Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq [Paperback]

Michael R. Gordon (Author), Bernard E. Trainor (Author)

Book Description

Release date: February 27, 2007

Written by the chief military correspondent of the New York Times and a prominent retired Marine general, this is the definitive account of the invasion of Iraq.A stunning work of investigative journalism, Cobra II describes in riveting detail how the American rush to Baghdad provided the opportunity for the virulent insurgency that followed. As Gordon and Trainor show, the brutal aftermath was not inevitable and was a surprise to the generals on both sides. Based on access to unseen documents and exclusive interviews with the men and women at the heart of the war, Cobra II provides firsthand accounts of the fighting on the ground and the high-level planning behind the scenes. Now with a new afterword that addresses what transpired after the fateful events of the summer of 2003, this is a peerless re-creation and analysis of the central event of our times.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

On one level, narrator Wasson's mostly neutral delivery is apt. The authors' dispassionate prose imparts their impeccably researched story of the 2003 Iraq invasion—from concept to insurgency. Sourced at the highest levels, Cobra II captures the fog of war and war planning. But Wasson's read too often feels routine, as if recounting a local board meeting. Because he renders the numerous players and backdrops with equal tones, differentiating between them can be a challenge. This style of narration creates an anti-tension when juxtaposed with the book's revelations that an invasion plan was being formed not long after September 11, despite administration denials. Strictly supervising the plan was defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was intent on transforming the military into a lighter, leaner force. False assumptions, faulty intelligence, willful ignorance, personal politics and a lack of foresight all fed into the invasion strategy and subsequent messy outcome. During the audiobook's second half, which documents the march to Baghdad and enemy engagements, Wasson's energy picks up and he paints some impressive scenes of war. But in the end, a more vibrant read would have better complemented the significance of this penetrating work. Gordon reads the introduction and epilogue.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Review

“A work of prodigious research, Cobra II will likely become the benchmark by which other histories of the Iraq invasion are measured.”—The New York Times “Magisterial . . . With mountains of fresh detail on the war’s planning and progress with judicious analysis, Cobra II . . . will be hard to improve upon.” —The Economist“Stands as the best account of the war to dateÉoffers an instructive lesson on the consequences of inadequate strategic planning.”—The Washington Post Book World“ExcellentÉ Cobra II is everything that the Bush administration's plan for the war was not. It is meticulously organized, shuns bluff and bombast for lapidary statements, and is largely impervious to attack.”—The New York Times Book Review“RemarkableÉ a classic military history of the blow-by-blow fighting to Baghdad. Cobra II makes an irrefutable case for where the laurels lay for the victors and where the blame lies for the defeats.”—The Portland Oregonian

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Product Details

• Paperback: 784 pages
• Publisher: Vintage (February 27, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1400075394
• ISBN-13: 978-1400075393
• Product Dimensions: 5.2 x 1.6 x 8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.5 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (108 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #222,778 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

227 of 249 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars A sure fire bestseller March 14, 2006

By Robert Busko TOP 1000 REVIEWERVINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover

I must say that having almost completed Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq that I'm relieved by the fairness of the book. While it does point up an abundant list of mistakes in judgement by those at the highest levels of the command structure, it also makes clear that war is a foggy business at best. It is my opinion only that Cobra II avoids the pitfalls and traps by staying as impartial as possible. I found no axex being ground for either the right or the left.

I am also impressed by the degree of access to materials that Gordon must have had access to. I know that the prepub releases mentioned that Gordon had unprecedented access to both reports and personnel in researching this book. That is even more apparent as you read through the content. Gordon, who is chief military correspondent for the New York Times does a masterful job of telling the story of the Iraq War. Retired General Trainor, a Marines Marine, lends his insight and expertise and I'm sure made sure that Gordon stayed on task.

All together, Cobra II is a masterful book, written by two experienced individuals....experts in their respective fields. I think you will feel informed in a way that perhaps you haven't felt in the past after reading this book. You'll want to read this one.

186 of 206 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Eye opnening March 18, 2006

By J. A Magill VINE™ VOICE

Format:Hardcover

When it comes to writing a book about the inner workings of the war plan in Iraq and its execution, one can hardly think of a better suited team than Michael Gordon, the chief military correspondent for the NY Times and General Bernard Trainor, formerly of the Marines and now a noted academic. This teams first work, a history of the first Gulf War, is the definitive work on the subject. With unparalleled sources and careful analysis, these two men bring the readers a front seat view of the Iraq War. What they find, to put it bluntly, is not pretty.

