Customer Reviews

Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Many social and political challenges are involved in combating proliferation of weapons, from analyzing intelligence data for accuracy to understanding how technology transfers and how security policies are directed and implemented. COMBATING PROLIFERATION: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY POLICY comes from two specialists who analyze trends in the collection and applications of intelligence data, providing hard-hitting chapters questioning the accuracy of both data and methods used to compile and scrutinize it. Both college-level military and political science holdings will find this a key addition promoting understanding, debate, and classroom discussions.

There are really two categories of intelligence that concern the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The first category concerns the international transfer of WMD technology from nations possessing it to nations (or transnational groups) that do not posses it. The second category concerns the development of indigenous WMD capabilities by a nation that did not previously have such capabilities. Clearly the two categories are related, but require quite different intelligence methods and techniques. This book covers both categories and demonstrates how each supported counter-proliferation strategy and policy execution.

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has always been a key factor in the development of U.S. counter-proliferation policies, but has not always been in harmony with broader U.S. geo-political strategy. As a result often very good WMD intelligence on countries such as Pakistan and Iraq, has been ignored because it was not relevant to U.S. strategy at the time it was produced. It is also true that, as in the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. WMD intelligence was in harmony with U.S. strategy, but was badly flawed. This book covers both intelligence successes and failures in a balanced and generally accurate manner. Elllis and Kiefer provide quite a good history of U.S. counter-proliferation policies and strategies and the rather uneven WMD intelligence efforts that sometimes supported them and sometimes did not.

Of course both Ellis and Kiefer at the time they wrote this book (2004) worked for the Defense Department and were constrained to maintain their objectivity throughout the book. They therefore describe but do judge counter-proliferation policies and strategies of various U.S. Presidential Administrations over some thirty years. In the same manner they make every effort to fairly reflect the efforts by the IC to support counter-proliferation including the IC failures, successes, and challenges. A workman like, but good history of symbiotic relationship between counter-proliferation and intelligence.