Robert Bork's thesis is that "the rule of law has become confused with -- indeed subverted by -- by the rule of judges." This is, he contends, precisely what judidicial activism seeks to accomplish. The result, Bork argues, is minority rule, and the minority "at least for the foreseeable future" is the New Class, a group Bork describes as "overwhelmingly liberal [leftist] in its outlook." Readers, in my opinion, would do well to remember that Bork attacks judicial activism principally because it is anti-democratic. There is, he thinks, a strong tendency for activism and liberalism to arrive in the same package, but it is not inevitable. Yet, in the countries he examines -- Canada, Israel and the U.S. -- he finds a leftist judiciary usurping legislative power. More interesting, in my view, than his country-specific examples, was his discussion of the deference that Courts around the world are increasingly paying to international law, and international courts. "The major difficulty," he contends, "with international law is that it converts what are essentially problems of international morality, as defined by a particular community, into arguments about law that are largely drained of morality."
The validity of Mr. Bork's central contention is difficult to evaluate. It requires finding counter-examples, or their absence, in the mass of law he has surveyed. That is beyond the scope of the ordinary citizen (not to mention this reviewer). However, assuming Bork's argument is valid, two inter-related puzzles surface. (1) Why are we not seeing more of a backlash against the "rule of judges" in democracies that have experienced judicial activism? (2) Why are Courts continually held in high esteem? Discussing the case of Israel, Bork finds "less and less reason for the Israeli people to bother electing a legislature and executive; the attorney general, with the backing of the Supreme Court, can decide almost everything for them." Fair enough, but why, then, do Israelis continue the charade? Bork is aware of the problem, and he correctly notes that a range of factors might contribute to the apathetic response he witnesses. The one possibility he seems not to consider is that the thesis itself is flawed; that, however it may look to him, citizens are obtaining from Courts outcomes consistent with their expectations. Of course, such an answer would still not satisfy Bork: Courts are not just about outcomes, but about processes, and activists that stray from the intent of the law they interpret are writing law, not finding it. The underlying problem may have much less to do about citizens recapturing lost ground from allegedly wayward Courts, and much more about what it means to be a citizen. Bork's lamentation may be on target: "Perhaps a preference for immediate victories is part of the spirit of our times." Perhaps citizens are weary and cynical. Perhaps "the old civics lessons," which Bork believes are still sound, are evolving in ways that differ from the past. Coming to grips with these and other such issues constitutes, at least for me, the principal reason to read and contemplate Robert Bork's case.