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In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War

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This is a brilliant book! It is extremely well researched and written and tells a powerful and interesting story.

"In Command of History" is the history of a series of books - Winston Churchill's monumental and authoritative "The Second World War", his six-volume narrative of Great Britain in World War II. "In Command of History" is also many other things, including a book about World War II, the Cold War,and Churchill himself.

Perhaps the underlying theme of this book is that histories and memoirs written by politicians are not to be totally trusted for their aim is not historical accuracy, but rather to enhance the own political and military reputations and to vindicate their leadership.

Author David Reynolds writes about Churchill with an honesty and insight that is refreshing, covering every aspect of the British leader and his work. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this book was the ability of Churchill to use classified documents that would not be available to historians for many years to come. Equally interesting are the many documents that were available but not used because they would have cast the author in an unfavorable light.

Certainly one of the most contentious issues that Reynold addresses is Churchill's resistance to Operation Overlord, the Allied Cross Channel invasion of the France. After the war the British leader expended a great deal of energy to show that he supported the invasion, but Reynolds research reveals this is not totally true. Also of interest to this reader was Churchill's decision to plan for an attack on Soviet Russia in 1945, "Operation Unthinkable."

As might be expected "The Second World War" highlights Churchill and Great Britain's many important contributions to the Allied victory in Europe.

Despite Churchill's many shortcomings, Reynolds makes it clear the British leader remains one of the greatest political figures of World War II and history. "In death, as in life," writes the author, "Winston Churchill continues to glow. He remains in command of history."

Prime Minister Winston Churchill started his career as a twenty-something journalist covering the Boer War back at the turn of the century. As was his habit, he became the story when he was captured by and then escaped from the South African Boers -- his journalistic tale launched his political career. Mr. Churchill, an accomplished writer, repeated this pattern of either writing about himself or his ancestors constantly (mixed in with his histories of America/England) to support his family during a low paying political career. The need for cash to support his expensive life-style led to his multi-volume epic "The Second World War" and the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Anyone familiar with either William Manchester's or Martin Giblert's extensive biographies of Mr. Churchill is aware of his idiosyncratic and unique production of research and writing. After entertaining guests in the evening, he would either write or dictate through the night while leaving research of original sources to his devoted staff. He was a great synthesizer of information and a gifted writer who knew how to turn a phrase (see his speeches during World War II).

Mr. Reynolds covers the six year period when Mr. Churchill was out of political office and in his home office writing, essentially his wartime memoirs, while trying to cover the entire history of the War. Mr. Reynolds points out that the Prime Minister had a selective memory in favor of his own role -- in this regard he was no different from Mark Twain who told his audience the truth as he remembered it. With "The Second World War," Churchill was a second-tier historian and a first-rate storyteller. Mr Reynolds has extensively researched his own history of Mr. Churchill writing his history. "In Command of History" could had been trimmed down from its 600+ pages but when Churchill is front and center, it is a fascinating book for the reader.

When former President Clinton released his autobiography some months ago this was seen as a political and literary event. All this pales in comparison to when Winston Churchill published his 6 volumes of history on the Second World War from 1949 to 1954. These works are the subject of David Reynolds highly interesting book `In Command of History'.

Unlike Clinton, Churchill was hardly retired; he was leader of the opposition Tory party, giving significant speeches across Europe and North America, renewing his interest in painting and in 1950 he was also 75 years old. All Churchill's colleagues would remark on his boundless energy - particularly given the fact that he hardly took any regular exercise. Churchill was also a prolific author before World War II having written a history of the Great War, a volume on the Duke of Marlborough (his ancestor) and his `History of the English Speaking People's' had yet to be completed.

As soon as Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940 speculation was rising about the future book to be published. Towards the end of the war various publisher's were `frothing at the bit' and Cassell in England and Houghton Mifflin in the U.S. won. As well, there were serialization rights in major English newspapers and in the U.S. The New York Times and the now defunct Life magazine negotiated these rights in the U.S. and in addition provided working vacations for Churchill and his entourage in lavish resorts in France, Switzerland and North Africa - for enhancement of the writing process. Both Henry Luce of Time/Life and Arthur Sulzberger of the New York Times were internationalists who had long admired Churchill.

