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Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864

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I suppose that the most fitting summation of the merits of Gordon Rhea's "Cold Harbor" that I can give would be to simply state that it fully meets the standards established by its predecessors. Rhea has already published three outstanding volumes about the 1864 Overland Campaign waged between Grant and Lee. The present volume wholly lives up to the promise of those earlier books. Despite the complexity of the events described, Rhea's narrative is clear and compelling, and I have gained an understanding of the what's and why's of the Cold Harbor battle that far surpasses anything before.

Rhea challenges several popular misconceptions about the battle, especially regarding the famous, ill-fated grand attack of June 3rd. Although in recent years understanding has grown amongst specialist military historians that the image of a hugely costly and essentially unprecedented sacrifice of attacking troops was much more a product of myth rather than fact (Rhea concludes that Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg produced substantially more casualties than the ill-conceived Cold Harbor June 3rd assault), Rhea's book marks the first full use of that understanding in a major narrative history devoted to the battle.

Rhea's evaluation of the merits and weaknesses of the contending generals is balanced. Although Grant wins praise for his flexibility in seeking solutions on a strategic level through maneuver instead of simple plow-ahead fighting, Rhea sharply criticizes Grant (and Meade and their chief subordinates) for a failure to establish even the rudiments of tactical control, resulting in innumerable lost opportunities and pointless casualties. And while Lee is given very high marks for his skill in crafting superlative defenses, Rhea also points out that frequently Lee misread the situation, increasing his army's vulnerability at key moments.

The description of the combat, ranging from the initial cavalry probes to the full-scale assaults upon entrenched lines as the battle moved to its climax, is extremely well done, doing full justice to the men of both armies. As Rhea amply demonstrates, courage and skill did not wear only one color uniform.

Taken as a single work, Rhea's history of the Overland Campaign should rank high on anyone's list of outstanding achievements in the military history of the American Civil War. Balancing a broad scope with fine detail, this whole series of books proves Rhea understands that first-rate narrative history depends on the equal success of both those words: narrative and history.

I look forward to the next volume in this outstanding history, which will bring Grant's army across the James River to the defenses of Petersburg.

Most contemporary histories of the Civil War cover the 1864 Overland Campaign as a series of maneuvers from the Rapidan river ultimately to Appomattox with emphasis on the major battles fought at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna River, Cold Harbor and the siege at Petersburg. Little is publicized concerning the planning and marches to and from these prestigous battlefields, until Gordon Rhea's study of this series of battles. In Cold Harbor, Rhea's latest in this series, he comes clean with the details of the maneuvers from the North Anna river to Cold Harbor and the ensuing battles on June 1st and 3rd, 1864. By providing such a complete and comprehensive campaign history, Rhea sacrifices (in my opinion) some of his previous improvements in "readability" and essentially redefines what a "campaign history" reads like.

Even though this period does encompass a significant amount of maneuvering, cavalry battles, small infantry engagements and entrenchments, Rhea, as in his previous works, feels obligated to discuss all of it in detail. While he does accomplish an amazingingly organized study of this amazingly complex series of movements, he loses many a reader to these details and ultimately the whole book suffers somewhat in terms of quality.

This isn't to say that this is a bad book...on the contrary, as I've previously stated, Rhea presents an impressive study, taking no liberties in his research to uncover what really happened and when. We start out with the armies facing each other at the North Anna river. U.S. Grant, having realized that R.E. Lee's inverted "V" entrenchment south of the river is indeed a trap, decides to again move "by the left flank" and steals a march on Lee by crossing the Pamunkey river with his sights set on Richmond. Lee finally discovers this and sets up strong defenses along Totopotomoy creek between Grant and Richmond. Cavalry battles at Haw's Shop/Enon Church, Bethesda Church and Matadequin Creek presage the infantry "skirmishes" along Shady Grove Road and Old Church Road.

