 1, he discounts in book 8. This is a work in progress, left unfinished due to his untimely death in a cholera outbreak in 1831.

Here are some of his concepts I found interesting:

The State should be viewed as an ideology and value, not as a geographic entity. This concept was new and went against 1800's thought.

Peace is the result of war. Peace is the moral aim of any war.

Napoleon was a genius. He was drunk with victory, and this state of mind led him to more victories. He called Napoleon of 1815 a gambler, gambling his way to victory.

Historians invent history.

War is nothing else than fighting. As mentioned above, Clausewitz barely mentions tactics.

Feeding the troops is of secondary importance; there are more pressing problems facing a general.

War is not impossible for a weaker army; being superior in number is not a rule.

War advocates killing for killing's sake.

Future wars will be a struggle of life and death.

Not all wars escalate.

Defensive warfare, he argued, is both militarily and politically the stronger position. A defense army is stronger but with a weaker aim; while an offensive army is weaker but with a stronger aim.

Time is on the side of the defender; aggressors can only lose time.

Expect nothing from the generosity of another. This is as true in war as between individuals!

Allies eventually go to the defender's side to keep the balance of power in check. This happened during World War I and II. Will this now happen against the US, as it expands its influence in the Middle East?

The result of war is never final, inviting more hostilities as time goes by.

In maintaining that "war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with the admixture of different means," he denied that war is an end in itself.

The phrase fog of war derives from Clausewitz's stress on how confused warfare can seem while one is immersed within it.

Though generals often proclaim wars must end in absolute victory, Clausewitz asserted that in the real world annihilating the enemy is rarely possible and often a bad idea.

He advocated the concept of total war, in which all of the enemy's territory, property, and citizens are attacked. This assertion is what led some historians to blame Clausewitz for the mass death tolls during World War I and II.

He stated that strategy should aim at three main targets: the enemy's forces, his resources, and his will to fight.

Wars are essentially unpredictable.

One of Clausewitz's most famous lines is that "War is merely a continuation of politics," ("Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln"). While accurate, some historians believe that it was not intended as a statement of fact.


Some historians assume that with the passing of cavalry and Communism, Clausewitz is passé. Others claim that nuclear proliferation makes Clausewitzian concepts obsolescent. However, no two nuclear powers have ever used their nuclear weapons against each other, instead using conventional means to settle disputes. If, hypothetically, such a conflict did occur, both combatants would be effectively annihilated. Therefore, the beginning of the 21st century has found many instances of state armies attempting to suppress terrorism and bloody feuds whilst using conventional weaponry. This makes Clausewitz's On War still relevant today, and for this very reason it is still widely read and quoted today. For example, in Lawrence of Arabia (1962), General Allenby (Jack Hawkins) contends to T.E. Lawrence (Peter O'Toole) that "I fight like Clausewitz, you fight like Saxe." To which Lawrence replies, "We should do very well indeed, shouldn't we?" In the film Crimson Tide, the naval officers of the nuclear submarine have a discussion about the meaning of the quote "War is a continuation of politics by other means." The executive officer (played by Denzel Washington) contends that the captain (played by Gene Hackman) has taken a too simplistic reading of von Clausewitz.

I found this book a little hard to digest, and because Clausewitz was contradictory in nature, the book was hard to follow. This book might not be enjoyable to most readers with no background in military strategy. It is certainly not a book to read at bedtime. This is a book you should read in a study environment with pen and paper in hand, taking notes and discussing the concepts with your fellow readers. This book actually makes a great reading in a book club gathering.

The book arrived quickly & in first rate condition. It is an excellent book and the seller is first class!