In his book Reynolds writes that Churchill was writing history within history. He was not writing about events of long ago in which the protagonists were long gone. The book is divided into 6 sections to correspond with the 6 volumes. It examines the era of the volume versus the time it was actually written in.
In England Anthony Eden was titular head of the Conservative party while Churchill was off writing and speech-making. Also Eden had long been foreseen as replacing the aging Churchill as head of the Conservative Party. This is reflected in the writings of the `Second World War'. Churchill claims to have been extremely distraught when Eden resigned as foreign minister from the Chamberlain government - was this really the case or was Churchill trying to over-play the emphasis Eden had on him? He needed Eden at the time of writing (1948-49) to substitute as head of the Conservative Party for him. At the time of Eden's resignation in 1938 they were not considered to be allies.
Another interesting fact Reynolds brings up is that the British parliament allowed Churchill to publish his own government war memo's (of which there were thousands). However, because of confidentiality, Churchill was not allowed to publish responses to these memo`s. It gives the impression throughout the 6 volumes of Churchill single-handedly managing the war. To some extent this is true - Churchill would involve himself in extreme detail much to the annoyance of those being probed.
There was `positive' or logical censorship in the volumes. Churchill could not divulge that England had broken Germany's war transmission codes - there was still a fear that Germany could rise again via ultra-nationalists groups who could use the code-breakers as another excuse that Germany had been unfairly beaten. When Eisenhower decided to run for president in 1952 some memos had to be doctored to remove less than complimentary remarks. However, scathing remarks about Australian Prime Minister Curtin's decision to remove his troops from North Africa were left in. But Curtin was out of the political picture and Australia was not power player like the United States in the 1950's.

Reynolds' also brings up documentary emphasis about Churchill's reticence to Overlord (the D-Day landings at Normandy in 1944). Before Churchill's volumes several books had already been published on the American side alleging this. Churchill deliberately manipulates his writings to attempt to prove that he was always in favour of the landings in France. He omits parts of his war memos that have a strong leaning favouring the extension of the war from Italy into the Balkans instead of pursuing Overlord. There were strong memories of the killing fields in France during World War I; perhaps this is one reason for this reluctance. D-Day is seen as success today - prior to the landings there was a vast unknown.

Interspersed in his memoirs' is a pet project of Churchill's to lure Turkey in the war with the Allies. Churchill in fact visited with Turkey's leaders in a futile attempt to persuade them to join in the `common cause'. This was all a part of his project of extending troops from Italy into the Balkans. Turkey would probably have been a burden in the allied camp - requesting endless military supplies. Reynolds does not inquire into the motives of using Turkey as an ally. Churchill general's said that he had `one hundred ideas a day - the problem was to decide what the good one was'.

I take issue with Reynolds' negative review of the 'Gathering Storm' - the first volume of the memoirs detailing the growing Nazi menace. Reynolds misses the point that Churchill was always a strong individualist never scared to express his own beliefs. Churchill took a tough stand against German expansionism and India's independence - but it is what he believed. He could also be remarkably prescient - he foresaw the futility of British involvement in the Spanish Civil War. Franco's Spain was neutral in the Second World War. Franco did not interfere with the Allied build-up in Gibraltar and distanced himself from both Hitler and Mussolini during the war years.

These six volumes of Churchill are probably the most significant work of the past century by a political and literary colossus. As a matter of fact it was only on the publication of his 6 volumes that the term `Second World War' came into acceptable and common usage.
This is what makes Reynolds examination so compelling.

Winston Churchill is instantly recognizable. He is eminently quotable, and is constantly cited as an example of visionary leadership. He stands for doggedness, steadfastness and persistence.

Right after "he won his war," his own electorate tossed him out of office, and he needed work and money. He wrote a multi-volume definitive history of the war, "The Second World War," and "Command of History" is the story of the series' creation.

The first theme is that some complex financial machinations were done in order for Churchill to avoid payment of 90%+ in income taxes on the book's royalties. It's funny to read this; the ultra-patriotic Churchill puts Al Lay to shame with his capitalistic self-interest.

