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Combinatorial Auctions
 
 
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Combinatorial Auctions [Hardcover]

Peter Cramton (Author), Yoav Shoham (Author), Richard Steinberg (Author)
5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)

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Book Description

December 9, 2005

The study of combinatorial auctions -- auctions in which bidders can bid on combinations of items or "packages" -- draws on the disciplines of economics, operations research, and computer science. This landmark collection integrates these three perspectives, offering a state-of-the art survey of developments in combinatorial auction theory and practice by leaders in the field.Combinatorial auctions (CAs), by allowing bidders to express their preferences more fully, can lead to improved economic efficiency and greater auction revenues. However, challenges arise in both design and implementation. Combinatorial Auctions addresses each of these challenges. After describing and analyzing various CA mechanisms, the book addresses bidding languages and questions of efficiency. Possible strategies for solving the computationally intractable problem of how to compute the objective-maximizing allocation (known as the winner determination problem) are considered, as are questions of how to test alternative algorithms. The book discusses five important applications of CAs: spectrum auctions, airport takeoff and landing slots, procurement of freight transportation services, the London bus routes market, and industrial procurement. This unique collection makes recent work in CAs available to a broad audience of researchers and practitioners. The integration of work from the three disciplines underlying CAs, using a common language throughout, serves to advance the field in theory and practice.


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Editorial Reviews

Review

"Combinatorial auctions is an important interdisciplinary field combining issues from economics, game theory, optimization, and computer science. The book presents a great collection of state-of-the-art surveys with a well-balanced view integrating all aspects. A very impressive accomplishment! It will help us all appreciate the full range of issues, and will be a great reference for years to come."--Éva Tardos, Cornell University



"Anyone with an interest in auction theory, market design, and more broadly, practical applications of game theory, will find this book extremelyvaluable both as a reference to the existing work on combinatorial auctions and as a source of topics and ideas for new research." Journal of Economic Literature



"Combinatorial auctions is an important interdisciplinary field combiningissues from economics, game theory, optimization, and computer science. Thebook presents a great collection of state-of-the-art surveys with awell-balanced view integrating all aspects. A very impressiveaccomplishment! It will help us all appreciate the full range of issues,and will be a great reference for years to come." Eva Tardos , Cornell University



"'Smart' markets, which allow participants to bid for packages of items, arenow an attractive option for sales and procurements in a variety ofsettings. This book provides a comprehensive overview of both theoreticalconsiderations and practical details. It is remarkable for combiningeconomics, game theory, optimization, and computer science in a unifiedperspective. Combinatorial Auctions is a major advance in the theory andpractice of market design." Robert Wilson , Stanford University



"The study of combinatorial auctions has importance both practical andtheoretical. In combinatorial auctions, our elegant models of resourceallocation confront the true complexity of markets, where potential traderscompete to buy or sell many different but related goods. Combinatorialauctions are the great frontier of auction theory today, and this bookprovides a state-of-the-art survey of this exciting field." Roger Myerson , University of Chicago, Nobel Prize in Economics 2007



"This book is indispensable for all researchers and practitioners that want to get introduced to the world of combinatorial auctions." Operations Research Letters

About the Author

PHILIP AUSLANDER, a frequent contributor to PAJ, teaches atthe Georgia Institute of Technology. His recent book is entitled Liveness.



Richard Steinberg is Chair in Operations Research, London School of Economics.


Product Details

  • Hardcover: 649 pages
  • Publisher: The MIT Press (December 9, 2005)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0262033429
  • ISBN-13: 978-0262033428
  • Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 7.3 x 1.4 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 2.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #838,428 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Since 1983, he has conducted research on auction theory and practice. This research appears in the leading economics journals. The main focus is the design of auctions for many related items. Applications include spectrum auctions, electricity auctions, and treasury auctions. On the practical side, he is Chairman of Market Design Inc., an economics consultancy founded in 1995, focusing on the design of auction markets. Since 2001, he has played a lead role in the design and implementation of electricity auctions in France and Belgium, gas auctions in Germany, and the world's first auction for greenhouse gas emissions held in the UK in 2002. He has advised numerous governments on market design and has advised dozens of bidders in high-stake auction markets. Since 1997, he has advised ISO New England on electricity market design and was a lead designer of New England's forward capacity auction. He led the design of electricity and gas markets in Colombia, including the Firm Energy Market, the Forward Energy Market, and the Long-term Gas Market. Since June 2006, he played a leading role in the design and development of Ofcom's spectrum auctions in the UK. He has advised the UK, the US, and Australia on greenhouse gas auction design. He led the development of the FAA's airport slot auctions for the New York City airports. He received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University.

 

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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars Comprehensive and Understandable, February 15, 2006
By 
Jose M. Vidal (Columbia, SC USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   
This review is from: Combinatorial Auctions (Hardcover)
This book is aimed at researchers in Economics and multiagent systems who want to know about the latest research in combinatorial auctions---a field which has seen a lot of advances in the last decade. I found the book to be very accessible. Many of the chapters present summaries of recent work, bringing together in one place theorems and algorithms that have been published in different conferences. These summaries are a great way to learn all there is to know about combinatorial auctions without having to wade thru complex proofs or hard to read presentations.
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Inside This Book (learn more)
First Sentence:
Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called "packages," rather than just individual items. Read the first page
Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
proxy auction, atomic bids, composite bid, proxy round, proxy phase, winner determination problem, biddable combinations, second chance mechanism, bidding language, combinatorial allocation problem, bid graph, bus routes market, increment scaling, straightforward bidding, submodular valuations, combinatorial auction protocol, singleton bids, allowing package bids, coalition value function, elicitation ratio, incremental elicitation, multiattribute bids, shortest certificate, gross substitutes condition, maximum total gains
Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Electronic Commerce, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham, New York, National Conference, Karla Hoffman, Management Science, Journal of Economic Theory, Optimal Revenue, Paul Milgrom, United States, Journal of Economics, Noam Nisan, Journal of Political Economy, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Daniel Lehmann, Amir Ronen, Method Rounds Prices, Putting Auction Theory, Shigeo Matsubara, Bidder Payoff, False-Name Bids, Subhash Suri, Yuko Sakurai, Federal Communications Commission
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