Then "a fateful cascade of events had brought Cold Harbor to the forefront Grant's and Lee's attention. Federal commanders initially had no intention of using the place in their offensive operations. They considered the road junction significant only because Confederates might exploit it as a staging area to harass Union supply lines and thwart (Union General Baldy) Smith's arrival." Lee, sensing Grant's intention to capture the crossrads and use it as a launching pad for an invasion of Richmond, sends Cavalry to Cold Harbor to prevent them from taking it. Union Cavalry under Phil Sheridan fears that the Confederates plan to attack him there and goes on the offensive. Lee conversely thinks that the Cavalry attack is the vanguard for a major Union attack and shifts an entire infantry corps there. Grant sees this and starts his infantry there and the engagement is on.

The famous confrontations on June 1st and 3rd mark the true battles at Cold Harbor and Rhea hits his stride in discussing them: "Writers later alluded to a 'Cold Harbor' syndrome, claiming that the carnage Union soldiers witnessed in the fighting there persuaded them to shy away from assaulting entrenched positions. In fact, by the time the Army of the Potomac reached Cold Harbor, veterans had already learned that valuable lesson. Cold Harbor is where newcomers discovered what old timers already knew." Famous engagements involving the 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery and the 8th New York Heavy Artillery are detailed here making these stories a remarkable companion for the History Channel's "Civil War Combat" episode on Cold Harbor. These army-wide assaults against the entrenched Confederate positions have driven many historians to indict Grant for mis-management of this battle and garnering him the reputation of a "butcher". Rhea dispels these myths: "When viewed in the war's larger context, the June 3 attack falls short of it's popular reputation for slaughter. Grant lost more men each day in the Wilderness and on two different days at Spotsylvania Court House than he did on Jume 3, making his main effort at Cold Harbor only the fifth bloodiest day for the Federals since crossing the Rapidan." What Grant and the Union army is guilty of is army-wide coordination. Time and again, they have an advantage taken away when coordinated movements go awry and the Confederates are able to capitalize...Rhea documents these in his closing chapter and discusses Grant's feeling that this was not a major defeat, but just another obstacle in his road to defeating Lee's army.

A study not for the general reader, but an essential component for historians and of Civil War history, Gordon Rhea's latest book continues his impressive documantation of the close of the war in Virginia and I would encourage all Civil War buffs to read these books.

The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 520 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (July 1994)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807118737

The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7-12, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 483 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (May 1997)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807121363

To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 505 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (May 2000)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807125350

Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 552 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (September 2002)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807128031

I am reviewing the four books a single series although each book is a full stand-alone history. This is a highly detailed military history of Grant's Overland Campaign of 1864. Two of the best generals commanding two of the best armies, in American history, decide the Civil war in the East. Gordon Rhea gives this month the detailed attention it requires and had never received. The 2,000 pages allows for the full story of the campaign, the personalities, failures and success.

The first book covers the major battle of The Wilderness an area Grant wished to clear and Lee hoped to trap him in as he had Hooker in 1863. Through a series of Union miscalculations and command problems, Lee manages to get in Grant's way. What follows is a confused bloody two-day battle that has been termed "Bush whacking on a grand scale". An excellent series of maps, help the reader stay abreast of the battle and understand the confusion of both sides. Lee loses Longstreet and starts to make the hard decisions about personnel that he has avoided since 1862. Grant while testing his relationship with Meade and Burnside, is trying to learn the AOP's generals too. This process dominates the four books as repeatedly Grant is forced to deal with the problems this creates and Lee takes steps that were unthinkable in 1863.

The second book moves the battle from The Wilderness south to Spotsylvania and Yellow Tavern. Grant refuses to "play the game" and retreat behind the Rappahannock but pushes past Lee and continues south. What follows is a race from defensive point to defensive point, which the AOP concedes to the AoNV. Union commanders hesitate at critical moments while the AoNV reinforces the objective. This allows Lee to stay up or ahead producing one of the bloodiest battles in our history at Spotsylvania. In addition, this book covers the critical cavalry operations, Grant's reasoning, and the price paid in taking Sheridan away from Meade. J.E.B. Stuart's death, is well covered. Both in terms of what it means to the AoNV, to Lee and to the Confederacy.

