Customer Reviews

The Coming War With Japan

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The Friedmans have a view of world power returning to the multipolar world status it was before 1914. In their view, the old reasons for the USA and Japan to be allies had ended as of 1991, and economic frictions would lead to conflict between the two countries.

But in retrospect, they were very, very wrong. In fact, the USA and Japan probably have more reasons to be economic, political and even military allies in an increasingly dangerous world than ever before.

1. While the Friedmans thought Red China would come apart ("The same forces that destroyed European communism are present in China, suppressed at Tiananmen Square"), and that the resulting "refragmentation of China" would lead to Japanese vs. American intrigue in China, that hasn't happened!

Red China, while it calls itself communist, has in many ways reinvented or rediscovered fascism, with private corporations subject to tight state political control. And it is far from politically breaking up. Indeed, quite the contrary, an increasingly militarized and aggressive Red China, now with a blue water navy, will draw Japan and the USA closer together even more than the Soviet threat did.

2. The need to contain and perhaps reform the Muslim menace, and the need to secure oil and other resources, will again give Japan and the USA far more reasons to cooperate than to compete against each other. Already Japan has been quite cooperative with US military intervention in Iraq, in rather stark contrast to US "allies" like France.

3. Lastly, the Friedmans completely missed the demographic factor. For a nation to be willing to become more belligerent, especially against a nation as powerful as the USA, it had better have a large enough pool of angry young people, particularly men, willing to fight. Japan has one of the world's lowest birthrates, with 1.2 per woman as opposed to 2.1 per woman in the USA, and Japan has one of the lowest proportions of people under 30 of any nation on earth. Even with a society as into robotic technologies as Japan is, that's a serious and fatal flaw in the Friedmans' analysis.

Heres an interesting book that has been somewhat discredited over time. Still, the analysis is excellent and worth considering.

The basic theme is that Japan and the United States could become opponents again with the end of the Cold War. The titanic battle against communism required Japan and the United States to come to an understanding. Basically, Japan was to manufacture goods, allow the US basing privileges and provide some defensive capability by patrolling the airspace and ocean immediately surrounding Japan. In return, the Unites States would guarantee Japan access to natural resources and provide for Japan's military defense. With the Cold War over, this arrangement has become economically unsound for the US to continue. A new political arrangement must be developed.

The authors show how Japan must have access to material resources from Asia and the Middle East to continue as a strong nation. They also reveal that Japan could probably aquire this access on its own through new alliances (especially with India) and by rebuilding its military. This would put Japan in conflict with the US since America needs control of the Western Pacific to feel stable.

The analysis leading up to the conclusion is inspiring. Friedman and Lebard boil down Japanese and US strategic interests and show how these needs are (or could be) met. They also show us how Japan could quickly rebuild its military forces.

As a prior post reveals, the conclusion is less than stellar in some aspects. They think Japan should ally itself with North Korea. Fat chance of that even before the Kim Dynasty started lobbing nuke capable missiles in Japan's direction! Another point that seems strange is the idea they put forward of placing a US armored division in South Korea. Why? The terrain just isnt right for large tank units.

The conflict the authors envision has not occurred for many reasons. As I noted above, they didnt factor in North Korea very well. Also, they didnt forsee Tokyo's economic bust. Even so, you can see some of the elements they discussed in motion today. A good example is the growing pressure in Japan to remove the Marines from Okinawa. This wouldnt have happened during the Cold War.

The authors missed some critical points in their analysis. Still, they did seem to capture many of the post-Cold War pressures we see today in Northeast Asia.

Though events in the two decades following publication of this book have not proceeded as the authors predicted, it is still a useful analysis.

The authors failed to anticipate 1) that the Chinese communist system would survive the fall of the Soviet and East Europe communist regimes 2) that the frenetic globalization of the world economy would lead to vast increases in Chinese power and influence and 3) that Japan's economy would tailspin into a (terminal?) deflationary spiral. These three factors, together, create a situation of a powerful China and a weak Japan. So the Japanese are no longer in any position to threaten anybody with military aggression.

Still, should the future develop into a Cold War-style standoff between the PRC and the USA, all the old factors active during the USA-USSR cold war will once again become pertinent. This is where the book shines with its analysis of cold war power politics and economics. Well worth reviewing.

I think the most important point made in the book is that during a cold war-type situation, events that take place anywhere on the globe have a profound impact on the behaviors of the two competitors. When that situation ended between 1989 and 1991 (with the decline and collapse of the USSR), that entire dynamic ends and a "de-coupling" of crisis events makes for a situation in which a US-Japan split becomes possible and likely, as described in the book.

I also very much liked the text on the back cover which illustrates just how unpredictable the teeter-totter of history can be. How the world can change completely only in a span of twenty years.

The authors' central point is that the events leading to the war in the Pacific (1937-1945) are (contemporary to the early 90s) repeating themselves, and that another war between the U.S. and Japan is imminent. The proof of this is there, and incredibly accurate, but the authors' have failed to grasp the emotional and sociological reasons why that war will not come. As an analysis of the causes of WWII in the Pacific, and why Japan's economy suddenly fell apart in the late 90s, this book is as good as it gets -- just don't buy their predictions.

Even though this book is getting older, it's worth finding it at your library and giving it a read. The Friedmans see the world returning to more classic, zero-sum balance-of-power relationships in the post-Cold War context. This is even the case as regional, multilateral, and global international institutions develop. Since the nation-state system is still the most legitimate actor in these relationships, it seems that final equations of national interests will be the utlimate determinants of peace, war, and wealth in the coming decades.

This is an important consideration to understand if we are interested in looking at the world as a set of relationships that are more than public relations gestures [Kissinger's, 'Diplomacy' is also essential].

This 'Coming War With Japan,' identifies a set of mutually incompatible needs of both the United States and Japan that will ultimately define their relationship in the absence of the Soviet threat. China certainly understand this as well. These needs dwell in the economic and strategic spheres, much of it centering around energy needs.

The value of the Friedmans' approach -what makes their other book, 'The Future of War,' equally good- is to present these issues within a broad, historical context that gives us a perspective that isn't limited by the current context of our relationship. Even if you think that any differences between Japan and the United States can ultimately be resolved without was or economic conflict or else obscured by the growing prominence of China, this book still provides a useful perspective on the United States' relationship with Japan and its interests in the region.

Still waiting....? Another failed post-cold war attempt at 'Mr X' (or Mr and Mrs X??) status...

The analysis of where post-Cold War politics is going is insightful and profound. Unfortunately, the alleged trigger for the coming war, European (non-) Union of 1992 has its roots in Cold War politics. Friedman used the dissipation of Cold War politics as the rationale for the coming impotence and disintegration of Cold War institutions (ie NATO). The EU is a child of Cold War politics; therefore the failing of successful integration should have been anticipated. Ergo, the "coming war" loses it's trigger. Still, the analysis is sound and I will be purchasing subsequent books from Friedman.