Another eye-opener, though, is the extent to which he used platoons of ghostwriters and collaborators in this highly successful and widely-read series. Churchill did not have complete personal knowledge of the war - he was not personally involved with the Eastern Front and the Pacific theater. These gaps were filled by his ghostwriters whose work was pretty much "cut and pasted" into the series.

Not that there were no revisions - there was a lot of cycles, since he took over six years to produce this work.

Some of the war's most memorable stories are recorded in the series, but there are also long passages of detail that lack much life or realism.

The most disturbing thing about "In Command of History" is that we learn, once again, that any political leader, even one as worshipped as Churchill, is essentially self-serving. The book portrays Churchill's vanity and desire to take credit for good outcomes and shift blame for bad ones.

To have to confront the fact that a work like Churchill's is, to an extent, "spin" and not the sort of hard history we'd thought is no fun, to be honest with you. Since it was contemporary history, Churchill also had to be careful not to offend Dwight Eisenhower and Anthony Eden, with whom he had to continue working in the postwar period. And he had to watch what he said about other countries, even the Soviet Union, for fear of causing a diplomatic incident.

Did he hold back from criticizing Eisenhower's failure to take Berlin in 1945? Seems so. More understandably. he had to cover up some wartime secrets, like the British success in cracking German codes, which was not publicly revealed until 1974.

Beyond these more obvious historical lapeses, though, Reynolds asserts that Churchill had to bend and sometimes break the historical record - for instance, by overstating his support for a cross-channel invasion. This has now solidified into historical fact, regardless of any subsequent evidence to the contrary.

Politicians cannot stop being politicians. Reynolds is a historian critiquing a politician who fancied himself a historian, and also trying to sell books himself...

Should you buy this book? Yes, but brace yourself for another deflation of an honored figure...

Winston Churchill liked to say that history would be kind to him, as he intended to write it. In Command of History tells the story of how he did this. David Reynolds, a Cambridge professor, has made a close examination of how Churchill wrote The Second World War. In doing so, he shows how Churchill used the books to place his own war-time actions in the best possible light and to further his future political agenda. Reynolds has thus produced a fascinating story of Churchill the writer, Churchill the politician and Churchill the statesman. It is an absorbing account that illuminates an undiscovered corner of the Great Man's career.

Reynolds shows that Churchill tried, and largely succeeded, in framing how history would view World War II. Indeed, by calling his history "The Second World War," he confirmed the name we would give to the conflict (recall that what we now know as "World War I" was originally called "The Great War.") Churchill "wrote" his account mostly while he was the leader of the Conservative opposition in the post-war Labor government of Clement Atlee. Churchill structured his six volume work, written between 1946 and 1954, and released in seriatim, to emphasize the elements of the conflict that he deemed most significant and in which he played the central role. Thus, Volume 1, "The Gathering Storm," was written to drive home the lesson of the failure of appeasement. "The Finest Hour" emphasizes the bravery of the British people at their darkest hour, when they turned to Churchill as Prime Minister in May 1940. By contrast, there is astonishing little about what in retrospect was the main field of combat: The Eastern Front, pitting Russia against Germany.

Reynolds shows that Churchill also had a distinct agenda:

* He painted himself as the chief opponent of appeasement. Reynolds notes, however, that Churchill was hard on Hitler's Germany but softer on Mussolini's Italy (Anthony Eden saw through Mussolini and resigned from Chamberlain's Cabinet because of appeasement towards Italy, not Germany.)

* In Britain's "Finest Hour," he sought to perpetuate the myth of a British government united against any peace with Hitler. He deliberate falsified his account of Cabinet meetings in which Foreign Minister Lord Halifax sought to open negotiations with Hitler, the story of which has only emerged over time (most notably in John Lukacs' Five Days in London: May 1940.)

* He emphasized Britain's close cooperation with America, in part because when he was writing Britain needed America's financial and military support after the war. In doing so, he underplayed friction within the military high command, especially between Gen. Eisenhower and Field Marshall Montgomery. He blunted his opposition to Operation Overlord, the Normandy invasion, by selective editing of published documents and misleading innuendo. He feared bloodshed on the order of World War I and only reluctantly faced up to the need for a cross-channel invasion.