After one of the hardest weeks in their history, the two exhausted bloodied armies eye each other over their entrenchments. Lee understands that he is being trapped and that defensive war can only end in defeat. Grant is trying not to be stuck in a siege and determined to continue south. What follows is a series of forced marches and small battles as Grant and Lee test each other. Each general wins and loses daily as the armies march, counter march and fight. However, at the end of each day, Grant is always closer to Richmond. Lee produces a brilliant trap, Grant takes the bait but circumstances keep lee from springing it. Almost to late, Grant sees the trap pulls back, changes direction and continues south. Book 3, To the North Anna River covers this brilliant and exciting time in detail. Rhea produces some excellent analysis of both commanders and the developing personnel problems they are facing. Neither man is having an easy time of it and both understand they have never faced an enemy like this.

The last book takes us to Cold Harbor, one of the most controversial battles of the war. The detail history and excellent analysis leads us through this battle and produces some startling conclusions. As always, the author provides full support and justification for them. This might be the most important book of the series and the definitive book on the battle of Cold Harbor.

Each book has a full set of maps and illustrations. The writing is uniform and very readable. While detailed, the actions are understandable and you are seldom lost in a sea of names and/or unit numbers. Each book is a stand-alone history and is readable as such. The books were published from 1994 to 2002 and had to be written that way. This is the best account of the Overland Campaign available. It is both an invaluable reference and a great reading experience.

Last night I sat entranced with the words of Gordon C. Rhea as he enthralled a large audience at the Knoxville Civil War Roundtable regarding his new tome Cold Harbor. Rhea has a way
of being able to put complex tactical movements into understandable terms even lay folks like moi can follow. The
sanguinary chess game between Grant and Lee was filled with
surprises, tactical trickery and bloody assaults. The book
punches the life out of several myths such as;
1. Soldiers tied nametags on their uniforms in an early form of "dogtags." No! This first appeared in Horace Porter's post-war work Campaigining With Grant filled with inaccuracies.
2 The battle was the bloodiest assault of the war. Nope! It was fifteenth!
3 Grant was a butcher! Wrong. Rhea learned from modern military folk on a recent staff ride in the area that this was the best option for Grant to follow at this juncture of the campaign.
The book is beautifully written, based on years of solid primary source resourcin and includes many maps to help follow the action1. Highly recommended!!!!

Like Rhea's other books, this book is meticulously researched and Rhea continues to offer his analysis of everything surrounding both armies, most interestingly the personality conflicts in the chains of command.

However, there were a few things in this book that made it the least readable book among the 4 books of his Overland Campaign series:

#1 - The amount of technical detail makes the reading in some spots very bland. This was not a problem in any of the other 3 books.

#2 - This book had a thesis type feel to it because Rhea sets out to prove not only that the Cold Harbor campaign didn't make Grant a butcher, but also that Grant and Lee were equals whose generalships were at times great and at times shoddy.

In my opinion, Rhea is not giving Lee enough credit for his repulse of Grant in every major campaign of the Overland campaign from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Other than May 12, the Army of the Potomac could not claim a tactical victory in any serious contest, despite having a 2 to 1 advantage in manpower.

Lee's defenses were masterful through the North Anna River. He suffered dysentery and was ill throughout the Cold Harbor portion of the Overland Campaign and his subordinates were able to defend the line against the Union's assaults.

Rhea credits Grant for continuing to move forward in the face of repulse after repulse, which certainly is a testament to his aggressive nature. However, Rhea writes as if Lee's army is on equal footing with Grant's army throughout the book. Given his incredible deficiency in manpower, it's hard to hold it against Lee that he was unable to wrest the initiative away.

Lee's mistakes in the Cold Harbor campaign can be attributed to the fog of war. Grant and Meade don't even personally supervise the Confederate lines before ordering assaults. And while Rhea points out that both armies had lost nearly the same proportion of strength, that still means Grant had lost 22,000 more casualties than Lee in the span of a month.

#3 - Rhea's book doesn't cover the entire conclusion of the Cold Harbor campaign, although I assume it's likely he'll cover the "truce controversy" in the next book, since this one only covers up to June 3. Rhea offers plenty of proof that points to Grant being a tactician, not a butcher. At the same time, this book doesn't cover the fact that Grant needlessly left the wounded to die on the field instead of offering official truces as dictated by the rules of warfare, knowing full well that most of the wounded were his own men.

