Customer Reviews

Closing With the Enemy: How Gis Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Modern War Studies)

5 star:		(9)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Doubler takes the evidence for American combat effectiveness and presents it in a clear, convincing style -- the best that I've seen so far at showing how effective the GI was when fighting in Europe during WWII. There's no obvious axe to grind, but the author does make it a point to demonstrate the essential elements of training, leadership, and innovation that makes for tactical success. Sometimes they worked well together, sometimes not.

I especially liked how the author devoted a chapter to each "problem" encountered by the GI in Europe: hedgerows, towns, cities, forests, and bunkers all required different skills and approaches. Doubler shows how the Americans learned the hard lessons, then as they became more proficient, they managed to gain experience without having to pay so much in blood. The reader also gains an appreciation for the evolution of an army in combat.

Doubler's work will appeal both to specialist and general reader. You don't have to be a military type to understand and enjoy. He explained well his peculiar terms and working definitions.

The only weakness (what kept it from 5 stars in my rating) is that the view is limited to tactics. A chapter or some other kind of elaboration on operational level issues, which invariably influenced tactical actions would have made this a more complete study. Despite that, highly recommended.

This book is interesting on two levels. It describes many of the tactical lessons learned by the US Army in Northwest Europe in 1944-45. It also provides enlightenment on the various ways these lesson were promulgated throughout the combat units, both formally and informally, during this period. It may be rather dry reading for the casual reader looking for good war stories; but as a fairly avid military history buff, I found much of this book fascinating and educational.

This is not a personal WW II story, though it's peppered with specifics on several campaigns. It gives a birds eye view of the practical lessons learned from each of the major battles in the ETO. Often it swoops in to details too. There are excellent explanations of the triangle organization, Division Strategy, Tank / Infantry integration, Airpower/infantry development. There's a good section at the end comparing US, German, and Soviet methods of strategy and learning. Read this before you dive into any other WW II books. It explains what many authors take for granted. Great reading too!

This is a highly informative book. Col. Doubler basically analyzes the obstacles faced by the GI's in the ETO and how they overcame them; bocage, fortifications, urban warfare, river crossings, the massacre in the Hurtgen Forest, the defense as used in the Ardennes and how the GIs made effective use of air support. Doubler states the possible problems, the possible doctrine the Army had at the time and how the GIs eventually found a solution.
His focus in this case is the American Army from June 6 1944 to May 8, 1945, the lessons learned in North Africa and Italy are dealt with only summarily, but Doubler's focus is on the ETO. He calls into question some of Russell Weigley's conclusions which he published in Eisenhower's Lieutenants, as well as Martin VanCreveld's opinions of Fighting Power. The GIs were adaptable and quick learners. They were much tougher than believed, and could improvise much better than the British or the Germans. If the enemy came upon a problem not covered by their manuals, they were usually helpless, not so the Americans.
The problem with the book is that each chapter reads like an article for a professional military man's magazine. His writing style is quite dry, so you won't get through this as you would say, like Stephen Ambrose or Peter Mansoor.

Still, an essential book on the GIs in Europe. Definitely worth the effort and time to read it.

This book is a superior work and is invaluable to the military professional interested in small unit tactics. COL Doubler has assembled exhaustive detail and provides a masterful analysis of the small unit tactics employed by the German Army and US Army in late WWII. He does so in a manner that is both easy to read and easy to extract: each chapter examines a specific tactical problem or environment. Read the whole thing and use it as a reference later. Military Historians will love it for the detail, but Military Professionals should read this book if they want to see a systematic discussion not only of WHAT the soldiers did, but why they did it that way and how it turned out. If you are an American Soldier add this book to your reading list: much of what you are taught is not tactics, but battle drills. Read this book and see how an earlier generation confronted seemingly insurmountable problems and solved them by thinking for themselves.

This book fills a real need. Most histories can tell you where and why Bradley, Patton, and so forth did well or ill. Personal memoirs tell about events as one man saw them, but not much about how the guys were trying to act as a team in battle. This book explains how regiments, companies and platoons fought in a variety of conditions, hedgerows, forests, and mountains. It also shows the inititive displayed at all ranks down to private to solve problems. It can only increase your appreciation of "The Greatest Generation" and is a corrective to accounts depreciating the qualities of US infantry.

This book is for those who seriously study the subject of World War II. The subject focuses on the tactical rather than the strategic element of the battle. The American soldier was strenuously trained for the Normandy Invasion, but was unprepared for what was to come in the following months of the war. What was in America's favor was an army made up of innovative citizen soldiers with the keen ability to adapt quickly under fire and in the midst of battle with new ways to close with the enemy. Doubler goes to show that the war really belonged to the dogface, the Captains and Lieutenants on the front line. I highly recommend this book.

Doubler deftly explains the sometimes painful learning process of soldiers in war. "Closing With The Enemy" compares pre-War US Army doctrine with practical experience and knowledge learned on the battlefield. Examples of the types of operations outlined in the book include fighting in the Norman bocage, river assaults, and breaching the West Wall (Sigfried Line). This book is a must for anyone wanting to know the "how" behind WWII combat as protrayed in "Saving Private Ryan."

Michael Doubler gives military historians an excellent analysis of why American troops during the last year of the war developed the tactics that they did. From the dreaded Bocage to the gritty street fighting, he shows why the boys did what they did.

Michael Doubler argues that the US Army in World War II was more effective than it is often portrayed. After learning some basics in North Africa and Italy, the Army developed true combined arms tactics starting in Normandy, and due to the Army's decentralized nature, successful ideas spread throughout the whole organization. Hedgerow assault tactics developed in several divisions in Normandy and quickly spread throughout the whole army, allowing the Allies to break the deadlock. Close air support techniques as effective as any of the war were pioneered by IX TAC. Tactics for assaulting fortifications and crossing rivers developed contrary to doctrine, as doctrine was seen more as a rough guideline rather than something to be strictly followed. The book is well written and difficult to put down at times, giving an excellent discussion of tactics and tactical development. The author makes his case as convincing as it perhaps can be made. This is why the book deserves 5 stars. Nevertheless, the book has some flaws and should be read only along with other viewpoints. Despite admitting to serious errors with the replacement system, supply, and operations, it seems that the author views the army through rose colored glasses, perhaps because he looks at the low levels of command. The high command was another matter. Except for tank destroyers, the book gives little insight into the flawed concepts of Leslie McNair and their effect on weaponry and tactics. McNair's ideas caused the inferiority of American tanks during the war, a topic not even touched on in the book. In fact, although the book gives a very good treatment of the infantry, the armored divisions are neglected, and I was left wanting more detail on the artillery. Overall, this book would be a valuable addition to your collection, but it should be read along with viewpoints to get a broader view.