Customer Reviews

The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War

5 star:		(38)
4 star:		(21)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(6)
1 star:		(8)

 

 

"Anarchy" aptly describes the world envisioned by Kaplan in this collection of essays. He builds on his vast experience working with the U.S. military and third world countries to construct the ultimate pragmatical, yet in his mind bone-chillingly true, prediction for the future. His vision consists of a bifurcated world divided between the first-world economic superpowers and everyone else; a world in which the gap between the two will be ever more exacerbated as time goes on. In such a world, he envisions the devolution of the nation-state(which he believes to be largely a fantastical Western construct when applied to most of the world) into what can be described as nothing else but barely controlled chaos or anarchy. He predicts dramatic changes in the world power system in the next century, brought on by dramatic negative political and socioeconomic changes in the least developed but fastest-growing areas of the earth. Another perspective I found interesting came from the final essay in the book, in which he criticized the idealist foreign-policy views of many American intellectuals, an argument I have found in my experience to be dead-on.

From a critical perspective, I believe that Kaplan takes too negative a take on the world's prospects for the next century for two reasons. First, he draws from his experiences with underdeveloped nations and extrapolates to make generalizations about the world's economic superpowers, an oversimplification that I found astounding given his depth of knowledge on the subject. Second, he largely excludes economics from his direct analysis, an omission which, given the phenomenal grobalization trend that we are witnessing now(see The Lexus and the Olive Tree by Thomas Friedman), is inexcusable from a truly pragmatical analysis of the world.

In defense of Kaplan's stance, he draws largely from his experience as a military consultant for his experiences, so an understandably narrow view based solely on physical force and largely ignoring non-physical forces of coercion(i.e. economics) emerges. Also, I doubt if he truly feels the extremes that he sets forth in his book; in order to lay out his true feelings, he had to polarize to the extreme realist/negative viewpoint.

I highly advise this book to anyone who harbors an idealist perspective on the future of the world; although a bit extreme, it will rightfully shatter many of your naive preconceptions of the world. Beyond my humble viewpoint, Thomas Friedman cited Kaplan's work as one of four major perspectives of the post-Cold war era, along with Fukuyama, Kennedy, and Huntington. All in all, a seminal and extremely important work that I recommend to anyone interested in obtaining a more truthful perspective on the world than that advanced by the mass media

