Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy [Hardcover]

Jeffrey A. Engel (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 31, 2007 | ISBN-10: 0674024613 | ISBN-13: 978-0674024618

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In a gripping story of international power and deception, Jeffrey Engel reveals the "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain in a new and far more competitive light. As allies, they fought communism. As rivals, they locked horns over which would lead the Cold War fight. In the quest for sovereignty and hegemony, one important key was airpower, which created jobs, forged ties with the developing world, and, perhaps most importantly in a nuclear world, ensured military superiority.

Only the United States and Britain were capable of supplying the post-war world's ravenous appetite for aircraft. The Americans hoped to use this dominance as a bludgeon not only against the Soviets and Chinese, but also against any ally that deviated from Washington's rigid brand of anticommunism. Eager to repair an economy shattered by war and never as committed to unflinching anticommunism as their American allies, the British hoped to sell planes even beyond the Iron Curtain, reaping profits, improving East-West relations, and garnering the strength to withstand American hegemony.

Engel traces the bitter fights between these intimate allies from Europe to Latin America to Asia as each sought control over the sale of aircraft and technology throughout the world. The Anglo-American competition for aviation supremacy affected the global balance of power and the fates of developing nations such as India, Pakistan, and China. But without aviation, Engel argues, Britain would never have had the strength to function as a brake upon American power, the way trusted allies should.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

The "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain did not extend to aircraft development during the Cold War, contends Engel in this thoroughly researched, well-reasoned case study. He presents aircraft technology as a critical area of competition between a rising superpower with prodigious production capacity and a state seeking to establish a lead in quality. Underlying this contest was an ideological tension between American commitment to free market competition and British movement toward a managed economy. In an emerging Cold War, the answer was complicated by the conflicting demands of security and sales. Corporations sought to distribute their products as widely as possible, while governments feared losing ground in the technological competition. Rigid control of exports, however, risked crippling the infant jet aircraft industry. Engel describes a series of policy conflicts that, through the 1960s, repeatedly, and seriously, shook the Anglo-American relationship. Britain consistently took "astounding" risks with its American relationship, while the U.S. judged its intimate ally by its acceptance of American security concerns. Yet both parties valued their relationship enough to stand together despite their differences over trade and security issues—a decision Engel considers cultural as well as political. (Mar.)
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Review

An impressive work that makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the Cold War and Anglo-American relations. Engel's view of the conflict and cooperation between the United States and Britain adds considerable nuance to existing interpretations, especially with the British skullduggery over Viscount sales to the People's Republic of China. This was a delight to read.
--Alan P. Dobson, University of Dundee

An excellent, ambitious book. I know of no other work that uses aviation to explore the Special Relationship. Engel is a superb writer, with a keen sense of the drama of his story and an ability to make the topic come alive.
--Thomas W. Zeiler, University of Colorado

This brilliant book contributes to both the history of the airplane industry and Cold War history. Great Britain and the United States competed for supremacy and clashed over sales in the industry as leaders in each nation believed they alone knew how to strike the proper balance between the demands of security and the needs of commerce. It is a fascinating and important story, and Engel tells it well.
--Richard S. Kirkendall, University of Washington

A story of power and conflict brilliantly told. Engel reveals in unprecedented detail the bitter Anglo-American discord over policies to control the sale of the most technologically advanced aircraft of the Atomic Age. This book will change our perspective on the Cold War.
--Richard H. Immerman, Temple University

Despite their strategic special relationship, cooperation between the British and Americans masked a fierce rivalry for air power after World War II. This thorough yet fast-paced narrative is not only a rich contribution to Cold War history, but a timely reminder about the limits to globalization in a world where hard power still matters, even among 'friends.'
--Walter A. McDougall, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age

This book recounts Britain's challenge to American hegemony in the production of airliners during the years after the Second World War. Ho hum, you'd think. But with a cast of colorful characters--among them Ernest Bevin, Dean Acheson, and John Maynard Keynes--and acute glimpses into how things worked in postwar Washington, this chronicle of an intense commercial struggle gives readers a fascinating glimpse into a forgotten cranny of history. (The Atlantic )

