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The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

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This is a thoroughly researched and overall well written book on the first winter of the Korean War by the late author Halberstam. He worked on this book for well over a decade, and it shows. The focus of the book is on the winter of 1950-1951, with a considerable part about the fall of 1950, as the author notes, it is the most interesting part of the war (the remainder was so stagnant it reminds historians of WWI), the book gives a complete explanation of WHY this war dragged on. Fans of McArthur might want to skip this book, along with those who think Truman was the worst president ever. Some officers shine, while others are considerably less lustrous. Halberstam does a nice job looking at the war from all the ranks, from private first class up to the commanders.

Memories are the building blocks of identity, and psychologists have long known that, more than recollections of the past, memories are narratives that have built into them clear lessons consistent with an individual's worldview. What individuals do naturally for themselves historians do for society: write narratives from known facts and events to help bulid a national identity. And that is what David Halberstam does superbly in his masterwork "The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War."

In "The Powers that Be" and earlier works David Halberstam writes in a folksy and plain-speaking manner that comes across as pretentious and arrogant but in his last work this same style has rendered stories and heroes awesome and memorable. Mr. Halberstam is a wonderful storyteller, and he seamlessly weaves from the macro of the political times to the micro of village battles. And as a wonderful storyteller he has rendered the main players fascinating and knowable and the events relevant and immediate.

In Mr. Halberstam's narrative the Korean War was both tragically inevitable and shamelessly avoidable. A war eventually had to be fought between the newly victorious Communist Party of China and the United States, sponsor of the CCP's adversary the Kuomintang. Moreover, the Soviet Union's North Korean puppet leader Kim Il Sung was just as reckless and uncontrollable as America's South Korean puppet Rhee Syngman. Both sought to manipulate their sponsors to grant them Korean unity.

And while war was inevitable the type of war was determined by the stupidity and vainglory of the book's chief villians: Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and ultimately General Douglas MacArthur. Douglas MacArthur may have been responding to a North Korean invasion but by pursuing the North Koreans so far north he forced the Chinese into the war; here his arrogance (that he was the greatest general ever) was supplemented by his racism (that the Chinese were peasant cowards, and wouldn't dare risk a fight) to make a severe miscalculation that would cost thousands of American lives when the Chinese army trapped America's 8th Army near the Chinese border, forcing an embarrassing and deadly retreat. And even though McArthur's advance forced Mao to enter the war no one forced Mao to believe in the indomitable will of his troops, and to hurl tens of thousands of good Chinese infantry against superior American technology and weaponry. For Mao a just ideal is worth more than hundreds of thousands of good soldiers.

The Korean War was forced upon the Americans by the grandiose imperial ambitions of three great dictators (Kim Il-Jung, Mao Zedong, and Douglas McArthur), and was deeply unpopular at home. Worse the Korean War was unwinnable because for the Americans to advance into China would trap them, like the Japanese before, in an enemy country with a seemingly infinite number of enemies. And a Chinese defeat would bring the Soviet Union into the war.

So the Americans led by General Matt Ridgway chose to fight a limited war to inflict the maximum number of casualties against the Chinese, and it was at the fierce seige of Chipyongni that the Americans finally proved to the Chinese superior tactics and technology could defeat their devastating numbers. And by humbling the Chinese without devastating them Matt Ridgway deterred future Sino-American clashes, an important Cold War achievement if not a total victory.

In the end Douglas McArthur was recalled, and even though Mao Zedong cost China the lives of hundreds of thousands of good men he would live another twenty years to kill tens of millions of Chinese. The only winner seemed to have been Joseph Stalin who goaded on the Chinese and whose death finally permitted the Chinese to sign a truce with the Americans.

"The Coldest Winter" is historical journalism and story-telling at its very best but there are two main problems with the book: the first is that it's written by a great journalist, and the second is that it's written by a great story-teller. Journalists are tremendously adept at researching and reconstructing events but they are not intellectuals, and David Halberstam may be a great journalist but he is still a journalist. Towards the end Mr. Halberstam writes about the historical significance of the Korean War, and the final section feels weak and thin and not at all convincing.

