"Cobra II" provides a detailed accounting of the planning and execution of the Iraq War. The heroism and bravery of American troops under fire was well-documented and moving; unfortunately, there was also much to report about many at the top - how their incompetence and arrogance bungled the handling of post-war Iraq, has thrown the entire outcome into chaos, and has cost innumerable lives.
Bush II, prior to his election, signaled that he wanted to overhaul the U.S. military - Gulf I had taken too long to plan and execute. Bush also did not see the need for lengthy peacekeeping and nation-building, such as the U.S. had undertaken in the Balkans. These viewpoints were presumably major factors in selecting Donald Rumsfeld, who shared them, as Secretary of Defense.
From the very beginning military leaders recommended close to 500,000 troops for Iraq, especially for the post-war phase. Rumsfeld, showing irritation at the first presentation of such a plan, was asked by Chief of Staff "How many did he thought might be needed?" Rumsfeld's reply was 125,000, "and even that was probably too many." The military's plan reflected long-standing military principles about force levels needed to defeat Iraq, control a population greater than 24 million, and secure a nation that size of California, with porous borders. Rumsfeld's numbers, in contrast, seemed to be pulled out of thin air.
Many planning iterations and about 1.5 years later, the U.S. attacked Iraq with the number of troops Rumsfeld initially fixed on. The U.S., however, was not alone in making major miscalculations. Saddam's top priority was internal threats and Iran - the U.S. was a distant third. According to Saddam, the Republican Guard had stopped the U.S.-led forces at the Euphrates in Gulf I, and his plan was to do it again. Saddam also believed that it was the threat of chemical weapons that kept the U.S. from marching on Baghdad. Opponents dared not raise their hands. Shiite troops (the most disposable, to Saddam) were located on the front lines, far from Baghdad, where the risk of them revolting was minimal. Further, unit commanders were prohibited from talking to each other lest they plot a revolt. Leadership posts were assigned on the basis of loyalty - especially to relatives. Each village, town, and city would become a semi-independent citadel with Fedayeen units drawing on caches of light weapons guarded by Baathists. The stockpiling of weapons and ammunition was not detected by American spy satellites.
General Tommy Franks, U.S. Commander, initially assumed that the State Department would handle post-war Iraq. Only just prior to hostilities was this clarified and given to DOD. Regardless, civilian leaders planned to emulate their successes in Afghanistan, despite Army leaders pointing out that Iraq was much more densely populated and therefore difficult to control. Other major (erroneous) assumptions were that many Iraqi units would surrender and switch sides - providing manpower with which to maintain order after the invasion, that the U.S. would be greeted with flowers, and that civilian institutions would readily resume their regular functions with but a few U.S. advisors. (Planners forgot that destroying communications - key to quickly taking over - would also greatly hinder post-war operation.) Initial planning was for $1 billion/year for three years of reconstruction, aided by Iraqi oil revenues. DOD also balked at a planned $38 million for post-war security (later revised to $1 billion). As for the Iraqi police, the CIA assessment was that they were apolitical and well-trained (reality was they were largely poorly-trained, unreliable traffic cops, and hated by the populace). Finally, U.N. assistance was NOT welcome (they were incompetent); later events brought a reversal in this position, but by then word of problems was spreading around the world. Thus, the U.S. plan to leave within six months and have a British, Polish, and Muslim (largely led by Saudi-Arabia) division each, augmented by constabularies from numerous nations never got off the ground.
Much of "Cobra II" is taken up with detailed descriptions of fighting at the small-unit level, with numerous stories of incredible bravery.
Heavy bombing did provide relief for tactical operations, but failed to take out top Saddam leaders - the execution was always precise, but the intelligence flawed. Special Forces and CIA operatives were of little/no value in Iraq - they had not been in the country prior to the attack (such as in Afghanistan), and helicopters were often sidelined by dust.
The main opposition came not from Republican Guards but fierce Fedayeen in civilian clothes, as well as foreign guerillas. One U.S. commander was almost relieved for remarking to the press that the opposition was not like what had been trained for.
Side problems included keeping Kurds from taking over territory with their armed bands (likely to provoke a reaction in Turkey), and Chalabi's army of unarmed 570 exiles (played no role).
Between the poor pre-war state of Iraq's infrastructure, U.S. damage, and looting, society deteriorated after the invasion. Sewage, water, garbage, gasoline availability, telephones, and electricity all suffered. Iraqi's could not believe that a nation that had sent a man to the moon could fail - it must be that we didn't care. Meanwhile, without either electricity or functioning TV facilities, the U.S. could not communicate with the Iraqis.
The initial post-war occupation did not go well - lack of money, Iraqi staffing, or adequate U.S. troops resulted in massive looting and infrastructure problems. Gen. Garner was soon replaced by Paul Bremer - lacking Mid-East or reconstruction experience (considered assets by some). His first decree was a tough de-Baathification (decapitating much of the nation's skilled leadership), and his second was disbanding the Iraqi army - creating major dissension and failing to make use of their potential for stabilization. (Acerbated Rumsfeld's decision to short-staff U.S. military, which Bremer had protested.)
Bottom-Line: The future of Iraq is in doubt; however, there can be no doubt as to the heroism is American forces and the incompetence of some of their leaders.