* He tried to appear far-sighted in his fears of a Soviet-dominated post-war Europe. Certainly he was better than Roosevelt in this regard, but he was willing to do deals with Stalin where he could, as when he and Stalin divided up Eastern Europe on a scrap of paper in October 1944.

* He emphasized the importance of the war time conferences, such as Cairo and Tehran, because he liked "Big Man Diplomacy" (what we now call summitry). During the Cold War, he believed that he could reach a rapprochement with the Russians in part by the force of his personality.

Reynolds shows how Churchill shaped his history to make it serve both his historical and political purposes. His historical purposes were to magnify his role in events (not hard to do,) and to look omniscient on strategic issues (a much more difficult task) while furthering his political purposes (to return to power in Britain and retain his influence with America.) He won the cooperation of the British government doing this (a central role being played by the Cabinet Secretary, Norman Brook,) as gradually the government saw Churchill's memoirs become Britain's "official history" of WWII.

Did Churchill, at advanced age and as leader of the Conservative Party or Prime Minister, actually write the book? Churchill was, after all, a professional writer. He had written a monumental history of World War I (Arthur Balfour is said to have remarked, "Winston has written a great book about himself and called it The World Crisis.") Churchill had his war-time memos and letters bound monthly. These provided the "backbone" of his history. Churchill employed a team of writer/editors, including academics and former military officers, to put these into shape, research ancillary topics, and in many cases to write first drafts of chapters. The "Syndicate" was enormously productive, accomplishing this task faster than any single writer could hope to do it. (Reynolds notes that Eden had no such assistance and that his memoirs, appearing years later, were a mere historical footnote.) Still, Churchill gave the book his close editing attention and wrote crucial sections on his war time meetings with Roosevelt, Stalin and DeGaulle. One of the Syndicate was later asked about authorship of the series. He replied that a master chef is not expected to chop the lettuce. Churchill won the Nobel Prize for Literature; he was disappointed, he wanted the Nobel Prize for Peace.

Did Churchill get it right?

Revisionists (e.g., Charmley) argue that Churchill sold out Britain to the U.S. and that Britain should have arrested its decline through a negotiated peace with Germany. Can one really take this argument seriously? Hitler was a monster and any negotiated peace with him would have been a monstrosity. I believe Churchill's history lesson against appeasement has stood the test of time. No effort has been successful, in my view, to restore the tattered reputations of the Prime Ministers who preceded him, Baldwin and Chamberlain. No sensible historian has ever explained how a negotiated peace with Hitler would have been in Britain's, let alone Western Civilization's, interests.

Churchill succeeded in making the Mediterranean a major theatre of operations and in trying to use Italy as a springboard to operations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Certainly his efforts in this direction are problematic. General Marshall was right in insisting on a direct cross-channel invasion at Normandy. Churchill's history, as previously noted, creates a bit of a mirage here, and doesn't tell the full story of the Anglo-American disharmony over planning Overlord.

Lastly, by emphasizing operations on the Western Front, Churchill fails to credit the Russians. Far more divisions were employed by Hitler against Russia than against the British, Canadians and Americans. Stalingrad gets only a few paragraphs and other major battles, such as Kursk, receive only a summary treatment. A fairer view of the European theatre of operations would give much more weight to the Eastern front than Churchill chose to.

Reynolds is a sparkling writer (he refers to Churchill's "iron whim") and this is a first-rate book. Churchill fans, of whom I am one, will devour it, but those not familiar with the broad outlines of the war (or Churchill) may find the going tougher. At the end, Churchill appears to be much more calculating, deliberate and even devious than the popular image. (He refused to put word to paper until his tax advisers figured out how to avoid Britain's then-ruinous income tax.) But he pulled off a marvelous feat. He not only won the war (or at least, prevented it from being lost,) but won the minds of future readers by shaping our view of the war. Our admiration grows.

I found this volume to be extremely interesting, even fascinating at times. It focuses upon the writing of Winston Churchill's epic "The Second World War," whose six volumes were a major publishing event around the world, and eventually earned Churchill a Nobel Prize for literature. It is really several different books in one.