The second problem is more perturbing. The blatant arrogance and flagrant stupidity of the book's villians are too tragically real so it seems as though Mr. Halberstam needs to compensate by diefying the book's heroes: Harry Truman, General Matt Ridgway, the Chinese General Peng Dehuai, and the dozens of American soldiers and officers who fought so bravely and selflessly. If Mr. Halberstam is right about Ridgway then the general was omnipresent and omniscient -- and while Ridgway may be good it's hard to believe he's God.

David Halberstam's "The Coldest Winter" is a book about the classic battle between good and stupidity, and while historians will question his narrative there's no question that Mr. Halberstam's clear and simple narrative is consistent and coherent with America's larger vision of itself as a good and simple nation sometimes thrown into the nastiest of nightmares and always responding with upmost honor and bravery. That is how Americans want to remember the Korean War, and that is how the Korean War will be remembered.

"The Coldest Winter" will be the definitive history of the Korean War, and it is the late David Halberstam's proudest achievement.

David Halberstam's last book is a true classic detail of the start of the Korean War through its first cruel and brutal Winter.
One thing Halberstam always does is that he gets the view of history from the men who were on the ground when it happened. He just doesn't get the enlisted man's viewpoint, he also gets the perspectives of the junior officers and junior staff who saw first hand the decisions of senior officers, and how they effected the troops on the ground.
In reading some of the reviews of this book, I saw critical remarks about this book not being what it was claimed to be. For some strange reason these reviewers were looking for the ultimate read on the entire Korean War. If that's what you are looking for this is not your book.
However if you want to learn about the origins of this War and how the United States reacted to these preemptive attacks then this is indeed the book you want to read.
This is the definitive Cold War showdown. The High Noon of the Cold War. Russia nudges Red China to back this attack. North Korea attacks South Korea. The United States in all its unpreparedness enters the conflict. The fight of the Pusan Perimeter and the exploits of Task Force Smith are all fully described in a flowing and gripping narrative by Halberstam.
Enter Douglas MacArthur and in his last magnificent grand strategy is able to pull off a successful landing at Inchon to cut off the North Korean supply lines and send the enemy reeling to the North.
Halberstam guides us in MacArthur's march to the North. He shows the lack of MacArthur's intelligence and also the committing of the mortal sin of separating 8th Army and X Corps. The Author depicts a rather inept Douglas MacAuthur who subjects American Troops in harms way needlessly. Indeed he never suspected that 300,000 Red Chinese Troops were waiting at the Yalu River.
What happened at Kanuri and the Chosin Reservoir should not have happened at all. When President Truman fired MacArthur the whole nation was enraged. In fact from that time forward Truman's approval rating tumbled. From early 1951 on, Truman knew he couldn't run for President again, even though he was eligible to campaign. The sad fact of it all is that in retrospect Truman was right and MacArthur was wrong. Dead wrong!
Halberstam does a great job in showing us what General Matt Ridgeway had to contend with and sort out when he took command of the UN Troops. We see a soldier's General who would relieve his own brother of command if that person couldn't do the job.
This is a classic look into the origins and first months of this forgotten conflict. Put this down as a must read!