Regardless of these reservations, thankfully Rhea leaves the book hanging with the seeming intention of writing a sequel covering the armies' movements toward the James.

Gordon Rhea has written a series of four books, providing a chronicle of the bloody fighting in 1864 as Ulysses Grant headed south and Robert E. Lee tried to prevent him from success. From the Wilderness to Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River to Cold Harbor. These four books take us through this sanguinary period, day by day. There is no obvious end of one battle and start of the next. It was a continuing slugging match between Confederate and Union forces.

This book begins with Grant pulling away from the trap that Lee had set for him at the North Anna River. The moves in the chess match between Grant and Lee featured both misreading the other. Each missed opportunities to maul the other. Grant cleverly sidestepped Lee from the North Anna line, but did not follow up the march that he had gained on Lee.

Each side moved in response to what they thought the other was doing, and did a slow dance of maneuver toward Cold Harbor. Major cavalry fighting broke out (e.g., Haw's Shop). Both sides saw some problems with generalship at Corps level (Early's hotheadedness led to some foolish attacks on Union positions; Burnside continued his blundering; Warren dithered; Anderson was at the very limit of his competence). The bleeding of Confederate generals slowly reduced the effectiveness of the Army of Northern Virginia, and Lee had to assume more direct control.

Finally, the two armies fought it out at Cold Harbor, with the Union forces being driven back with many casualties.

And here is where Rhea's book is distinctive. He argues that Cold Harbor was not nearly as disastrous to Grant's forces as often thought. Indeed, as a percentage of forces lost to casualties, the Confederate Army was in worse shop after Cold Harbor than Union forces (that is, they had lost more troops percentagewise than Northern forces). Grant could replenish his forces; Lee had a much more difficult time.

At the end of the slugging matches from The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, Grant pondered his next move. And that's how the book ends.

This is well written. Many maps help the reader visualize the movements of the two armies. The order of battle at the end shows the organization of each army, down to brigade and regimental levels. All in all, a worthy addition to the library of students of the Civil War.

Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee May 26 - June 3, 1864 written by Gordon C. Rhea is a well-researched and written account of what really happened in this part of the Overland Campaign as for the first time Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee go head to head with their respective armies.

Rhea gives the reader a surprising new interpretation of the famous battle the left 7,000 Union casualties and only 1,500 for Confederates. Contrary to the image urged by Grant's detractors, the general's campaign agaisst Lee reveals a warrioe every bit as talented as his famous Confederate counterpart.

Grnt's and Lee's battles spawned persistent legends almost as farfetched as the parodies of the generals themselves. This book puts aside the rumors and deals with the factual accout of the battles of Cold Harbor.

The Cold Harbor in these pages differs sharply from the Cold Harbor of popular lore. Grant is not an unthinking automaton shoveling bodies into the maw of Lee's earthworks. And Lee does not fight a perfect battle. Grant begins the campaign by executing one of his best moves, pulling his army across the North Anna and stealing a march on Lee. Discovering Grant's deception, Lee takes up a strong defensive line along the Totopotomoy Creek, countering the Union ploy. Grant send out feelers, and Lee responds, sparking battles across woods and fields northeast of Richmond. By accident rather than by design, the military center of gravity shifts to an obscure Virginia crossroads called Old Cold Harbor. Lee's line seems stretched thin. The rebel army, its back to a river and on its last legs by Grant's reconing, dediantly faces the Federals. Grant sense a chance, a long shot perhaps, to end the war and orders an army-wide assault.

This is, in a nutshell, what happens, but the narrative is about Grant's Cold Harbor offensive and the events leading up to the major attack on June 3, 1864. It is a campaign study about commanders and armies. The cavalry battles at Haw's Shop, Metadequin Creek, Hanover Court House, and Ashland, the infantry fights at Totopotomoy Creek and Bethesda Church, and even the big assults of June 1 and 3 at Cold Harbor are all in here as we read on in the book.

This is the fourth book in the author's Overland Series and the first that we see Grant pitted with his counter part Lee making for a throughly researched and dramatic tale. Every imaginable primary sourse has been used making the strategies, mistakes, gmbles, and problems with subordinates all come to life... giving the reader a presence. This volume is worthy of a place on your library shelf for the American Civil War.