"Kaplan is no more than an alarmist." That is what I thought somewhere in the middle of the first essay from which the book gains its title, The Coming Anarchy. Then I began the second of the nine essays which make up the book, "Was Democracy just a Moment?" "O.K., he's an alarmist who believes democracy will destroy the world," my thinking continued. But by about page 69 I began to find insightful principles like, "States have never been formed by elections. Geography, settlement patterns, the rise of literate bourgeoisie, and, tragically, ethnic cleansing have formed states." And, "Social stability results from the establishment of a middle class" (70). These were the kinds of foundational thinking I could agree with. "Maybe I shouldn't dismiss this guy altogether," I speculated. At that point I never imagined that I would find what I did, at the end of the book.
The fact that Robert Kaplan recognizes the import of powers of observation is one of the things that impressed me as I continued to read Kaplan's essays. The first several essays of the book paint graphic pictures of a not-so-idealistic post Cold War world. Kaplan undauntingly portrays the chaos in most Third World countries. He draws parallels that cannot be dismissed. Whether you agree or not, you are forced to consider. While many people look away, and journalists won't consider writing, Kaplan keeps watching and composing.
Linked with his deductions resulting from observation, Kaplan combines a commanding respect for understanding the significance of human nature. In the fifth essay in the book, "And Now for the News..." he establishes the value of history as related in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, by Edward Gibbons. He says, "The Decline and Fall instructs that human nature never changes, and that mankind's predilection for faction, augmented by environmental and cultural differences, is what determines history" (113). Throughout all of his essays, I began to see the basis for his theses are amazingly simple, at least insofar as understanding human nature is simple. When he concludes this essay with, "When Gibbon describes everyday people in poor nations as exhibiting a `carelessness of futurity,' he exposes one tragic effect of underdevelopment in a way that many more-careful and polite tomes of today do not" (117), I realized that this guy is not only observant and somewhat discerning, he is brave, it's just not politically correct to insult people who live in the Third World.
The third, fourth, and sixth essays in the book establish without a doubt, Kaplan's identity as a realist. This fact coincides with his attention to observation and study of human nature. In the last sentence of the third essay, "Idealism won't Stop Mass Murder," he says, "But many Americans think that it may be possible to afford some protection to all those other people. If so, I fear that we may have to be very ruthless indeed" (104). "Uh oh," I thought, "he's crossing the line again, give me balance, Robert." In the next essay, "Special Intelligence," he does just that. He shifts his emphasis from observation and estimation, to more concrete illustrations. He explains that, "The assumption at Fort Bragg is that despite war-crimes tribunals and Geneva Conventions, future adversaries will play by the rules even less often than present ones do" (109). I found that, in a post 9/11 world, I have to agree with that.
By the sixth essay in the book, "Proportionalism: A Realistic Approach to Foreign Policy," Kaplan had earned my respect, although still somewhat begrudgingly. He aptly characterizes liberals and conservatives, and generously describes government, "Caught among the various mind-sets are well-meaning Washington bureaucrats who are trying to craft workable policies on global humanitarian issues" (120). In this essay Kaplan actually presents a balanced and thoughtful proposition about this subject. Given my initial impression of the book from reading that first essay, I had not thought to discover any semblance of balance or generosity. I still don't necessarily agree with him, but as a reader I am moved to consider and that is an accomplishment for an author, especially one whose approach is forceful.
I remember that I thought at this point in my reading, "He'll never conclude this book with realizing we will end up with world peace." And because I believe that we will eventually achieve world peace (albeit temporarily), I judged Kaplan as observant, discerning, generous-at-times, and unexpectedly balanced, but ultimately wide of the mark. I read the next two essays. They continued to be challenging, insightful, and proportionate. When I turned the page to begin the last essay, I still was not expecting to find the topic, "The Dangers of Peace" (169).
Kaplan's last essay is a superlative ending for this book. It is a prophecy that can't quite be believed, yet he supports his thesis with significant illustrations and facts. As he concludes this essay he makes this outrageous suggestion regarding the United States and its relationship with the United Nations, "The U.S. should pay its dues and, in essence, without declaring it, take over the U.N. in order to make it a transparent multiplier of American and Western power" (181). By this point in the book I have become used to these kinds of statements by the author, so I just take a deep breath and read on, "That, of course, may not lead to peace, since others might resent it and fight as a result; but such an action would fill the world organization's insipid ideological vacuum with at least someone's values-indeed ours" (181). The danger of a world with an ideological vacuum...it's quite ironic that it takes a realist to understand that.
Concluding this review in the context of a course on the United States and the Post Cold War, Kaplan's book, The Coming Anarchy; Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War, is entirely relevant. It is demanding and shrewd; and invites the student to think critically about the present and the future. While the author evokes passion and emotionalism by his literary technique, the student must exercise mental restraint and evaluate objectively the analysis and prediction the author offers.

While Mark Kaplan writes well, he gives the impression of being more interested in shock value than in thinking his own vision through to its ultimate consequences. Unfortunately a balanced view of the future is probably less of a crowd-puller than a vision of the apocalypse.

While certain parts of the earth are rendered infernal by their inhabitants, it is tendentious to assume that the hell-like quality of such areas will engulf everywhere else. A look at every moment of history, the earth has always had hellish corners, but the fact remains that we are not ruled by the successors of Stalin, Hitler, Franco or Mao. The Sendero Luminoso did not establish a gigantic slave empire in South America. Many countries that were profoundly awful and repressive places three or five decades ago have redemocratized, with results that even former revolutionaries approve of. The urban riots that rocked civilised countries like Britain in the 1980s have died down and appear, in retrospect, to have been largely due to insensitive policing. The world is thus not fated to an inevitable process of disintegration and increasing entropy.

