47 of 50 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Chilling realism, May 13, 2000
"Anarchy" aptly describes the world envisioned by Kaplan in this collection of essays. He builds on his vast experience working with the U.S. military and third world countries to construct the ultimate pragmatical, yet in his mind bone-chillingly true, prediction for the future. His vision consists of a bifurcated world divided between the first-world economic superpowers and everyone else; a world in which the gap between the two will be ever more exacerbated as time goes on. In such a world, he envisions the devolution of the nation-state(which he believes to be largely a fantastical Western construct when applied to most of the world) into what can be described as nothing else but barely controlled chaos or anarchy. He predicts dramatic changes in the world power system in the next century, brought on by dramatic negative political and socioeconomic changes in the least developed but fastest-growing areas of the earth. Another perspective I found interesting came from the final essay in the book, in which he criticized the idealist foreign-policy views of many American intellectuals, an argument I have found in my experience to be dead-on.
From a critical perspective, I believe that Kaplan takes too negative a take on the world's prospects for the next century for two reasons. First, he draws from his experiences with underdeveloped nations and extrapolates to make generalizations about the world's economic superpowers, an oversimplification that I found astounding given his depth of knowledge on the subject. Second, he largely excludes economics from his direct analysis, an omission which, given the phenomenal grobalization trend that we are witnessing now(see The Lexus and the Olive Tree by Thomas Friedman), is inexcusable from a truly pragmatical analysis of the world.
In defense of Kaplan's stance, he draws largely from his experience as a military consultant for his experiences, so an understandably narrow view based solely on physical force and largely ignoring non-physical forces of coercion(i.e. economics) emerges. Also, I doubt if he truly feels the extremes that he sets forth in his book; in order to lay out his true feelings, he had to polarize to the extreme realist/negative viewpoint.
I highly advise this book to anyone who harbors an idealist perspective on the future of the world; although a bit extreme, it will rightfully shatter many of your naive preconceptions of the world. Beyond my humble viewpoint, Thomas Friedman cited Kaplan's work as one of four major perspectives of the post-Cold war era, along with Fukuyama, Kennedy, and Huntington. All in all, a seminal and extremely important work that I recommend to anyone interested in obtaining a more truthful perspective on the world than that advanced by the mass media
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37 of 40 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Don't give up after the first essay...read on!!, October 2, 2002
This review is from: The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (Paperback)
"Kaplan is no more than an alarmist." That is what I thought somewhere in the middle of the first essay from which the book gains its title, The Coming Anarchy. Then I began the second of the nine essays which make up the book, "Was Democracy just a Moment?" "O.K., he's an alarmist who believes democracy will destroy the world," my thinking continued. But by about page 69 I began to find insightful principles like, "States have never been formed by elections. Geography, settlement patterns, the rise of literate bourgeoisie, and, tragically, ethnic cleansing have formed states." And, "Social stability results from the establishment of a middle class" (70). These were the kinds of foundational thinking I could agree with. "Maybe I shouldn't dismiss this guy altogether," I speculated. At that point I never imagined that I would find what I did, at the end of the book.
The fact that Robert Kaplan recognizes the import of powers of observation is one of the things that impressed me as I continued to read Kaplan's essays. The first several essays of the book paint graphic pictures of a not-so-idealistic post Cold War world. Kaplan undauntingly portrays the chaos in most Third World countries. He draws parallels that cannot be dismissed. Whether you agree or not, you are forced to consider. While many people look away, and journalists won't consider writing, Kaplan keeps watching and composing.
Linked with his deductions resulting from observation, Kaplan combines a commanding respect for understanding the significance of human nature. In the fifth essay in the book, "And Now for the News..." he establishes the value of history as related in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, by Edward Gibbons. He says, "The Decline and Fall instructs that human nature never changes, and that mankind's predilection for faction, augmented by environmental and cultural differences, is what determines history" (113). Throughout all of his essays, I began to see the basis for his theses are amazingly simple, at least insofar as understanding human nature is simple. When he concludes this essay with, "When Gibbon describes everyday people in poor nations as exhibiting a `carelessness of futurity,' he exposes one tragic effect of underdevelopment in a way that many more-careful and polite tomes of today do not" (117), I realized that this guy is not only observant and somewhat discerning, he is brave, it's just not politically correct to insult people who live in the Third World.
The third, fourth, and sixth essays in the book establish without a doubt, Kaplan's identity as a realist. This fact coincides with his attention to observation and study of human nature. In the last sentence of the third essay, "Idealism won't Stop Mass Murder," he says, "But many Americans think that it may be possible to afford some protection to all those other people. If so, I fear that we may have to be very ruthless indeed" (104). "Uh oh," I thought, "he's crossing the line again, give me balance, Robert." In the next essay, "Special Intelligence," he does just that. He shifts his emphasis from observation and estimation, to more concrete illustrations. He explains that, "The assumption at Fort Bragg is that despite war-crimes tribunals and Geneva Conventions, future adversaries will play by the rules even less often than present ones do" (109). I found that, in a post 9/11 world, I have to agree with that.
