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9 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Thorough and concise summary of the Chinese challenge, September 18, 2005
This review is from: The Coming Conflict with China (Paperback)
_The Coming Conflict with China_ by Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro is a relatively brief (at 221 pages) but thorough assessment of the possible threat of and (to a lesser extent) the possible solutions to an emerging China in the early years of the 21st century. While not condemning China in any manner I would describe as hateful or racist and indeed acknowledging that there is a distinct possibility China may one day grow more democratic and develop close ties to the United States in the future, the authors contended that American policy makers need to be aware of the real threat to American vital interests posed by the Chinese, the disparity between stated Chinese goals and actual Chinese policy, and the ineffectiveness if not downright naivety of past American policy dating from the late 1980s, when China and the United States no longer had the Soviet Union as a common enemy and thus no longer had much in the way of common ground on strategic issues. Chinese policy has changed markedly since then thanks to events beginning in the late 1980s, notably with the brutal crackdown of the Tiananmen Square student occupation in 1989 (the Chinese saw this and other actions as a real threat to their Communist Party), the consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev's political reforms (which the Chinese interpreted as diluting the Soviet Communist Party's power and leading to their ousting), and the 1991 Gulf War (a display of very advanced military technology and planning that stunned the Chinese, showing to them how far behind the Americans they were and technology they would have to begin to master in order to achieve territorial goals in the South China Sea and any possible future military actions against Taiwan).
The leadership in China has been working towards a goal of domination over Asia by a four-pronged strategy. First, and foremost, to gain sovereignty and control over Taiwan (the authors described in detail the Chinese naval, air, and army build up in the last decade or so), second, to expand Chinese military presence in and take control of the South China Sea (in large part by annexing small islands and island groups such as the Spratly Islands and Mischief Reef, illustrated in a map in the front of the book), third, to reduce the American military presence in East Asia (particularly if possible on the Korean peninsula, done by encouraging the collapse of North Korea and the reunification of the peninsula under South Korea, ending the need for a large American military presence there), and third, paradoxically, to maintain a high American troop presence in Japan to keep it from rearming and becoming more assertive in international affairs. The latter point is one the authors stressed several times, as the growing power of China will require a more powerful, skilled, and assertive Japanese military, as the Americans alone cannot hope to counterbalance China, to keep Taiwan safe and free, and to keep the sea lanes open (in the face of Chinese dominance in the South China Sea and any possible future actions in the waters around Taiwan such a blockade).
In addition to being on the road to becoming a hostile hegemon in Asia - a direct threat to American vital interests, as such a hegemon could coerce American allies, threaten vital trade routes and sea lanes, and counteract or otherwise threaten American military deployments in the region - China is already an economic threat to American economic interests and furthermore is using its unfair trade practices to aid it in its military buildup by amassing large foreign cash reserves and acquiring advanced technology by coercion, deception, theft, or simply strong arm tactics (additionally many companies that do business in the United States are actually owned or are subsidiaries of the People's Liberation Army). China has been added in this endeavor by something the authors called the New China Lobby, a loose organization of businesses, investors, and economic advisors that have a large financial stake in China; eager to do business there, they either follow direct Chinese suggestions and orders or act in ways they generally believe Beijing will like in order to curtail or abolish American policy designed to end Chinese tariff and non-tariff barriers (as well as any linking of economic and regulatory benefits such as Most Favored Nation Status to human right issues within China), and by companies based in our European allies, who China turns to from time to time to punish some American firm for failing to hand over high tech or proprietary technology or for Washington for passing some legislation or making a statement that Beijing disagreed with.
Bernstein and Munro stated that the U.S. should have three goals with regards to China, namely to ensure peace in Asia by maintaining a stable balance of power there, to encourage China to become a responsible state committed to non-proliferation, peaceful resolution of disputes, and honest free trade, and third, to induce China to become more democratic and respectful of human rights. To achieve those goals they suggest that Washington push for a 5% annual reduction in the trade-deficit ratio, fully and loudly support all international forums to decry Chinese human rights abuses, and be "cool and correct" but not lavish and celebratory in Chinese-American diplomatic relations (summits should not be "occasions for tyrants to bask in glory"). Americans should be realistic about Tibet, as while there is virtually no chance that it will become an independent country and too much "sentimental nonsense" has been written about some idyllic Tibetan past, Washington should nonetheless maintain a respectful and public relationship with those who represent Tibetan cultural and religious aspirations and as with human rights issues in general unapologetically point out Chinese excesses in that area. Additionally, America should seek to maintain the technological edge it has over China, deter Chinese nuclear buildups, maintain Taiwanese defenses as a credible deterrent, and to encourage and strengthen Japan militarily and politically, ending its internationally abnormal military weakness and "diplomatic pariah-hood."