Jeffrey A. Engel’s study of Anglo-American rivalry in aviation provides a fascinating look at the underlying issues that strained the alliance during the first two decades of the Cold War. Building on existing historiography regarding the allies’ different strategic visions during this period, Engel develops a fascinating new approach by demonstrating how conflicts over aviation policy illuminate these differences. Employing an impressive array of archival research, the author details how the allies endured a number of potentially serious disagreements regarding the diffusion of aviation technology. While Engel may overestimate the damage that these disputes had on the alliance, as no real crises developed from the cases he explores, he does an exceptional job of showing how important airpower was in the conflicting worldviews of the two great English-speaking powers.
--Daniel C. Williamson (American Historical Review )

Cold War at 30,000 Feet stands out as one of a handful of books on the diplomacy of commercial aviation and as one of the few that emphasize the fierce competition between the United States and Great Britain in the early Cold War. Its narrower chronological focus, in particular, sets it apart from its closest historiographical cousin, Alan Dobson’s Peaceful Air Warfare...Engel’s book asks interesting questions, offers new and thorough research, and is a compelling read.
--Jeff Woods (Diplomatic History )

Jeffrey A. Engel’s book is a fascinating read, especially for those who maintain that international relations are defined by “high politics” (as in global alliances and security issues) that take precedent over “low politics” (such as financial and trade issues). In examining Anglo-American differences over the trade in aeronautics (engines and aircraft), Engel shows just how much low politics mattered—and how they could be defining moments of high politics when international relations collided with economic and trade interests...Cold War at 30,000 Feet is an important addition to our understanding of the Cold War.
--Marc Dierikx (The Journal of American History )

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 384 pages
• Publisher: Harvard University Press (March 31, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0674024613
• ISBN-13: 978-0674024618
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.4 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #610,062 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Fascinating Account of Amglo-American Relations in Aeronautics after WWII, May 7, 2009

By 

Roger D. Launius "Historian" (Washington, D.C., United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy (Hardcover)

The demise of Great Britain's aviation industry in the aftermath of World War II is an oft-repeated object lesson among the aviation policy community in Washington, D.C. Usually it is interpreted as a warning to American policymakers not to decrease federal funding for both aeronautical technology and infrastructure, lest the U.S. decline as an air power like the British did after World War II. As Jeffrey A. Engel shows in "Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy" the story of British fortunes in aeronautics after World War II is both more complex and interesting than the simplistic morality play that policy analysts have used repeatedly to turn back the budget cutters.

Instead, we learn that both the U.S. and Great Britain recognized aviation's primacy in not only winning the war but also in ensuring continued sovereignty and hegemony in the postwar world. It would become, as leaders on both sides of the Atlantic realized, a critical linchpin in cold war rivalries. Accordingly, as "Cold War at 30,000 Feet" makes clear, these two allies jockeyed for position in controlling the aviation business after the war. They knew that supplying airplanes to the world--both commercial and military--would help ensure economic well-being, create well-paid jobs, enhance international trade, tightly link postwar allies, and assure nuclear superiority. Both sought to control this situation, but the U.S. had the advantage in industrial capacity left intact despite the war. Moreover, its prewar aviation industry had built excellent transport aircraft in large numbers, especially the incomparable DC-3 of which thousands were flying by 1945.

The Americans intended to use this advantage to control postwar international relations with the Soviet Union and China, as well as others. The British sought to concentrate on this high-technology capability to help recover from the desolation of war. As early as 1942, Engel reports, the two nations fashioned an agreement in which Britain concentrated on fighter and bomber production, an historic strength of its firms, while America built transports to go along with its military aircraft. This was a win-win during the war years, but aided the Americans long-term. As Engel concludes: "The 1942 Arnold-Powers agreement did more than just rationalize Anglo-American wartime aircraft production; it also placed American producers in an overwhelmingly advantageous position for postwar civil aviation dominance" (p. 31).

