Comm Check...: The Final Flight of Shuttle Columbia (Hardcover)

by Michael Cabbage (Author), William Harwood (Author) "Plunging back to Earth after a 16-day science mission, the shuttle Columbia streaked through orbital darkness at 5 miles per second, fast enough to fly..." (more)
Key Phrases: reconstruction hangar, bipod area, bipod ramp, Mission Control, Mission Management Team, White House (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From The Washington Post

What is it about the space program, anyway? When the Mars Rover began sending pictures to Earth a while ago, the NASA Web site received more than a billion hits within a couple of days. When President Bush wanted to find a national goal that would transcend everyday concerns, he chose returning to the moon. Why, in a time of war and terrorism, are our spirits lifted because a small machine millions of miles away sends back some photographs, or when our political leaders remind us of larger goals?

You won't find much attention to this intriguing question in Comm Check. What you will find instead is a gripping, detailed account of what happens when you try to translate the glowing vision of space exploration into the nuts and bolts of real-world accomplishment. The authors, both veteran reporters on the NASA beat, have taken as their subject the tragic events of Feb. 1, 2003, when the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated as it re-entered the Earth's atmosphere over the southwestern United States. Starting with a short description of the horrified silence that fell on the control room in Houston when instruments lost track of the craft, the authors walk us through pre-launch preparations 16 days earlier, the disaster itself and the investigation that followed.

The story is a complicated one, involving a chain of technical and bureaucratic errors. During the launch, some insulating foam came off the external fuel tank and crashed into the leading edge of the craft's wing, opening a hole about a foot wide. The damage couldn't be seen from the spacecraft and wasn't picked up by ground cameras during launch. Higher-level executives ignored warnings from engineers and vetoed requests that damage be assessed by photographs from highly classified military surveillance satellites, although later analysis showed that even if the damage had been documented, nothing could have been done to save the astronauts once they were in orbit.

The authors' account is highly readable and largely free of technical jargon. When they introduce a new player, they always give a thumbnail sketch of the person's background to give you a sense of who he or she is. They also include a very useful appendix of acronyms to help the reader deal with NASA-speak, though sometimes the details get a bit overpowering. Closet techno-geeks like me, for example, will be absolutely mesmerized by the second-by-second account of what happened to Columbia's left wing as it re-entered the atmosphere, but the eyes of the general reader may well glaze over. Interspersed with the details are some fascinating bits of information. When President Bush was told about the disaster, for example, his first words were "Where are the families?" -- a reply I took to be a significant insight into the man's value system. Ultimately, the authors give us as complete and readable an account of the Columbia disaster and the inside workings of NASA as we are likely to get.

But in the end, the significance of this book, particularly at this moment, derives from what it has to say about the debate going on in the space program -- the questions of whether we should be sending humans into space at all. As the Columbia disaster shows, this is both risky and expensive. Wouldn't it be better, some argue, to send out (relatively) cheap robots rather than fragile humans to explore the solar system?

I suppose this argument would make sense if the only goal of the space program were to gather data on the planets. But sometimes, when I'm in a contemplative mood, I think about humanity's move away from our home planet in a different way. I wonder what history books will say about our generation 500 years from now. In that perspective, the great conflagrations of the 20th century -- even World War II -- will mean no more than the War of the Spanish Succession does to us today. The War on Terror, whether it turns out to be the start of a clash of civilizations or just the dying gasp of a fundamentalist ideology unable to move into the 21st century, will mean no more than the Crusades. In the end, I think, we will be remembered primarily for our many scientific achievements -- splitting the atom, decoding the genome. But most of all, they will say about us, "Yes, they were the first people to walk on the moon."

And I want to tell you, my friends, that there are a lot worse things to be remembered for.

Reviewed by James Trefil

Copyright 2004, The Washington Post Co. All Rights Reserved.

