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Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday Life

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Many readers are introduced to Jean Lave's work through Situated Learning (1991) with Etienne Wenger. However, readers interested in the genesis of Lave's two decade long effort to critique a reified understanding of cognition created in the narrow confines of a sterile experimental room by situating the study of learning within the everyday activities of social life may find Cognition in Practice (and also Everyday Cognition (1985) with Barbara Rogoff) insightful. Though the cognitive sciences themselves have moved on from the `information processing' or `transmission' model of learning that is an artifact of the experimental method and a 1960s fascination with the computer, this model of cognition remains endemic in formal educational today and particularly in educational policy decisions such as the No Child Left Behind Act that reveal a belief in the infallibility of science, so Lave's critique remains relevant today, two decades after the book was written.

However, Cognition in Practice aims not merely at critique but at developing a new framework for thinking about cognition - respecifying a `psychological theory of cognition' as an `anthropological' one - and the book is divided into two sections to address each. This endeavor of theory creation does make the book a cumbersome, though not difficult, read at times. The greatest challenge, Lave notes, is involved in depopulating reified meanings of the vocabulary of cognition that we no longer question and respecifying them in specific social/anthropological terms. Lave, in Cognition in Practice, makes the effort to address such dualities as theory/practice and mind/body, revaluing the latter concepts with respect to learning (cognition/learning is another such duality). Yes, two decades later, this is no longer groundbreaking.

Though Cognition in Practice is derived from anthropological ethnographic fieldwork and is therefore empirically-based criticism, it shares many of the goals if not the particular focus of literary critical theory. Indeed, in the two decades since the book was written, the lines have been blurred between what Gee (2000) identifies as more than 20 research programs within the great `social turn' in the social sciences and humanities, as ideas and methodologies have cross-populated within critical communities of practice - Gee's (1999) own "Big D" Discourse is Lave and Wenger's (1991) `Communities of Practice,' for example.

Cognition in Practice lays the groundwork for Situated Learning (1991), and though the latter is probably more familiar to readers and the concepts more refined (e.g. "whole persons acting in social worlds" becomes "legitimate peripheral participation"), readers interested in the cognitive basis for sociocultural theories of cognition that place learning as an activity located not exclusively in the brain but socially constructed in interaction with others and artifacts in everyday contexts will find Cognition in Practice useful.

One part uncontroversial cognitive psychology and five parts lit-crit bluff--the kind the author clearly doesn't understand, and hopes no one else in the seminar will admit they don't either. To be fair, the almost random juxtaposition of bits of continental philosofeces is consistent with the author's apparent contempt for reason.

If this book was intended to be a hoax, or a test of editorial standards similar to Alan Sokal's bogus article in "Social Text", then I apologize for the low rating, but it really is about time to reveal the joke.