Kaplan admits to this in an oblique fashion, by pointing out that his Turkish shanty town on the outskirts of Ankara is a world away from the slums of Sierra Leone that are terrorized by adolescent thugs. He nevertheless seems to suggest that such examples are peculiar examples of popular Islam at work that are exceptions to the general principle of social breakdown. A country like Brazil, which is experiencing a huge upsurge of charismatic Christian movements that tend to reinforce the social fabric of communities, should show that such examples of popular organisation are not the exclusive preserve of one religion.

This is a key flaw in his analysis. For in projecting a bipolar world of civilisation and anarchy, he overlooks the fact that many countries have institutions that are not perfect and do not deliver to the whole population, but that are not wholly ineffective. Politicians are not philosopher-kings who govern in disinterested fashion on behalf of society as a whole but have to court special interest groups in order to get elected. There is nothing to prevent grassroots organisations from lobbying effectively for action by the state. If he had visited favelas in São Paulo, he would see the housing projects that are gradually changing the face of its periphery. Granted, there is enormous corruption involved in these projects, in the absence of which twice as many apartments could be built, but just because it is imperfect does not mean that it is doomed to failure. He instead seems to revel in telling us just how dark his African heart of darkness is.

Kaplan is equally suspect in the historical parallels for decay that he cites - notably Gibbon. It is a shame that he did not mention some counterexamples, such as the early 11th century "Peace of God", where peasants and the Church spontaneously lobbied the aristocracy to curb the anarchic behaviour of the more unruly members of the latter.

His vision of Nostromo is equally tendentious. Granted, in Western African countries, there may be only a few people who are able to get things done. Anyone who has done business in a large developing country like Brazil will know that there are well-defined codes of conduct and large classes of people that make things work, even if it sometimes requires 'informal' approaches to achieve results.

Kaplan is right to remind us of the phantoms that haunt us. It is possible to imagine a dispossessed native underclass joining forces with an influx of marginalised immigrants to form a radical movement that challenges the hegemony of the elite. Then again, such groups may simply fight each other and thus become amenable to control. Both outcomes are possible, but the impact on the well-being of the elite would be profoundly different in each case. It is thus misleading to assume that social breakdown is inevitable everywhere, and a shame that he did not highlight an equally serious danger - of the loss of personal freedom in the name of protection against the anarchy he so enthusiastically forecasts.

Although I do not agree with the pessimism of Neo-Malthusians and end-of-history advocates, I found Robert Kaplan's new book an eloquent warning against apathy as we enter a new century. Kaplan correctly points out that the map of the world is deceiving. Most frontiers do not include or define nations based on a single ethnicity and/or religion, i.e., the essential cohesive force for a stable society is missing. Based on his travels around the Third World, the author observed that rapidly expanding populations, urbanization without adequate infrastructures and environmental disasters are causing the collapse of marginal states and their forcible integration into Yugoslavia-type states. Soaring populations and shrinking raw materials make democracy problematic and stability uncertain ,espcially, in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Influenced by such writers as Huntington, Home-Dixon, van Gleveld, Rahe and others cited in the text - unfortunately there is no bibliography - Kaplan believes that homogeneous states such as Germany and Japan may not face the certain fragmentation of multiethnic societies, perhaps even the United States. Although the writing is uneven - the last third of the book consists of essays published previously - Kaplan does develop some interesting themes: Democratically elected regimes do not survive if the economy is not developed enough to prevent the return of authoritarian governments. Enlightened despotism is not preferable to democracy. The preferred alternative may be the middle for those countries which are trying to develop their economies without falling into anarchy. Like Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts, this book is a warning and perhaps a prohesy.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism led to a search for a new paradigm to explain the post-Cold War world. Three major works have been written (originally as articles in Atlantic Monthly and Foreign Affairs) to explain this new era. Robert Kaplan's A Coming Anarchy, Francis Fukuyama's End of History and the Last Man, and Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order attempted to provide a framework for international relations in the 90s and beyond.
Of the three authors, Robert Kaplan approaches the subject not from an academic background but as a reporter and a world traveler. The Coming Anarchy is he view of the state of the world. It is a world where globalization only serves to link the Western World towards a sinking Third World. It is a world where stability is a fleeting goal that can never be achieved. Of the three authors, Kaplan's view is the most stark and unforgiving. Fukuyama presents a more optimistic view where liberal democracies have triumphed over the world and the next golden age is in the world's grasp. The truth probably lies between them. Kaplan has no confidence in the abilities of the Western world to help stabilize the Third world. The relative success of the United Nations and NATO in Bosnia serve to contradict Kaplan's argument but the real test will occur when forces withdrawal.
Samuel Huntington attempts to paint a new Cold War not between ideologies but between the fundamental civilizations of the world. This echoes Kaplan's articles and the events between Israel and Palestine.
As one of the three signature attempts to envision the post Cold War world; the Coming Anarchy alone deserves attention. For good or ill, the article presents a reasoned approach towards world affairs that policy makers are in part basing US policy on.
The remainder of the book presents other essay's the Robert Kaplan has written. Although they display the breadth of Kaplan's knowledge, the star of the book is the Coming Anarchy. Without that article, the book looses it focus... Despite this, the book is must read for anyone interested in international affairs and want to understand how the world is changing and why.

