Customer Reviews

Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo

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This book is essentially a manifesto for neo-liberal interventionism. It makes little attempt at objectivity. The leaders of the Slavic world can do nothing correctly, except as they agree to Western dictums. The book itself is quite valuable, if not necessarily for the reasons the author and publisher think: it documents the inevitable failure of a country (e.g., empire) trying to impose outside values upon traditional and regional communities.

In many ways the book summarizes the lead-up to the war, the nature of the Allied coalition, and the political consequences throughout and following the war. This review will largely avoid those issues as they are thoroughly covered elsewhere. Rather, the reviewing will focus on insights from Norris' experiences and thoughts resulting from those insights.

The book begins on a painful note. The author of the foreword, Strobe Talbott, is acting like a Clintonian cheerleader. He is guilty of using "loaded language" and bias. (I point that out because it is taboo for official and/or scholarly documents to engage in self-congratulations.) His particular argument asks, quite rightly, what should be the conditions for empire, I mean, intervention. He notes that military force should only be used when diplomatic means are exhausted, that it guarantees safety to both the "victims" of the aggression and the regular citizenry, and that it ensures stability in the region. Talbott claims it gloriously met all of those goals. The truth, though, is that NATO failed--in one aspect or another--in all of the above: It was the Russians, not NATO bombers, that brought Milosevic to the table; the United States rejected numerous diplomatic proposals from the Bosnian Serbs and actually urged Izetbegovic to reject peace and go to war in the mid-1990s (!), and Serbs living in Bosnia and Kosovo today are facing a genuine ethnic cleansing on the level of which Milosevic was accused.

Reading Between the Lines

While NATO was technically victorious, it nearly lost the war and created several far greater disasters. Many of the Allies did not even want to proceed with air strikes, and the more traditional and Christian members like Italy and Greece nearly withdraw when NATO insisted on bombing Orthodox Christians during Pascha. Another point of contention was Russia. When Russia advised Serbia in this war, Russia was weak, bankrupt, and internally divided. That said, Russian special forces nearly captured several key airports in Kosovo. They actually could have done this quite easily, but Yeltsin was not committed. Had Russia proceeded, and American brass admits it could not have stopped Russia, then a combined Russian-Serbian movement would have easily won the war. Think about it for a second: if a poorly equipped, disillusioned Russian force under Yeltsin could have accomplished this, imagine what a modern Russian army under Putin could have done?

Had several Allies withdrawn from the campaign (which even US State officials expected them to do), combined with Russian forces seizing key Kosovar airports, along with NATO's inability to decide on air strikes or sending ground troops, and with the general instability of the region (Norris, 30), NATO--or more precisely, the Anglo-Americans--would have lost this war. While sending ground troops would have ended the conflict quickly, the costs would have been enormous. Norris hints as much and this is one of the areas his book is quite useful: he truly does give an insider's perspective.

Presuppositions Determine Evidence

Despite the flaws and biases of this book, CNN, and the Clinton Administration, Serbophiles have to face up to the fact of genocide and war crimes. Did Milosevic carry out ethnic cleansing against the Albanians? Given the fact that the Hague could never decisively prove this at the ICC (along with Milosevic's mysterious death), the answer has to be "no." Were Serbs guilty of violence against the Albanians? Probably, but this was no different from the Allied treatment of German civilians during WWII (Dresden, anyone?).

As other CIA analysts (Schindler) have noted, Muslim forces have long used "safe havens" as staging points for attacks on Serb forces; therefore, when the Serbs retaliate, it seems like they are attacking civilians.

Conclusion

Despite the "CNN-idolizing" feel of the book, the author has correctly identified Kosovo has a symbolic defining point between East and West. In other words, the actions in Kosovo will determine not only Russia-America relations, but also how the "international community" can respond to situations within national borders.

The most obvious reason leading to American bombing is the alleged ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Milosevic. I say "alleged" because the charges against Milosevic were never proven at The Hague. (There is a reason Milosevic died under mysterious circumstances). In fact, one cannot escape the impression that the West orchestrated this war. The West routinely rejected halts to the bombing and rejected several overtures at peace, overtures largely favorable to NATO and brokered by Russia (p. 19-21). As other analysts have made clear, NATO needed Kosovo as an oil transit. Accordingly, peace was unacceptable as long as Kosovo remained in Serb hands.

One other point of contention: The CIA had already identified the Kosovo Liberation Army as a terrorist group. Given that, how come Norris never discussed the criminal (and violently anti-American) actions of the KLA? The fact he doesn't mention this shows how much this book is pure propaganda. (Milosevic pointed this out to Albright, which Albright derisively dismissed. One thinks the reason is obvious).

Given that this book is written by an "Establishment man," and to a large degree, the author's protests notwithstanding, this book unofficially represents the Western Establishment on interventionism. Given that high pedigree, high standards are required of the book. Unfortunately, this book fails on a scholarly level. I do not fault the author for not citing sources--much of the information can be found elsewhere, and the author does give a thorough bibliography and an extensive index. Rather, the author uses loaded language on every page. I think if one looks beneath this language one sees a "quiet desperation." The Clinton Administration must justify its position continually. Kosovo today is a failure by anyone's reckoning. (Interestingly, google "UN Resolution 1244" in connection with Hillary Clinton, and you will see Clinton urging the international community to violate this resolution, which is law. The administration knows it has broken international law in intervening, and their record since then is a poor one. In other words, the Regime (rightly) suspects its authority and dignity is now illegitimate and it lacks moral force for any of its actions. Clinton, Talbott, and Norris are right to be nervous.

So should one buy this book? It really is valuable in giving info one wouldn't find elsewhere; unfortunately, $50 is a lot to ask for mediocre writing.

This is a great book for students of diplomacy. It's enjoyable to read and gives the reader a first hand perspective of how negotiations unfolded between the US & Russia.
One word of caution: if you are looking for a historical and cultural perspective on why the war broke out in the first place this book is not for you. Nor does it go into the nuances of nation building that we're now dealing with in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I've read a lot of books on American diplomacy and this is one of the best. Norris tells the story of how the US engineered the end of the Kosovo war 7 years ago, bringing the Russians and Europeans along to end Slobodan Milosevic's violent repression. It's rare for a book on diplomacy to be a page-turner, but this is one. Written with crispness and flair, it brings the personalities and events of this drama to life, taking readers from tense meetings inside the Oval Office, to the bombing runs of NATO planes, to showdowns inside the Kremlin. From the perspective of today -- when many around the world are questioning America's role in world -- it offers many valuable lessons about the importance of American diplomacy and strong leadership. It is also about a foreign policy triumph. With the final status of Kosovo again in the news, this book is a vital resource for anyone who wants to understand the stakes there. But most important, it will be a fun read for anyone who is just interested in a compelling, well-told story.