Neither a comprehensive history of what the author calls "a black hole" nor a focus on the winter of 1950-5 which was a nadir of American military fortunes. Rather, it is a somewhat rambling, yet carefully constructed account of "the forgotten war" with its heaviest emphasis on that coldest winter. He begins in media res with the first warnings, in October 1950, that the Chinese were entering Korea, warnings that MacArthur ignored as they intruded on his conviction that the North Koreans were finished. MacArthur is the chief villain of this book, followed closely by his loyal subordinate (lackey would be a better word), Ned Almond, and then by Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's so-called chief of intelligence. The prostitution of intelligence data by the high command in Tokyo, the blatant disconnect between authority's pronouncements and reality led to the disaster that was the "big bugout" of November and December of that coldest winter.
Halberstam jumps back from the October days to before June of 1950. There is a great deal of political history that precedes the North Korean incursion. In a rambling section, the author provides a context that includes biographical analyses of the major political and military players. He follows the brutal fighting around the Pusan perimeter, the decision to go into Inchon, and the race northward. Not until one is almost halfway through the book does the "coldest winter" segment begin. The failure to heed the October warnings of his general on the ground (Walker), and insist on an all-out drive to the Yalu with no thought of establishing any backup defense line across the narrow waist of Korea, was due to MacArthur's intransigent belief that the war was won. After all, MacArthur was the sole architect of the brilliant turning movement at Inchon, so who in Washington (or Korea) could gainsay him? Halberstam documents many other failings of the generalissimo. He never spent a night in the field in Korea, he split his forces to create X Corps, independent of Eighth Army, largely to justify three stars for his favorite courtier, Ned Almond.
The great bugout is encapsulated in vignettes about the near-decimation of the 2nd Division in the west, and the Marines spectacular withdrawal from the Chinese ambush in the X Corps sector. Marshall and Ferenbach have written better accounts, but Halberstam's aim is not military history, but to highlight the arrogance of MacArthur and the mendacity of his high command. Believing that Inchon completely intimidated Mao from any intervention, he referred to the Chinese as "laundrymen". And any pronouncement from the great man was accepted without doubt--dissent ".... would have been questioning an announcement from God."
The shambles resulting from the big bugout were slowly cleaned up by Matthew Ridgeway who succeeded the unlucky Cassandra, Walker. MacArthur openly lobbied for a wider war--"unleashing Chiang" and bombing mainland China--despite Truman's determination to keep the war localized. Finally, Truman had enough of MacArthur's insubordination and relieved him from command in April 1951. Why did the ouster take so long? Largely domestic politics. MacArthur had been an American icon since the bad days of Bataan (where, according to Halberstam) he never spent one day. His gross lapses in preparing the Philippines for the Japanese onslaught even after the unmistakable warning afforded by Pearl Harbor and his mismanagement of the defense of the islands were overlooked because at that time, the United States was sorely in need of a hero.
MacArthur returned from the Far East still a hero. He was received with a ticker-tape parade, he appeared before a joint sitting of Congress to give his valedictory, and was taken up by the right wing as a possible presidential candidate. Veneration of MacArthur has continued to this day, even though his role in the Korean War has been thoroughly dissected, and has been found wanting. And it is with the firing of MacArthur that Halberstam that effectively ends this book. There was still much hard fighting ahead, and the agony of the armistice negotiations. But Halberstam had accomplished his mission--the demythologizing of Douglas MacArthur. Book has extensive notes and the sources are mostly secondary works and oral histories. Also, a serviceable bibliography.

"The Longest Winter" is the story of the first winter of the Korean War, 1950-1951. CW covers the original North Korean invasion, the counterattack by the United Nations forces ("the "Inchon Landing"), the Chinese entry to the conflict and the ultimate stabilization of the front lines under the leadership of General Matthew Ridgeway. This critical period was the core of the Korean War. Author Halberstam drives headlong into the full maelstrom of front line combat including heroism, military politics and some appalling failures of command. Halberstam correctly emphasizes the importance of leadership at the company and platoon levels. There are excellent background sketches of the ruling circle of the era: President Truman, Kim Il Sung, Dean Acheson, George Marshall, Joseph Stalin, Syngman Rhee, Mao Zedong, and Generals MacArthur, Almond and Ridgeway. Personalities plainly matter to this author. Ridgeway stands out as everyman's hero and MacArthur receives the full brunt of Halberstam's sharpest barbs. Looming darkly in the background of CW is the constant drone of domestic politics. Korea was an unpopular war and the Republicans cut President Truman no slack. What pressures HST was have faced; one can only admire the man's courage in the face of it all. There are some minor points of criticism: Maps are strong but not always conveniently placed and there are zero (!) photographs. Vietnam era readers may have no idea what many of these guys looked like. Perhaps future printings can correct these defects. Also, the author's attempts to square the circle by seeking parallels with the Vietnam conflict are downright awkward and definitely superfluous. Some might carp with CW's length but this reviewer was perfectly comfortable with the 669 pages. The bottom line is that "The Coldest Winter" is a serious, thoroughly researched book on a customarily passed over/disregarded time in this nation's military and political history.