First, much like Ashley's "Churchill as Historian," the author discusses the actual mechanics of writing so massive a project when Churchill had plenty of other things to keep him busy. The "syndicate" of experts who assisted him, including even the Parliamentary Cabinet Office, is analyzed in great detail. According to the author, the "three D's" were the core of Churchill's method. That is, first he had set in type the key documents which he had collected during his wartime service as Prime Minister. Then he tied the documents together with dictated reminiscenses. Finally, the third "D" consisted of a very large number of drafts whereby the documents were edited down and the connecting narrative supplemented with WC's own recollections or papers drafted by syndicate members. Ironically, it is Churchill's heavy reliance upon documents that at once has yielded much praise from other historical researchers (since otherwise they would not have been made public for as much as 50 years after the war's conclusion),but also generated negative reactions from lay readers, especially in the U.S.

Next, the really interesting issues are tackled. For example, how candid and accurate was WC regarding his actions during the war? The author extremely well documents how WC would edit documents, or even modify them, in order to (not surprisingly) put himself in the best historical light. Also, he was duty bound not to reveal the existence of "Ultra," which was the designation for breaking the German code during the war. Given the fact that in the postwar period, others were also writing books (e.g., Ike with his "Crusade in Europe" and Sherwood's "Roosevelt and Hopkins"), WC would frequently modify his drafts in order to obviate any possible taint regarding his decisions and actions while PM in a stab at vindication. One good example was the dispute that arose over whether WC had favored or retarded the "Overlord" invasion of France in 1944. Churchill also faced the practical constraints of the Cold War being on-going and also acting as head of the Conservative Party and ultimately PM for a second time. These factors too influenced how he structured the text.

Of course a most intriguing question is did WC really write the work given the extensive assistance he received? The author suggests a useful analogy: WC was like a master chef at a large restaurant who designs and directs the menu, while others do much of the actual food preparation. He also likens it to a group project in science, where a number of folks collaborate on a paper which is attributed to the lead author. Clearly, it is Churchill's book even though he did not write all of it himself--but he reviewed every sentence and corrected or struck out that with which he disagreed.

Finally, in a most interesting discussion, the author recounts the arguments that arose during the 1955-1965 period as other historians, military figures, and the leaders of other countries (such as De Gaulle) took aim on Churchill's analysis. Not quite as challenging as fighting Hitler, but still quite a nice war of its own. The author, Professor of International History at Cambridge, has done just a superior job. Be warned, it is a long book (over 600 pages) and the Penguin edition is set in very small type. But the rewards of the book more than compensate for these problems, especially for those of us interested in Churchill. The stream of Churchill volumes continues unabated and has even increased recently--but this book should be singled out for the unique perspective it affords us on "the great man."

I was born during WWII in 1943, and during the 1950's while yet in high school became aware of Winston Churchill. During later military and college years gained even further appreciation and admiration for the man, the leader, and the politician. Here at Amazon I have written at least a couple reviews of recent books about him or written by him.

In the last couple years it seems we have either gained an appreciation of him or at the least developed a need to investigatingly write about him. Books have been rolling off the press at an all time high on Winston Churchill, with this author beginning his book by asking the question: "Another book on Churchill?".

My home library shelves hold many volumes about Winston Churchill, and while having all six of his hardcover WWII books, am considering ordering at least two additional recent volumes about him. This book I'm reviewing is one of them (I checked it out of our local library in order to review and to read before purchasing).

Winston himself had been quoted as saying that he could hardly wait to read WWII history because he intended to write most of it! And as this author also states Churchill is quoted in May, 1938, as saying "words are the only things that last for ever".

When one admires Winston Churchill as I have nigh on to 50 years, one must if realistic, accept him flaws and all. He was as human as any of us and imperfect in many ways, and anytime I light a Cuban cigar, it's difficult not to think of him. Coming away from this book as The Daily Telegraph has stated: "This book leaves you admiring the man more, not less".

He was a hard man to know, and an even more difficult man to work with or for. Even the two American men most close to him during the WWII years, Eisenhower and Roosevelt, were at many times overshadowed by both Churchill's intellect and abilities. And as Winston alluded to on on the floor of Congress had his parentage been different, he might have made it there himself. Who knows with his ambition and abilities we might have even had him as one of our presidents!