By the sixth essay in the book, "Proportionalism: A Realistic Approach to Foreign Policy," Kaplan had earned my respect, although still somewhat begrudgingly. He aptly characterizes liberals and conservatives, and generously describes government, "Caught among the various mind-sets are well-meaning Washington bureaucrats who are trying to craft workable policies on global humanitarian issues" (120). In this essay Kaplan actually presents a balanced and thoughtful proposition about this subject. Given my initial impression of the book from reading that first essay, I had not thought to discover any semblance of balance or generosity. I still don't necessarily agree with him, but as a reader I am moved to consider and that is an accomplishment for an author, especially one whose approach is forceful.
I remember that I thought at this point in my reading, "He'll never conclude this book with realizing we will end up with world peace." And because I believe that we will eventually achieve world peace (albeit temporarily), I judged Kaplan as observant, discerning, generous-at-times, and unexpectedly balanced, but ultimately wide of the mark. I read the next two essays. They continued to be challenging, insightful, and proportionate. When I turned the page to begin the last essay, I still was not expecting to find the topic, "The Dangers of Peace" (169).
Kaplan's last essay is a superlative ending for this book. It is a prophecy that can't quite be believed, yet he supports his thesis with significant illustrations and facts. As he concludes this essay he makes this outrageous suggestion regarding the United States and its relationship with the United Nations, "The U.S. should pay its dues and, in essence, without declaring it, take over the U.N. in order to make it a transparent multiplier of American and Western power" (181). By this point in the book I have become used to these kinds of statements by the author, so I just take a deep breath and read on, "That, of course, may not lead to peace, since others might resent it and fight as a result; but such an action would fill the world organization's insipid ideological vacuum with at least someone's values-indeed ours" (181). The danger of a world with an ideological vacuum...it's quite ironic that it takes a realist to understand that.
Concluding this review in the context of a course on the United States and the Post Cold War, Kaplan's book, The Coming Anarchy; Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War, is entirely relevant. It is demanding and shrewd; and invites the student to think critically about the present and the future. While the author evokes passion and emotionalism by his literary technique, the student must exercise mental restraint and evaluate objectively the analysis and prediction the author offers.
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29 of 31 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Mad Max for Highbrows, May 1, 2001
This review is from: The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (Paperback)
While Mark Kaplan writes well, he gives the impression of being more interested in shock value than in thinking his own vision through to its ultimate consequences. Unfortunately a balanced view of the future is probably less of a crowd-puller than a vision of the apocalypse.
While certain parts of the earth are rendered infernal by their inhabitants, it is tendentious to assume that the hell-like quality of such areas will engulf everywhere else. A look at every moment of history, the earth has always had hellish corners, but the fact remains that we are not ruled by the successors of Stalin, Hitler, Franco or Mao. The Sendero Luminoso did not establish a gigantic slave empire in South America. Many countries that were profoundly awful and repressive places three or five decades ago have redemocratized, with results that even former revolutionaries approve of. The urban riots that rocked civilised countries like Britain in the 1980s have died down and appear, in retrospect, to have been largely due to insensitive policing. The world is thus not fated to an inevitable process of disintegration and increasing entropy.
Kaplan admits to this in an oblique fashion, by pointing out that his Turkish shanty town on the outskirts of Ankara is a world away from the slums of Sierra Leone that are terrorized by adolescent thugs. He nevertheless seems to suggest that such examples are peculiar examples of popular Islam at work that are exceptions to the general principle of social breakdown. A country like Brazil, which is experiencing a huge upsurge of charismatic Christian movements that tend to reinforce the social fabric of communities, should show that such examples of popular organisation are not the exclusive preserve of one religion.
This is a key flaw in his analysis. For in projecting a bipolar world of civilisation and anarchy, he overlooks the fact that many countries have institutions that are not perfect and do not deliver to the whole population, but that are not wholly ineffective. Politicians are not philosopher-kings who govern in disinterested fashion on behalf of society as a whole but have to court special interest groups in order to get elected. There is nothing to prevent grassroots organisations from lobbying effectively for action by the state. If he had visited favelas in São Paulo, he would see the housing projects that are gradually changing the face of its periphery. Granted, there is enormous corruption involved in these projects, in the absence of which twice as many apartments could be built, but just because it is imperfect does not mean that it is doomed to failure. He instead seems to revel in telling us just how dark his African heart of darkness is.
Kaplan is equally suspect in the historical parallels for decay that he cites - notably Gibbon. It is a shame that he did not mention some counterexamples, such as the early 11th century "Peace of God", where peasants and the Church spontaneously lobbied the aristocracy to curb the anarchic behaviour of the more unruly members of the latter.
His vision of Nostromo is equally tendentious. Granted, in Western African countries, there may be only a few people who are able to get things done. Anyone who has done business in a large developing country like Brazil will know that there are well-defined codes of conduct and large classes of people that make things work, even if it sometimes requires 'informal' approaches to achieve results.
Kaplan is right to remind us of the phantoms that haunt us. It is possible to imagine a dispossessed native underclass joining forces with an influx of marginalised immigrants to form a radical movement that challenges the hegemony of the elite. Then again, such groups may simply fight each other and thus become amenable to control. Both outcomes are possible, but the impact on the well-being of the elite would be profoundly different in each case. It is thus misleading to assume that social breakdown is inevitable everywhere, and a shame that he did not highlight an equally serious danger - of the loss of personal freedom in the name of protection against the anarchy he so enthusiastically forecasts.
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