In this highly political and personally skewed account of the Korean War, Halberstam does a good job of explaining what the average soldier went through fighting in a war that no one in the US wanted. No one except Douglas MacArthur, and he wanted to turn it into a major ground war with Red China. It was a war caused by the goading of Mao by Stalin and the unrealistic attitude of Kim Il-Sung that the South wanted a communist regime.

The initial success of the North Koreans when they attacked, was due to the weakness of the military structure of the South, and the 'racist attitude' of Douglas MacArthur. The southern military was run by an officer corp that owed their positions to partisan politics not military knowledge. MacArthur considered the 'Asian' soldier to be 'laundreymen' and not able to overcome the 'huge' technology gap between them and the US military. He was also confident that the Red Chinese would NEVER enter the war. Well he was wrong on both counts and the US and UN both had their noses bloodied badly.

Halberstam spends way to much time going over the geopolitical and domestic issues related to the war and only spends short excerpts describing the actual fighting and strategies. Much to much space is given to excoriating MacArthur (though he deserves it) and his sycophants in Tokyo and their non-running of the war. This was the way that Westmoreland was to run Vietnam from his compound in Saigon (with the same results).

The discussion of the politics behind the scenes is interesting but redundant, overdone and overblown. Halberstam could have shortened this book by one hundred pages and made it much more interesting.

Zeb Kantrowitz

A well-written masterpiece. Very critical of General MacArthur's push to the Yalu River in 1950 in which the UN forces fanned out across the wide spaces of northern North Korea, exposing the UN troops to the Chinese onslaught.

I am a history buff and as such was looking to fill the void that is my lack of knowledge of the Korean War. I have read Halberstam before and am troubled that this would be his last.
The other reviews have given quite a detailed description of the scope of the book so let it suffice to say that I couldn't put it down. It has truly been since I first discovered Grisham that I could not put down a book, let alone a non-fiction. Well, I do need to amend that somewhat. At points in the book I was so overwhelmed with emotion as he recanted veteran's tales, that I had walk away for a day before shaking it off and then eagerly returned.
Yes, it did fill the void and I also learned more than I had ever hoped for on the larger picture of the early years of the cold war, the loss of China and the resultant politics back home. I certainly had to move Doug MacArthur down a shelf or two on my pantheon of historical figures, but I already knew that he should have retired a few years earlier.
I recommend it to anyone looking to understand the Cold War, the Truman/MacArthur episode, Communist China, military tactics and strategy, or the Washington Politics of the McCarthy era that have some eerie similarities to our own times. But most of all, it is simply a page turner and you can't wait to read what happens next.
America will miss Halberstam.

David Halberstam's "The Coldest Winter" is one of the most fascinating histories of war that I have read. It provides a detailed account of the political background leading up to the Korean War with Mao's army first fighting the Japanese and Chiang's Kuomintang forces, Stalin's involvement and refusal to commit Soviet troops, Kim Il Song's background and rashness, MacArthur's seeming imperial autonomy in the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo, and the continuing deference and ambiguous orders issued to him by the Joint Chiefs and the White House. Much history about most of the men involved, like Dean Acheson, Averill Harriman, Harry S Truman, Dean Rusk, Henry Luce, and a host of others, is well-developed so that the reader has insights into their thinking.