Far from a well coordinated strategy, their work paints a portrait of a war plan almost entirely driven by twin ideological beliefs, the first being that a military victory could be won by a small agile army of fewer than 100,000 men and the second that their would be no need for a long term American presence. The reason for the last belief, so tragically mistaken in retrospect, was the idea that the Iraqis would quickly and peacefully form a civil society and, to the degree it was needed the international community would pick up the slack. The holders of these two beliefs? Vice President Dick Cheney and Sec. Def. Rumsfeld, to whom President Bush gave full authority to run the war as they saw fit. As this work demonstrates with a shocking degree of detail, all those who opposed this world view found themselves sidelined in the lead up and the execution of the war.

Gordon and Trainor offer examples such as the State Department and Sec. Powell who warned the President, the VP, and the Sec. Def of the near certainty of a break down of civil society following the conflict. They were ignored. Military officers with experience in Bosnia and Haiti made raised similar warnings. They too were ignored.... Indeed, when military commanders on the ground in the race for Baghdad began to understand that the US faced a well planned and coordinated gorilla insurgency and requested the manpower and time to quell it, they were threatened with being pulled from command. Reading this work, one finds General Franks in well over his head, lacking the background to deal with the chaos that followed the war's end, nor willing to confront his bosses with problems on the ground.

While these authors do an impressive job keeping their analysis free of ideology, the work allows the reader only one conclusion, that the current gorilla war in Iraq was perhaps avoidable and certainly could have been less violent if the civilian leadership had taken the right steps at the beginning. These were not cases of hindsight being 20/20, but events predictable by experienced professionals that the President, the VP and the Sec Def chose to ignore. All of this begs at least one important question, which is why Don Rumsfield still has a desk at the Pentagon. Read more ›

54 of 59 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Detailed Accounting of Heroism and Incompetence March 20, 2006

By Loyd E. Eskildson HALL OF FAME

Format:Hardcover

"Cobra II" provides a detailed accounting of the planning and execution of the Iraq War. The heroism and bravery of American troops under fire was well-documented and moving; unfortunately, there was also much to report about many at the top - how their incompetence and arrogance bungled the handling of post-war Iraq, has thrown the entire outcome into chaos, and has cost innumerable lives.

Bush II, prior to his election, signaled that he wanted to overhaul the U.S. military - Gulf I had taken too long to plan and execute. Bush also did not see the need for lengthy peacekeeping and nation-building, such as the U.S. had undertaken in the Balkans. These viewpoints were presumably major factors in selecting Donald Rumsfeld, who shared them, as Secretary of Defense.

From the very beginning military leaders recommended close to 500,000 troops for Iraq, especially for the post-war phase. Rumsfeld, showing irritation at the first presentation of such a plan, was asked by Chief of Staff "How many did he thought might be needed?" Rumsfeld's reply was 125,000, "and even that was probably too many." The military's plan reflected long-standing military principles about force levels needed to defeat Iraq, control a population greater than 24 million, and secure a nation that size of California, with porous borders. Rumsfeld's numbers, in contrast, seemed to be pulled out of thin air.

Many planning iterations and about 1.5 years later, the U.S. attacked Iraq with the number of troops Rumsfeld initially fixed on. The U.S., however, was not alone in making major miscalculations. Saddam's top priority was internal threats and Iran - the U.S. was a distant third. According to Saddam, the Republican Guard had stopped the U.S....-led forces at the Euphrates in Gulf I, and his plan was to do it again. Saddam also believed that it was the threat of chemical weapons that kept the U.S. from marching on Baghdad. Opponents dared not raise their hands. Shiite troops (the most disposable, to Saddam) were located on the front lines, far from Baghdad, where the risk of them revolting was minimal. Further, unit commanders were prohibited from talking to each other lest they plot a revolt. Leadership posts were assigned on the basis of loyalty - especially to relatives. Each village, town, and city would become a semi-independent citadel with Fedayeen units drawing on caches of light weapons guarded by Baathists. The stockpiling of weapons and ammunition was not detected by American spy satellites.

General Tommy Franks, U.S. Commander, initially assumed that the State Department would handle post-war Iraq. Only just prior to hostilities was this clarified and given to DOD. Regardless, civilian leaders planned to emulate their successes in Afghanistan, despite Army leaders pointing out that Iraq was much more densely populated and therefore difficult to control. Other major (erroneous) assumptions were that many Iraqi units would surrender and switch sides - providing manpower with which to maintain order after the invasion, that the U.S. would be greeted with flowers, and that civilian institutions would readily resume their regular functions with but a few U.S. advisors. (Planners forgot that destroying communications - key to quickly taking over - would also greatly hinder post-war operation.) Initial planning was for $1 billion/year for three years of reconstruction, aided by Iraqi oil revenues. DOD also balked at a planned $38 million for post-war security (later revised to $1 billion). As for the Iraqi police, the CIA assessment was that they were apolitical and well-trained (reality was they were largely poorly-trained, unreliable traffic cops, and hated by the populace). Finally, U.N. assistance was NOT welcome (they were incompetent); later events brought a reversal in this position, but by then word of problems was spreading around the world. Thus, the U.S. plan to leave within six months and have a British, Polish, and Muslim (largely led by Saudi-Arabia) division each, augmented by constabularies from numerous nations never got off the ground.