Product Description

On February 1, 2003, the unthinkable happened. The space shuttle Columbia disintegrated 37 miles above Texas, seven brave astronauts were killed and America's space program, always an eyeblink from disaster, suffered its second catastrophic in-flight failure. Unlike the Challenger disaster 17 years earlier, Columbia's destruction left the nation one failure away from the potential abandonment of human space exploration. Media coverage in the immediate aftermath focused on the possible cause of the disaster, and on the nation's grief. But the full human story, and the shocking details of NASA's crucial mistakes, have never been told -- until now.

Based on dozens of exclusive interviews, never-before-published documents and recordings of key meetings obtained by the authors, Comm Check takes the reader inside the conference rooms and offices where NASA's best and brightest managed the nation's multi-billion-dollar shuttle program -- and where they failed to recognize the signs of an impending disaster. It is the story of a space program pushed to the brink of failure by relentless political pressure, shrinking budgets and flawed decision making. The independent investigation into the disaster uncovered why Columbia broke apart in the sky above Texas. Comm Check brings that story to life with the human drama behind the tragedy.

Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, two of America's most respected space journalists, are veterans of all but a handful of NASA's 113 shuttle missions. Tapping a network of sources and bringing a combined three decades of experience to bear, the authors provide a rare glimpse into NASA's inner circles, chronicling the agency's most devastating failure and the challenges that face NASA as it struggles to return America to space.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 336 pages
• Publisher: Free Press (January 27, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0743260910
• ISBN-13: 978-0743260916
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.3 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars See all reviews (17 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #613,932 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars This book exceeded my expectations, July 25, 2004

By	Hello Kitty Ellen (Appleton, WI) - See all my reviews

I followed the Columbia accident very closely so I wasn't sure this book would have anything new for me, but I was surprised by its depth. The authors are veteran space journalists and were able to get interviews that no one else did. The retelling of how the critical information about the foam strike never got anywhere past a few bobbled opportunities to discuss how dangerous these foam strikes could be is fascinating. Many, many wrong turns were taken by people who thought the worst wouldn't happen, at least not during their hectic workday. A great book and the only book about the Columbia accident worth reading.

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Very enlightening, July 9, 2004

By	Kenneth Gosier (Boston, MA USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

I have no reservations in recommending this book to anyone who wants to learn more about the Columbia disaster. This book isn't "technical," in the sense of giving lots of equations etc. Rather it gives a thorough non-technical, managerial, and cultural description of events.

All of this book's sections are well written, and fit into a cohesive whole. There's the required section describing how things unfolded on that awful morning. The authors also describe the doomed members of Columbia's crew, and the unusually long period of training and delays they had to go through to get to space in the first place. This gives a glimpse into the space station and shuttle politics within NASA, and also gives a real human touch to the tragedy. Esp. with details such as Rick Husband's decision to make Kalpana Chawla the flight engineer, helping her to redeem her career as an astronaut after an earlier mistake.

There's background from previous flights to set the stage, esp. the near-catastrophic foam strike on Atlantis, 2 flights before Columbia. This section shows NASA's inadequate response on a past flight, which then leads into the description of the debris assessment team's work during Columbia's mission. I found this section particularly enlightening, and I could relate very much to it, working in a large organization myself. All too understandable, and thus even more frustrating.

The work of the CAIB is described more in broad-brush strokes, since it took place over a much longer period. But its points are well taken. NASA's organization repeated the mistakes of Challenger, despite some very good work on some other safety concerns with the shuttle. The author's give a blow-by-blow account of how Columbia came apart in this section, which is gripping reading.

Overall, I enjoyed this book a great deal, esp. the sections on the work of the debris assessment team, and the account of how Columbia came apart. The authors' epilogue on the need for a vision at NASA is also well taken. Thoroughly recommended.