As soon as I knew this book was coming out I intended to both read and buy it. It will be a welcome addition to anyone who is an admirer of Winston Churchill. While he did need the money these books brought in, he could not know how successful they would be, nor just how much they would enrich him, both as an author and as an eventual millionaire.

If a reader has any interest in Winston Churchill, this book cannot be bypassed.

Semper Fi.

As the author states in the Introduction, this is a book about a book - (actually six books) - specifically Winston Churchill's six volume history of World War II. The author does this by first chronicling what happened during the war; then outlines the research and materials Churchill - and his many helpers - used after the war; and then highlights what was published in Churchill's books.

Just Churchill's negotiations for publishing rights, money and access to Top Secret information is a fascinating look into his character and the force of his personality - as Churchill consistently got exactly what he wanted from peers, the British Government, military men and publishers.

Reynolds also does an excellent job in pointing out the differences with what actually happened during this turbulent time with what Churchill subsequently wrote. This in itself is interesting as Churchill was still very active in British politics while writing the books - he would become Prime Minister again after completing this history - and many of the major players of World War II were still alive, i.e. Eisenhower was on his way to the Presidency and George Marshall was Secretary of State. So there was a fine line Churchill walked - while writing - with presenting himself in the best of lights without stepping on too many toes.

In writing his history it's not that Churchill changed what happened; he just tended to omit things - especially when he was wrong and he was wrong a lot - and he also neglected people and their contributions - the most glaring example being his military Chief of Staff, Sir Alan Brooke who is not snubbed as much as forgotten. Brooke became CIGS, (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), in 1941, served throughout the war, was part of every Allied plan and really served as a buffer between Churchill and the rest of the world. A God-forsaken task if there ever was one. Brooke received minimal thanks from his countrymen and even less from Churchill. Churchill's history also downplays the friction between the Allies, the most glaring example being the opening of a Second Front in Europe, i.e. the invasion of Europe culminating with D-Day in 1944 - which Churchill was always hesitant about.

Although the contract/deadline negotiations Churchill had with his agents and publishers gets somewhat repetitive, I found this a fascinating read. I do wonder though if someone who is not a Churchill or WWII buff will feel the same - that's my only caveat in recommending this book.

This is an intereting book, full of things I did not know about Churchill and his long history of WWII.

I admire Churchill, and always will. Reynolds' book proves he was human.

There are many aspects of the Churchill WWII history I had not realized. Among them are:

1) He did not write it all himself. Many sections were written by others.

2) He could have been accused of plagarism by Samuel Elliot Morrison. Sections dealing with the war in the Pacific came straight from Morrison, and Morrison was nice enough to ask for an attribution. He could have made things ugly.

3)Churchill used the books to burnish his image. Parts of letters and memos were deleated in writing the history. Churchill did not want the truth to emerge.

4) Churchill used the history to blame others for mistakes he made. This is not a real surprise, and part of it went back to earlier disagreements.

5) Lord Mountbatten was not the wonderful military leader the image makers created. In fact, he was behind the Dieppe fiasco, and his later leadership was of little relevance. But damn, he did look good in that white uniform, and those royal connections hardly hurt.

6) Churchill used the books to help him regain political office. Hardly against the law for a politician.

I did not come away from Reynolds' book thinking more of Churchill. But I don't think less of him. He was human, and was faced with a task which would boggle the average mind. Few people could have achieved the things he did. He was remarkable.

I still think of his leadership, and his ability to inspire the British to hang on, fight on, and "never surrender." When one considers his overall achievement, his petty faults, and personal foibles don't matter all that much. God knows FDR had them as well. All leaders have them. Churchill's are easy to understand.

At any rate, Reynolds wrote a book which is worth the time and effort. There are some hidden gems of information (Churchill felt that when life ended, it would be like "black velvet," or sinking into non-existence). There are facts about the war that are new, and interesting. Its a good book, and serves a purpose for fans of Churchill, or those interested in the writing of a huge history.

Another book about Churchill and the Second World War. Can it tell us something new? Reynolds argues that yes, it can. Does he succeed in doing this?

In one sense, he does succeed. The book is replete with scholarly detail and thoroughly researched. You are bound to learn something new from this book, even if you are familiar with the history of World War II, on account of the sheer amount of information the book includes. However, the book missed an opportunity to deconstruct some of Churchill's myth-making and also to offer a more rounded historical account of key events.

