Customer Reviews

Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992 (Studies in Social Discontinuity)

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In these days of historical specialization, a comprehensive treatment of any subject is most welcome, whatever its faults. Tilly has indeed set himself a daunting task, namely to explain the development of state formation in Europe over the last millennium; specifically, he seeks to explain why a pattern of divergent state formations ultimately converged in the form of the modern nation-state. To the chagrin of social scientists, he assumes that war has always been the central object of the state; economic/political determinism is complementary but subordinate. Given that the nation-state has enjoyed the greatest military success throughout the centuries, all states have been forced either to move in that direction or cease to exist.

Tilly makes many good points. He reminds us that rulers did not operate with a specific plan of state formation in mind--they created states only in conjunction with certain of their subjects. Given geographic and temporal circumstances, rulers could only pursue increasingly costly military ventures by bargaining with power blocks within their subject population for the necessary resources--soldiers, rations, etc. Where capital was not accumulated and concentrated, the balance of power lay with landowners. Where a city had emerged with a concentration of capital, proto-capitalists held power. Where capital was unavailable, the ruler could resort to methods of coercion of his subjects. Political and economic conditions dictated the bargaining terms with which the ruler sought to win support for his military goals. Tilly argues that different combinations of coercion and capital created diverse types of states. As the demands of war increased, the power blocks which rulers depended on gained more and more advantage over them, thus winning for themselves concessions that increased their standing in the state's government. In effect, the era of bureaucratization was born. The means of capitalization and coercion were incorporated into the structure of the state, and thus was born the nation-state. Essentially, the nation-state has proven to be the best at mobilizing and fighting wars, leading lesser states to either emulate it or risk being conquered by it.

Tilly offers a somewhat simplistic argument, acknowledging the criticisms he duly expects will come. State formation is portrayed as little more than an afterthought of warmongering. The accumulation of royal concessions in time laid the foundation for permanent infrastructure. By seeking revenues and compliance from a subject population, rulers eventually found themselves having to provide for their subjects' welfare--via production, distribution, transportation, etc. In the most modern states, social spending now outweighs military spending; this has served to shorten the length of wars while greatly increasing their intensity. A major contribution of this book is its implication that social history by itself does not explain the emergence of modern states and societies. Some will find Tilly's simplistic model untenable, but I find it quite logical and compelling. His argument (and the wealth of resources on which he draws) certainly warrants serious thought on the part of the reader.

Charles Tilly is obviously taking on a big topic. In this book, he covers 1000 years of state formation in Europe. His primary interest is to determine why states have converged from divergent state forms (city states, federations, and empires) to a single form (the national state). What I enjoyed about this book is that, unlike so many theories of international politics, it does not take the modern state system for granted but shows that it is the product of a complex historical process. Central to the process is the imperative of the state of extend its influence and to protect itself from rival states. Tilly shows that the growth in the capital intensity and complexity of warfare has led over time to a strengthen of the state and an expansion of its role. This is a plausible theory which has much to commend it. I would have liked to have seen two more issues addressed in the book ...

1) What role did class struggle have in the formation of states?
This concerned is hinted at but not explored. If wars have
become increasingly expensive how have states been able to
impose the high cost of war on their citizens? Does this not
also mean increased exploitation and intensified struggle?

2) How have nuclear weapons effected the long term viability of
national states?

I first want to direct people's attention to the very thoughtful comments on John Wolfsberger's review. I'm afraid that his ridiculous 3-sentence review will have undue influence purely because it is the only negative review, and thus continues to be displayed up front as the 'most helpful' critical review by default, even though so far 0 out of 26 people have found it helpful. He clearly never got past the introduction (or possibly the title).