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13 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A realistic look at an uncomforable subject, December 28, 1998
By A Customer
This review is from: The Coming Conflict with China (Paperback)
As my profession is that of a US Navy officer, I have more than a passing interest in foreign affairs. I spotted this book at the store, and in light of recent world events (i.e. the sentencing of Chinese democracy dissidents to years at hard labor for the Orwellian charge of 'spreading counterrevolutionary information' and the recent sale of missile technology to the Chinese govt) I bought it. It is a definite 'must-read' for anyone with an interest in this area. The authors show how greedy US businessmen, ex-government officials, and Chinese apologists are selling out both the American soldier and American consumer in the name of the quick buck. The authors use the Chinese government's own words to show the enmity held towards the United States, not by the Chinese citizen, but by the Communist ruling elite, intent on ruthlessly crushing any opposition. It is amazing to me that people will refuse to believe that China's leaders will not hesitate to crush a weakened neighbor when daily we see evidence of their complete disregard for the basic rights of their own citizens. If the authors are as right as they appear to be, the scenes seem eerily reminiscent of Europe in the 1930's. The question is, are we going to continue to 'appease' China much like Chamberlain tried to 'appease' Hitler? Or, are we going to find the Churchillian courage to remain firm in the face of evil? This book makes for an excellent, thought-provoking read. I wish that I could make it required reading for every Western military officer and national legislator.
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35 of 51 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
It worthes not even one star, November 15, 1999
By A Customer
The authors claim that China is an aggressive country seeking hegemony and is going to dominate Asia. Their argument is based on the two biases: 1. ``what is good for America is good for the World", needless to say, it is as absurd as ``what is good for General Motor is good for America". 2. Stealthy change of concept. The authors make the conclusion that China's promise that ``we will never seek hegemony" is suspicious by the following three ``good" reasons (page 53), ``One is that China is now beginning the passage into a new phase of its history what might be called an era of restored national greatness. Two, China is so big and so naturally powerful that it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy. Three, and most important, China has pursued initiatives and framed strategic goals that belie its claims of modest Third World status." The first two reasons have nothing to do with hegemony unless you substitute ``hegemony" by ``developing and modernization", but has China claimed that ``we will never seek developing and modernization"? Examine the authors' argument we will see that almost all actions taken by China which are set to substantiate the last and the ``mostimportant" reason, turn out to be only normal actions of a ``normal" nation which ``has the sovereign right to determine its security needs and to build the armed forces required to meet those needs." The quoted words and sentences are the authors', see page 171, where the authors accuse that China denies Japan those rights. But the whole book is based on denying China such rights. What is the authors' logic? Only when we apply the ``principle" that ``What is good for America, it is good for the World" then we can understand the hidden logic of the authors. That is, to maintain the status quo in Asia, (the authors assume that is in America's interest), no country is allowed to be strong enough to have the potential to compete with America. So a country as China has no right to develop. A China that using its ``sovereign right to determine its security needs and to build the armed forces required to meet those needs" and to develop its economy is a danger to America's hegemony in Asia, therefore, a danger to the World. But the authors have misidentified America's interest. When a nation like China ``is now beginning the passage into a new phase of its history what might be called an era of restored national greatness", how to protect America's interest? Of course, if America can stop this trend, stop it and continuing enjoy the domination of Asia, and the World. But if China cannot be stopped, which is certainly the case, does where lie America's interest? We only know that conflict is not in interest of any country and basic game theory tells us that the best situation to all sides might be the win-win situation. To justify that China should not have the sovereign right as the authors think that every nation should have, the authors call the help of ideology. The authors delude themselves by claiming that once China becomes a democratic nation, then everything will be OK. But as long as China keeps as one nation (that is, not be divided), democratic or not, it will use its sovereign right to determine its security needs and to build the armed forces required to meet those needs and to develop its economy. Then to cooperate or to conflict? You cannot escape the problem. Examples of some main flaws in the book: 1. Repeat an accusation many times without proof, then finally, the repeating itself is a proof. For example, the authors repeatly state that China's foreign policy is ``irresponsible", ``China's goal is to become the paramount power in Asia", but never give any detail to substantiate them. And by repeating it many times, later the authors just use these claims as facts. 2. Twist facts. For example, to establish that China is aggressive, the authors claim that the dispute about islands in South China Sea is all China's fault, redardless of history. The only reason the authors given is that all those island are farther away from China than other claiming countries. Using distance to judge island's belonging is an absurd concept, one look at the world map will show you how many American islands are actually nearer other countries than America. 3. Paint China as a demon, then whatever a demon does is evil. For the authors, even China's policy of pursuing peaceful coexistence with her neighbours is a threaten to Japan, a designed America ally by the authors. 4. Omit important information. The authors adimit that in all but one regional conflicts of China with its neighbours, China was actually in defensive position. The only exception is the war to Vietnam in 1979. But the authors forget to tell readers that America encouraged China in that war. Finally, it should be pointed out that ``Dongfeng" in Chinese means ``East Wind", not ``East Is Red" as the authors explained on page 76.
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