To his credit, Reynolds has not written a hagiographical account. He includes details that tarnish Churchill's reputation as the great prophet forecasting the perils of fascism, such as Churchill's support for Francisco Franco's coup against the democratically elected Spanish Republican government. He also provides plenty of examples where Churchill edited the record for various contemporary political purposes of his own, and where he sought to obfuscate the details of his responsibility for disastrous decisions.

But the bigger picture is missed: despite its scholarly details, Reynolds expends too much effort on the vicissitudes Churchill and his research team experienced in their battles with publishers and the politicking to get access to still-classified documents. There is too much focus on the details of decisions made during the war at the expense of offering us a deeper understanding of how Churchill's myth-making continues to affect popular perceptions of the conflict. The opportunity to offer us a deeper understanding of some of the key issues on the causes and course of the Second World War is lost. The book fails to rise above Churchillian platitudes that should have been disregarded long ago. In these senses, the book does not tell us anything new.

Two examples will suffice to illustrate my points in greater detail.

The first example is the Battle of Britain in 1940. The battle is fixed into our popular consciousness, the valiant `Few' against the Luftwaffe swarms. `The Few' was of course Churchill's phrase, and this pithy epithet continues to define how the battle is perceived to this very day. But historians (such as Richard Overy) tell a different story: the balance of planes and pilots made it a better-matched contest than was realised at the time. The few faced the fewer.

These facts were not known in 1940 but captured German documents after 1945 showed otherwise. Churchill knew of them by the time he set down his account but chose, for reasons that Reynolds does not make entirely clear, to discount them. But the point is that the myth endures, not so much because historians insist on perpetrating it, but because for some reason Churchill's mythologising continues to define popular perceptions of the conflict, especially in the UK.

This doesn't mean the battle was a pushover. Nor does this diminish the courage of the pilots of Fighter Command, or minimise the sufferings of civilians in the Blitz. It just means that Churchill's telling of it continues to confound a proper popular historical understanding of a pivotal event, 70 years later, and Reynolds does not deal adequately with this.

The second example is Churchill's treatment of the appeasers, who were `nailed ... into their coffins' by Churchill's memoirs, as Reynolds observes. Chamberlain said he could trust Hitler in 1938. Churchill said he could trust Stalin in 1945. Both men said they could trust a dictator's word, and both of them were wrong. Yet Chamberlain's reputation languishes in obloquy, Churchill's remains exalted. Why?

You can say in Churchill's defence that circumstances meant he had no choice. Stalin's armies dominated Poland and, short of fighting World War III, there was no way anyone could hold Stalin in 1944-45 to his promise to hold free elections in Poland. All this is true. However, there is a case to be made for Chamberlain too: that the country was not prepared for war in 1938; that fighter defences against the perceived bomber threat were not ready; that appeasement bought vital time to rearm; that the policy was informed by a noble desire to avoid a repeat of the horrors of World War One; that the policy of appeasement was popular at the time.

Appeasement we now know was a failure. But the history of it continues to be defined as morality play (largely on account of Churchill's memoirs), and fails to properly appreciate the motives of the actors concerned, and the restraints under which they felt they acted.

Why does this matter? Churchill's view of the appeasers continues to inform how we see not only the past but present dilemmas. The use of the Munich analogy - with regards to Nasser in 1956 and Saddam Hussein in the 2000s - illustrates the pernicious consequences of using history to devise policy in relation to problems that bear no relationship to Europe of the 1930s. False comparisons to Munich were not the only reason for British policy failures in both Suez in 1956 and in Iraq more recently, but Munich and the Churchillian account of appeasement did nothing to inform a wiser policy response in both instances.

Reynolds fails to offer a more judicious historical understanding of a key episode. Churchill continues to tell his side of the story from beyond the grave. This is not on account of any state-sponsored personality cult. It is a testament to the enduring legacy of the great man's powerful rhetorical and oratorical gifts. But not all historians have been so bewitched. There is a plurality of interpretations among historians and Reynolds fails to capture this. Had he done so, he might have given us a more nuanced portrait of a still-fascinating figure.