Tilly essentially provides us with a historical thought experiment in which he seeks to determine how much of the historical variation in the development of European states can be elucidated through an exploration of city/state interaction and the accumulation (total volume) and consolidation (distribution) of capital and the material means of violence. This might sound like a historical-materialist analysis to some, but Tilly never focuses on class conflict as a driving force of history. Again, he's simply interested in bringing out interesting relationships between capital and coercion, such as the relationship between capitalist expansion and the ability to raise capital-intensive professional armies (as only an industrialized economy can facilitate) vs. mercenary or peasant armies, setting in motion a cycle of economic and militaristic expansion that made the industrialized nation-state the dominant form of state of the modern era.

In the process, he closely examines cities as crucial hubs of the flows of capital and the consolidation of military might in the hands of a centralized state. Combining all these factors, he does an excellent job of highlighting some of the causes of the different patterns of development in the different regions of Europe - from the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, who rose and fell with the fate of militarized mercantilism in luxury goods, to the different fates of Eastern and Western Europe once a continental division of labor set it - dynastic seats of power in Eastern Europe, in which economic diversity and social pluralism were stunted by the dominance of large-scale landowners and capitalist agriculture, vs. the development of cottage industry and later factory organization in Western Europe. Pretty straightforward history, actually, and Tilly never claims to be making any startling new discoveries, so much as teasing out the full implications of such a theoretical framework. As a big-level thinker, he clearly enjoyed writing the book, which also makes it an enjoyable, if challenging read.

I really enjoyed this title.

Tilly starts off by stating that his goal is to understand the origins of the national state in Europe. Now, first off, when I initially read that I thought that national state was a typo for nation-state (no al suffix), but he clearly delineates between the two (as does Anderson):

- National State: governs multiple regions/cities via "centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures."

- Nation-State: people within share "strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity."

When using those definitions, a national state is territorially fat (so not like a city-state à la Athens circa 500BC) and has reinforcing institutions (so not an empire à la Alexander 323BC). Notice that in this meaning, national states can be nation-states and vice versa, but that seems to be rare, for how often does a larger national state really meet the requirements of "strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity"--not so often really. This has made me realize that in the past when I used the term nation-state I probably should have said national state. In everyday life, though, I do not think it really matters which one I use to refer to an entity like the USA. But for the political science world, it is most definitely better to start internalizing these hair-splitting definitions.

Anyhow...

So where did Europe get their plethora of national states? Well, Tilly's analysis boils down to two main factors: war and economy (hence the title of the book Coercion, Capital, and European States). In his estimation they have mutually reinforced each other in Europe for years and have had the capacity to make--if not directly lead to--the formation of numerous national states. What I enjoyed so much about this piece is that though this may seem reductionist, in some way one does have to whittle down to the most relevant factors if he or she is going to try and explain 1,000 years in 271 pages. In that sense the argument has a Jared Diamond feel about it.

War can be thought of as a process of accumulation and concentration of coercion towards the growth of a state, whilst the economy can be seen as a process of accumulation and concentration of capital towards the growth of cities. It is then when these two, the state and the city, become more dependent on each other that one sees the formation of national states within the geopolitical arena. Concepts like human agency and class are taken as less relevant (though Tilly does address those).

The real joy of the book though is not so much in his answer to the question Whence the state? as postulated above, but in the awesome whirlwind tour of Europe from 990AD to 1990AD that he provides as evidence for his claim. That is really the heart of the book. After the initial chapter where he outlines his main idea above, he runs through the following: how wars made states and vice versa, states and their citizens, lineages of the national state, the European state system, and ends with a discussion on soldiers and states in the modern world.

This formulation of Charles Tilly is clearly ambitious and was not published until the last decade of his career. Criticisms do abound for his explanation, but most of them have been leveled at the particulars. What would make a more fruitful criticism--what I want to read for myself as well--would be one that encompasses the same scope as Tilly's argument. That, too, would make an awesome read.

The book arrived in a timely fashion. However, almost half of the pages were written on, underlined and/or circled and many pages were dog earred. The book was not in good condition as advertised.

A Marxist view of history. Interesting if you're living on planet fantasy, useless if you're living on planet Earth. Would have rated it zero if it was allowed.