First and foremost, this is one of the most thought provoking books I've read in a long time. Kaplan's coverage and commentaries of many overlooked third-world tragedies are some of the most excellent and informative I've ever read. Kaplan has been on the ground during some particularly nasty historical events, and has seen first hand the growing pattern of anarchy and global instability that is certainly a crisis to us all. I am a person of strong opinions who will give them freely, but I also know a superior argument when I hear one, and on more than one instance I was surprised to find myself siding with Kaplan on things that I would have found harsh or ridiculous a year ago.

Unfortunately, Kaplan's excellent, intelligent commentary on global politics can often get bogged down when he takes to the soap-box. The closer you get to the end, the more the book disintegrates into a long-winded, cynical tirade that isn't very constructive at all. Kaplan's views on American domestic policy often seem a bit "out there" which isn't surprising considering he's an expatriate who's seen the worst the world can offer. He can really get self-indulgent when he starts pointing fingers. Also, praising the foreign policy of Henry Kissinger and to a lesser degree Richard Nixon is a little hard to take at times, and even seems to contradict many of his earlier statements.

Kaplan does more than just point fingers fortunately, but his proposed solutions range from progressive to medieval. Kaplan obviously prefers "order" over liberty which will certainly be hard for many liberal readers to stomach. It was almost impossible for me. I do agree with him that some countries need thier basic needs, like food and shelter met before having democracy thrust upon them like a white elephant. Unfortunately, it's hard for a spoiled westerner like me to judge when factoring in wild cards like tribal hatreds and religious intolorance. Kaplan actually gives the Taliban credit for stabilizing Afghanistan, which they obviously did. Of course, Hitler did wonderful things for Germany if you're willing to overlook that whole Holocaust thing.

While Kaplan does come off as another opinionated elitist in the end, I still believe this is a book worth reading and I stand behind my rating. This book, both reported facts, and too often Kaplan's own views, offer us a glimpse at the very worst the world has to offer. Should we be prepared for it? Yes. Should we live in constant fear of it? Absolutely not.

Robert D. Kaplan is a realist whose vision of where the world - especially the Third World - is headed is solidly based on history. He looks at Africa in particular and sees a continent degenerating into chaos as large masses of unemployed young males roam cities in countries which are barely functioning administrative entities. Kaplan pours cold water on our comfortable Western notions that all these places need is a little touch of democracy. His title essay describes the chaos in Sierra Leone. The front page story on the New York Times yesterday about the utterly meaningless and pointless war in the Congo (Zaire) was a chilling illustration of Kaplan's no-rose-colored-glasses vision of what is really happening in this distressed part of the Third World. His vision of mankind is Hobbesian, i.e. that life in these places is indeed "nasty, brutish and short". Conflicts are simply not going to go away, says Kaplan, and peace - desirable as it may be - may not always be what we are going to experience. I especially liked Kaplan's essay on Joseph Conrad's "Nostromo" which depicted how the brutal world of Conrad's mythical Costaguana remains a reality today, rather than a distant fiction. I similarly enjoyed his use of Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire to illustrate that we need to see clearly that the more things change, the more they remain the same.