Much of "Cobra II" is taken up with detailed descriptions of fighting at the small-unit level, with numerous stories of incredible bravery.

Heavy bombing did provide relief for tactical operations, but failed to take out top Saddam leaders - the execution was always precise, but the intelligence flawed. Special Forces and CIA operatives were of little/no value in Iraq - they had not been in the country prior to the attack (such as in Afghanistan), and helicopters were often sidelined by dust.

The main opposition came not from Republican Guards but fierce Fedayeen in civilian clothes, as well as foreign guerillas. One U.S. commander was almost relieved for remarking to the press that the opposition was not like what had been trained for.

Side problems included keeping Kurds from taking over territory with their armed bands (likely to provoke a reaction in Turkey), and Chalabi's army of unarmed 570 exiles (played no role).

Between the poor pre-war state of Iraq's infrastructure, U.S. damage, and looting, society deteriorated after the invasion. Sewage, water, garbage, gasoline availability, telephones, and electricity all suffered. Iraqi's could not believe that a nation that had sent a man to the moon could fail - it must be that we didn't care. Meanwhile, without either electricity or functioning TV facilities, the U.S. could not communicate with the Iraqis.

The initial post-war occupation did not go well - lack of money, Iraqi staffing, or adequate U.S. troops resulted in massive looting and infrastructure problems. Gen. Garner was soon replaced by Paul Bremer - lacking Mid-East or reconstruction experience (considered assets by some). His first decree was a tough de-Baathification (decapitating much of the nation's skilled leadership), and his second was disbanding the Iraqi army - creating major dissension and failing to make use of their potential for stabilization. (Acerbated Rumsfeld's decision to short-staff U.S. military, which Bremer had protested.)

Bottom-Line: The future of Iraq is in doubt; however, there can be no doubt as to the heroism is American forces and the incompetence of some of their leaders. Read more ›

16 of 16 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Worth Reading, But Incomplete October 15, 2006

By Mansizedtarget.com

Format:Hardcover

This book is well written and well organized. It provides a useful big picture sense of how the war was planned, the internal friction between different governmental and military constituencies, and the failure of Franks and the NSC to provide a useful counterweight to Rumsfeld's attempt to turn the Iraq campaign into a showcase for "transformation."

The book is also strong insofar as it details at a very high level of detail the fighting from March to June of 2003. "Fiasco" and other Iraq books have tended to treat this phase of the war as uninteresting, but we should not forget at the time that we were warned of a Stalingrad-like conventional campaign. Instead, the US soundly defeated the Iraqi conventional military, just as it did in the first Gulf War.

The book has a number of important flaws. First, it has little on the failures of international diplomacy to secure allies before the war, Turkish land routes, or European contributions to the post-war planning. It also gives short shrift to allies in its history of Cobra II, omitting even a detailed discussion of the British campaign in Basra.

Second, like "Fiasco" and Bob Woodward's new book, it often has unverifiable sources. A reader or scholar cannot really weigh evidence from an unnamed senior military official giving his information on an unknown date. The authors also fail to disclose any plans to keep their data in archival format or otherwise make it available to scholars. This book is merely the simulation of a scholarly history; it is, instead, simply a lengthy piece of journalism, with all of the flaws of that idiom....

Third, the authors' discussion of US training, lack of linguistic capability, flawed strategic thinking about insurgency, and the differences in approach of different units in phase IV is superficial and seems to go too far in letting the military off the hook. Everyone from a Major on up should have known something needed to be done to gear up American forces for this kind of occupation since March of 2002 at the latest. The superior Marine Corps appraoch (and that of certain Army commandres like Petraeus) is only visible when comapred to the heavy-handed fortress mentality of a great number of Army units who made no effort to win hearts and minds by focusing on Iraqis as the center of gravity.

Finally, the authors do almost nothing to get a handle on Iraqi attitudes, views, strategies, and internal motivation. There have been a number of important articles and books on this subject, including the writings of Anthony Shadid. The Iraqis remain a mysterious and primitive violent people in Cobra II's authors' views, and that view is part of the cultural blindness that impairs US forces in their counterinsurgency efforts. Any military history that focuses only on one side runs serious risks of reinforcing earlier failures. I fear the authors heavy focus on US conventional superiority and military prowess in the face of meddling civilians will fail to occasion the kind of soul searching that the military needs to do to beef up cultural awareness, language ability, and counterinsurgency and nation-building capability in the years ahead. Read more ›