Mr. Rhea has provided a clear, lucid account of that portion of the Overland Campaign from the North Anna River to Grant's decision to invest Petersberg instead of Richmond. Although somewhat over generous in presenting minor details concerning the movements of the Armies and details of the various assaults,
his narrative is fairly easy to follow and to comprehend. I especially appreciated the numerous, detailed maps which did not overlook showing locations whose place names appeared in the text.

Gordon C. Rhea marshals an impressive mass of detail about the events between Ulysses S Grant's movement from the lines on the North Anna River to the end of the Battle of Cold Harbor proper on June 3, 1864. I have heard many of the opinions about the battle ranging from the judgment of Grant as an unfeeling butcher on a large scale to Rhea's revisionist approach, which puts the casualties into some perspective for the campaign and the war as a whole.

The title of my review, which comes from a quote by Lt Col Charles Cummings of the 17th Vermont, is a good description of the main battle. Cold Harbor looks forward to the grim battle lines of the First World War, where men dug in and ventured from their trenches at their peril. As the war went on, the veteran troops on both sides learned to dig in. It was the gung-ho new regiments from the North that had the heaviest casualties: They had not yet developed the basic survival skills.

Rhea's study went in for such heavy detail that at times, I yearned for an occasional editorial perspective, which this author pretty much restricted to the first and last chapters.

Robert E Lee came out relatively unsinged from Cold Harbor, but Grant has taken much of the blame for the unfortunate general staff culture of the Army of the Potomac. Remember that it was only a short time before that he took over the command, and he had to make do with prima donnas like Meade -- who comes off particularly badly -- as well as Burnside, Warren, and Wright. Even Baldy Smith, Grant's friend whom he had rescued from the country club atmosphere of Butler's command at Bermuda Hundred, spent most of the time (though somewhat justifiably) complaining about lack of food and ammunition, and contradictory commands from the top.

After I finished reading this book, I looked up Grant's own memoirs and saw an interesting bit that Rhea omits entirely: After the battle, there was an exchange of letters between Grant and Lee (which Grant quotes verbatim) in which the Union general requests a truce to collect the dead and wounded. Lee refused repeatedly, until several days later, by which time only two of the many thousands wounded left on the battlefield survived. This is a serious charge and should be addressed in any book on Cold Harbor, if only to dismiss it. Perhaps Rhea will put it in his next volume?

I was enchanted by Lee's inherent ability to create good ground for a battle by his knowledge of the countryside and his superior relationship to his staff officers. He was for certain a formidable and great adversary. Grant, on his side, was walking on eggshells. The nominating convention to select a candidate to run against Lincoln was about to take place: A complete route of the Union forces would have led to, God save us all, a President George B. McClellan.

As with the preceding volumes, this one is filled with the factual detail and the narrative excitement, the reader has come to expect from a Gordon Rhea book. His skillful hand has brought Grant's Virginia campaign to life with a great depth of detail.

The battles leading up to the larger confrontation at Cold Harbor are fascinating. I found much new material that I had not been exposed to before regarding Haw's Shop, Bethedsda Church, and Matadequin Creek. All too often we forget how difficult it was for Grant or Lee to aquire accurate and useful information regarding the disposition of their foe. This seems particularly true of the Cold Harbor campaign. In many ways I found the lead-up to Cold Harbor to be somewhat similar to the lead-up to Antietam. Of course, this time, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had learned the craft of entrenching.

As other reviewers have indicated, there is a wealth of information concerning the leadership difficulties that Grant faced and in particular his relationship with Meade. As a reader, I certainly came away feeling that Meade perhaps deserved a significant amount of the blame for the latter parts of the Union failure at Cold Harbor. Certainly, as the letters to his wife confirm, Meade's focus was on himself and not on his men or his foe.

Lastly, I think many readers will find themselves questioning the time-worn idea that Grant simply sent his army to be butchered at Cold Harbor. Instead, I found that Grant's thought process may not have been so far out of whack. Grant did what McClellan failed to do at Antietam. He pushed the issue as far as he could. Unfortunately, for his men, it wasn't a day 2 at Antietam...but instead was a Cold Harbor indeed.