British leaders voluntarily gave up transport production knowing full well that it would damage their aeronautical competitiveness for at least five years after the war, but desperation reigned in 1942. The best they could hope for was to emphasize outstanding technologies and Britain did so remarkably effectively. Its aircraft engines, its military airframes, and its jetliners all led aviation technology in the 1940s and much of the 1950s. For example, the "Comet" jet transport beat Boeing's 707 airliner to the market by a full five years, did very well in international sales, and prompted major complaints from the American aeronautical industry which pulled out all stops to lessen its popularity.

The majority of "Cold War at 30,000 Feet" outlines a succession of parries and thrusts, bobs and weaves, and competitive actions and countermeasures between the United States and Great Britain to gain the upper hand in international aeronautical policy. The United States sought to ensure its hegemony in relation to aviation, especially in military capabilities, while denying advanced technology to opponents in the cold war. At the same time, this approach had from the perspective of American leaders the advantage of ensuring that such allies as the British remained dependent on American aeronautical technology. The British, while sympathetic to cold war concerns over dual-use technology reaching its rivals, were much more focused on selling aircraft and components to other nations, including China and the Soviet Union. They viewed this as important for their own economy and as a counter to American hegemony. Engagement, they reasoned, had the added benefit of improving East-West relations.

These divergent priorities and policies led to a series of tense episodes between the U.S. and Great Britain, much tenser as Engel explains in this book than previously appreciated by most scholars. At some level, readers may be reminded of Carl L. Becker's famous conclusion about the American Revolution; it was not only a question of establishing "home rule," but also a conflict over "who should rule at home." Engel demonstrates that cold war aviation diplomacy from the American perspective was not only about ensuring U.S. hegemony vis à vis the Soviet Union, but also about ensuring American dominance in the marketplace. "Cold War at 30,000 Feet" is a fascinating account of the Anglo-American rivalry carried out under the larger cooperative efforts to oppose the Soviet Union in the cold war. It adds an important new perspective on the "special relationship" between the U.S. and Great Britain in the twentieth century.

3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars But the Market Preferred American Airliners, March 1, 2008

By 

Robert Garvin "historian" (Sarasota, FL) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy (Hardcover)

Overall, I found the book interesting ---- particularly the data on
the British sale of Vickers Viscount airliners to the Peoples' Republic of China ---- a tad overwritten, particularly the repeated references to "the New Jerusalem." Was that phrase really in vogue in Whitehall at the time?
The author's thesis is that Britain needed to export airplanes and engines after the end of World War 2 in order to justify their development expense for the home market; that the best export market for its products was in countries that flew airliners into the USSR and PRC; that the USA prohibited such sales through COCOM, the Coordinating Committee, out of stubborn anti-Communism and to protect the US market dominance in aviation; and that therefore the British industry lost permanently its technical lead in jet engines and airliners.
What Engel does not address is that politics aside, British engines
and airliners did not prevail in the non-Communist market against more efficient and more productive American competitor products. When British products were competitive, they found a home in America, e.g. the Rolls-Royce Tay was built under license by Pratt & Whitney, the Armstrong-Siddeley Sapphire by Wright Aeronautical, the RR Spey and Adour by Allison (which was later bought by RR,) the Canberra bomber. Viscounts went into service with Capitol Airlines.
It is true that the size of the internal US military and civil aviation market was such that American firms inevitably developed competitive product to serve it, and achieved economies of scale and productivity not open to the smaller British firms. The reason for the
subsequent dominance of the American airliners was that they were more attractive to airline customers around the world in terms of productivity.
When Airbus Industrie was created later to design truly competitive airliners, and to make, sell, and service them on a scale comparable to that of the American firms, it became an economic success and a major competitive factor in the market. In other words, it is not impossible to make a better product and win market share. It just ain't easy.