8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Will NASA culture change THIS time?, July 20, 2004

By	dhascall "Non-Fiction Lover" (Indianapolis, IN United States) - See all my reviews

When Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart over East Texas, the morning of February 1, 2003, the country mourned for astronauts and the space program yet again. Columbia, on Mission STS-107, came apart during reentry just a few minutes away from its scheduled landing in Florida. My first fear upon hearing about the tragedy was that it was a terrorist attack, especially since the mission included the first Israeli on a shuttle mission. That was replaced by the fact that a small chunk of foam doomed Columbia. I listened to as many newscasts, read as much as I could and tried to understand how that small piece of foam insulation could bring down one of the most complex machines ever built.

Soon transcripts were made available of the last few minutes of the flight. Houston finally realized that there was a problem long after veteran observers on the California coast noticed the shuttle breaking apart. Transcripts and data from onboard sensors revealed that the shuttle was burning up, inside out from the heat of reentry. They also revealed that the crew had no idea that anything was wrong.

News started falling off about the loss of Columbia and the crew of STS-107 until I saw a blurb about "Comm Check." Apparently someone had received a pre-publication copy and I knew that I had to get my hands on a copy when it came out.

I read the book in only a few settings. Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, veteran space journalists presented fairly tight storylines from the background of the astronauts, past NASA history (including the Apollo launchpad fire and the 1986 Challenger disaster), a timeline of Columbia's reentry interface, NASA business culture, the accident investigation, findings and a wrap-up. The most incredible portions of "Comm Check" dealt with the investigations and findings and the internal problems that NASA has.

The investigation and their subsequent findings show that the only plausible explanation is that a small piece of lightweight foam impacted Columbia just a few seconds after liftoff and severely damaged (breached) the wing. Upon reentry superheated gases entered the breach in the wing and allowed the shuttle's infrastructure to disintegrate. The authors explained every detail, narrowing the breach down to a specific spar on the left wing. The writing was extremely thorough but not overly complex. High school level readers will be able to comprehend this. Thankfully the book doesn't contain scientific or mathematic equations to explain points - just great, sound writing. One thing that I never understood was the sudden failure of communications and then a return to a stream of (albeit garbled) data. This meant that the systems (at that time) had not completely failed. I long wondered why this dropout occurred in the last few minutes of the mission. The authors revealed that as the wing?s aluminum structure melted, molten globules were flying off and were caught in the windstream. These globules, it was explained, acted like "chaff" from a jet fighter to interfere with the enemy?s radar. The molten globules interfered with the shuttle's communication and data streams. The title of the book "Comm Check? relates to the radio call that Houston used in the last few seconds, trying to reestablish contact with the stricken craft.

The other section of note deals with NASA culture as a business. A few mid level engineers examined video and low-resolution still photos of the launch and were concerned with the shedding of the foam piece. Their request for high-resolution photos from Earth to examine any damage were snubbed by those at higher levels within NASA. These managers were of the opinion "there is nothing that can be done now." The book revealed many complex levels and egos within the NASA community. While the shuttle may never have been able to reenter safely, engineers may have been able to come up with a possible solution but were completely negated by NASA management. The book also showed problems with NASA's operating culture dating back to the 1986 Challenger disaster. A 1996 book by Diane Vaughn (The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA) was heavily quoted. She has shown that in the ten years after the 1986 disaster little was done at NASA. In fact she had recommendations for NASA. They were adopted by all sorts of other institutions but not NASA:


"I heard from many organizations that were concerned with reducing risk and reducing errors and mistakes. The U.S. Forest Service called and I spoke to hot shots and smoke jumpers, I went to a conference the physicians held looking at errors in hospitals, I was called by people working in nuclear regulatory operations, regular businesses where it wasn't risky in the sense that human lives were at cost. Everybody called. My high school boyfriend called. But NASA never called."

The interviews in the book were first rate and were done with respect.

All in all "Comm Check" is a unique read. It is very interesting for those interested in space exploration but also for those who need to look at the struggles with corporate structure. Godspeed to Rick, Willie, Kalpana, David, Michael, Laurel and Illian.