The story is extremely readable and entertaining as Halberstam carries his readers through the political machinations, incompetence, and corruption of the Nationalist Chinese. Their influence in Washington on foreign policy is shocking to discover. Even as Chiang's troops constantly abandoned their American-supplied weapons and materiel in the field to the communists, the China Lobby urged congress to pass more and more appropriations bills that simply led to a better supplied enemy as the Nationalists retreated. The extreme right-wing Republicans supporting Chiang, who were known as the "China Firsters," denigrated the patriotism of those who did not fully agree with them and made Truman's life difficult as he tried to limit the scope of the war. In retrospect and in fairness, the actions of many in that group seem treasonous today, but have to be considered within an era in which the U.S. was finding its way as a newly-minted superpower in a turbulent and dangerous post-war world with its threat of a Soviet takeover of Europe.

Halberstam's chronicle of the frigid war in Korea is gripping as the weakness of the U.S. army and the incompetence of many of its senior commanders are exposed. Those who suffer the most through his pen are General Ned Almond; who is revealed to be rash, abrasive, short-sighted, and reckless with the lives of American troops; Charles Willoughby, who as MacArthur's top intelligence officer, refused to accept reports from the field of Red Chinese infiltration of the Korean peninsula and whose faulty analysis and twisted logic led to massive underestimation of the size and ability of Mao's army and heavily contributed to the needless deaths of U.S. servicemen; and, MacArthur himself, who bathed in glory after Inchon, but who was insubordinate, never spent a single night in Korea, and claimed to be able to respond to the Chinese through his intuition, since he "understood the oriental mind." USMC General O.P. Smith is shown as one of the few competent senior officers as he smells the Chinese ambush awaiting the Marines and deliberately delays execution of Almond's orders to rush north toward the Yalu. Smith's caution and efficiency saved countless U.S. lives and administered large scale casualties on the enemy. Halberstam draws parallels between the blind northern push by Almond and the massacre of Custer's men at Little Big Horn. As I read about the crossing of the 38th parallel by the Americans and the rapid push north, it reminded me of how the Russians retreated in the face of Napoleon's army, leading them deeper and deeper into a vast country until they were annihilated.

The centerpiece of this account of the war is, of course, the friction between MacArthur and President Truman and MacArthur's relief for insubordination and meddling in political affairs. Perhaps at no time since the Civil War has our founders' constitutional scheme been as threatened as it was by the general's outrageous disregard for civil oversight of the military and rogue statements of U.S. foreign policy.

Halberstam's Korean War history is a comprehensive masterpiece, which is easy to read, compelling, and difficult to put down. I highly recommend it to all readers interested in military and diplomatic history.

This is my second reading of Halberstam's study of the Korean War, and feel his interpretation of the first half of the conflict, and long term impacts, are spot-on. He accurately breaks down the failures of leadership (on all sides) to understand the geographical conditions and needed logistics, the strategic and tactical ramifications of their decisions, while providing enough anecdotal details of combat from generals to privates to keep the reader interested.

This is great reading for those interested in the dynamics of command. Some might take offense at his analysis of aged General MacArthur, but that does not change the supportive facts within Halberstam's writing. He vividly describes MacArthur's organization and communication dynamics that led to the failed effort to secure the south bank of the Yalu River, and the horrific retreat which followed.

He also accurately describes the difficulties that can befall "top-down" leadership models which ignore "bottom-up" information contradicting the presumed model and plan of action. His writing describes all the strategic leaders: MacArthur, Truman, Mao, Kim Song Ju and Syngman Rhee. It also reviews leadership at the headquarters, corp and staff level that had tremendous impact on the ability of the division/regimental leadership to get the mission safely and efficiently accomplished.

It also describes the courage of leaders who thought through the environment and situation to save their men,and also, sadly, describes those who did not.

I have found few writers who can frame a conflict and interpret the long term results and echoes that follow the conclusion of a regional war. Halberstam has succeeded. You will not be disappointed in this book.