The Coming Anarchy should be required reading for every citizen who wants to think deeply about the dangers and realities of the emerging world. It would be particularly helpful for members of Congress and would-be advisers to the next President to read this disturbing and provocative work and ponder deeply its warnings about the dangers of human tendencies toward violence, selfishness, and self deception.

There is a good bit I would quarrel with in Kaplan's work (and I suspect he would disagree vehemently with some of my positions). Yet there is an informed literate intelligence and an experienced reality based reporting that combine to create one of the most interesting critiques of political correctness , the Clinton Administration's trivial superficiality and the Congress's neglect of the changing world that I have encountered.

Any book that cites Joseph Conrad's Nostromo, Sir Moses Finley's Politics in the Ancient World, Edward Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Thomas Hobbes, Henry Kissinger's A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, Pul Rahe's Republics Ancient and Modern and Latife Takin Berji Kristin : Tales from the Garbage Hills, is worth looking at. When that book is written by someone who has reported from Afghanistan, sub-Saharan Africa, Bosnia and Kossovo among other places it is a book worth reading. When he raises profound questions about the assumptions of both our conservative and liberal elites and paints vivid pictures of dangers unimagined by a peaceful society sheltered by decades of safety then it is a work worth thinking about long and hard.

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding the challenges we will face in the next thirty years.

For anyone familiar with The Ends of the Earth and Balkan Ghosts, Kaplan's dark views on the next century will be familiar. His latest has more of a political edge. The rhetorical questions he poses ask what we can do to intervene and fix social collapse in places like Congo and Pakistan. The answer, coldly logical, is that we can't do much. Techno-optimism (for the most part) seems to rule the day in the West for now. Somehow we've convinced ourselves that because we can use our computers to order merchandise through the mail, the future is inescapably bright and free from the constraints of rainfall, population density and tribal rivalry. This book is a needle which neatly punctures this Panglossian balloon and as such is sorely needed.

The book's title is somewhat of a misnomer; "The Coming Anarchy" refers to the book's lead essay which Robert Kaplan wrote in 1994. But the book covers much more ground, dealing with the relevance of realist thought in today's world and debunking some of the standard thought processes that dominate foreign policy discussions in the West.

Kaplan has lived and reported from the world's most wretched places-no wonder that this perspective is hardly accommodating to grandiose statements of the victory of liberalism or the need to conduct a moral foreign policy. Rather, his travels have hardened him and have thought him two things: that what the press writes about is not necessarily what should be in the news; and that the passion for morality and democracy can be counterproductive and dangerous.

On the first thought, Kaplan is keenly aware that headlines are hardly representative of the big changes that will affect our world-how we cope with the physical environment, how human beings crave for conflict, how shifting power relations impact world politics. His close reading of classical texts (Kissinger's "A World Restored" is prominent in the book) shows that he is not the type of journalist who comes across something and writes about it. Rather his travels form an impetus for thought and research-and this makes his articles all the more exciting and insightful.

His second thought is to dispute the passionate love that Western policymakers have for democracy and peace. A peaceful world would be one without conflict-where the basic questions that give rise to disputes would be resolved; but this might not be a good world, Kaplan warns. He is also follows steadily in the realist tradition that distinguishes between the pursuit of a moral foreign policy and the achievement of one-the latter often comes when policymakers are least in quest of morality.

What emerges from the collection is a strong realist sense that is sharply at odds with contemporary debates. But Kaplan's voice is informed and temperate, and his caution has been bred in the world's hardest places and so deserves to be heard, and heard.