Customer Reviews

Command of the Ocean: V. 2 (Naval History of Britain 2)

5 star:		(13)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This volume continues the author's brilliant elucidation of the history of the British navy, so ably begun with The Safeguard of the Sea. The author addresses the navy as a multi-faceted institution, influencing and being influenced by the evolution of politics, taxation, government finance, trade and bureaucracy. Though focused upon the British navy, the book includes a collateral and comparative consideration of naval institutions in France, Spain and Holland.
The author serves up a generally savory mixture of impeccable scholarship and pungent opinion. Nevertheless, American readers may find distasteful his dismissive attitude toward the outcomes of the American Revolution (the "American War") and the War of 1812, and their implications for British naval policy.
Like its predecessor, this volume is chaptered by theme within broad time periods. The thematic structure facilitates the development of theses concerning social organization, finance and the like. The book also includes a Glossory (invaluable)and statistical appendices (valuable, but not priceless).
I await with interest a further volume in this series -- when the author will have to come to terms with the ascendancy of the United States Navy, and modify his thusfar appropriate Euro-centrism. Yankee pride aside, this is an absolutely marvelous book.

NAM Rodger's name is already well-known to students of the Royal Navy during the great age of sail, particularly for his "The Wooden World". His "The Command of the Ocean" is a superlative history of the Royal Navy during its rise to dominance at sea and of its period of greatest achievement and glory -- the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars when it was Britain's primary weapon in the struggle with France. Besides being a compelling narrative of more than a century and a half of naval history, Rodger's book is also a compendium of detailed information about the Royal Navy as an institution. Fans of the nautical novels of O'Brian and Forester would do well to read "The Command of the Ocean" for a more complete understanding of the world in which their fictional heroes lived.

Rodger has written an excellent book that details why the Royal Navy triumphed over the French in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to Rodger the reasons for British naval superiority were better maintanence, superior ship design, more effective officer training, and improved health measures. The British were able to keep their ships afloat because they invested a great deal of money in buiding docks that were able to fix ships of the line as opposed to the French, who sacrificed dock building in favor of making new ships. The British also had rugged ships that with bronze plating could outrun their French counterparts that were of a lighter design. British officer training was more practical since it was aboard ships as opposed to the classroom eduction of the French officers. Finally the British were able to triumph over the French because they were able to keep their sailors healthy by a better diet than their French counterparts, and constantly cleaning the interiors of the ships as opposed to the French, who neglected these health measures.The main weakness of Rodger's book is that he seems to gloss over British naval operations, but despite this weakness, Rodger gives credible reason why the Royal Navy defeated the French on consistent basis.

As a integrated history of the British Navy, this book is unsurpassed. I couldn't possibly add anything meaningful to the praise by experts more qualified than me.

However, I can't give this book 5 stars because it has a very serious problem that might not be recognized by readers who are unfamiliar with the very complex political history of Britain from ~1620 to ~1780. Whenever Prof. Rodger has to discuss this topic, he cites minority views by revisionist historians that literally made my head spin. And these views always seem to be ultra-conservative opinions, even by the standard of those times.

Now this may be a welcome relief from the usual Marxist claptrap that passes for academic history these days, but it is just as far from reality. For instance, Rodger treats the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as though it were just another Anglo-Dutch War in which William of Orange just happened to invade and conquer Britain due to a lucky wind shift and the inexplicable cowardice of King James II. The deep-seated loathing of the English people for James' Catholicism is hardly mentioned, except as an irrational prejudice that was fanned by clever propaganda. I guess Prof. Rodger never heard of the Inquisition, or the hordes of Hugenot refugees that had crossed the Channel from France only three years before.

His description of the issues involved in the American Revolution is even more fantastic. Did anyone outside of Bedlam Asylum really think that men like Jefferson and Franklin were "aligning themselves with absolutism and Jacobitism"?

So my advice is: buy the book, read the book, but be very skeptical of anything it says about England outside the dockyard walls.

Generally I think the negative reviews of this book can be lumped together as the product of a rather triumphantilist strain of American History teaching that treats the Glorious Revolution, the American War of Independence etc. as a glorious chain of events in the march of liberty that are not only undoubtedly good and of immense import, but also predestined. This strain of pedagogy ignores the great deal of ambiguity that existed about these events as they happened and in the process distorts our vision of history by making it decidedly one-sided.

To answer a few objections offhand: The War of 1812 was not important for anyone that didn't live in North America. Period. The only British subjects for which that conflict was of great importance were the Canadians, and that's because in the war of 1812 we Americans tried and failed to invade their country for the last time. A few frigate actions do not make the creation of a great naval power--that would take the Spanish-American War and a couple of World Wars to do, and furthermore it is not the American Navy's history that is being recorded in the chapters in question, nor the history of the war of 1812 as such, but the history of the Royal Navy during the period, and for the Royal navy battles of scratch-built boats on lakes, however courageously fought, or frigate-duels, however inspiring, were not particularly important compared to Napolean.

The same can be said of the War of Independence: the actions of John Paul Jones were courageous and inspiring, but how important were they or anything else the Continental Navy's rather paltry fleet did in comparison to the thirty some ships of the line that were ready to invade England? Or the fact that by 1781 Britain was at war with every major naval power in Europe? Again, it's the Royal Navy we're talking about, not the American War as such, and it's what's important to the Royal Navy that's important to Rodger.

As to the Glorious Revolution, I suspect that when you take Locke not as a timeless champion of liberty but as a political partisan writing on behalf of a foreign usurper, that things will indeed look quite a bit like they did to Rodger. Though one does wonder if James' Catholicism is played down in order to play up the drama of the coup, ultimately the glorious revolution is not Rodger's subject here.

In general, I'd say Rodger tries to explain and clarify the prevailing sentiments of the time when he touches on larger events of British and World History, and that negative reviewers are offended that this does not accord with their perception of the same events, viewed from a contemporary (often American-centric) perspective. Most other objections can be countered by saying that Rodger isn't writing about XY and Z, he's writing about the Royal Navy, and if one keeps this in mind I find it hard to imagine that you won't have the greatest appreciation for this book.

How did Britain become the premier economic and military power in the world? To a casual observer in 1650, its population, internal divisions, and lack of military might all suggest that it was an unlikely candidate to assume the mantle of superpower. Yet by the end of the period covering this naval history, Britain stood alone at the summit of European and world power, having survived the loss of 13 American colonies and the World War wrought by Napoleon Bonaparte. The author brings us through this period starting with the English Republic of Oliver Cromwell, showing how power shifted from the sovereign (be it King, Queen, or "Lord Protector") to Parliament. More importantly, the recognition of naval power as a prerequisite for British security created an economic system capable of dealing with the maintenance and victualling of large fleets at sea for long periods of time.

Rodger divides his book into sections of common themes, e.g. "Operations," "Social History," etc. He convincingly argues that the advances made in economics and health (identifying methods of defeating typhus and scurvy) improved the capacity of the English ships to stay at sea and in good fighting condition for longer than ships of other nations. Similarly, a culture of fighting was developed that ensured that a captain was supported no matter the outcome of a fight, but was likely to be courtmartialled for cowardice if he didn't fight. He contrasts the British attitude to that of the Spanish and especially the French, whose admirals and captains had no specific orders to engage, and were in fact encouraged to flee from situations where the odds where not in their favour.

Naturally, the most interesting and exciting chapters are those involving dicussion of the operations of ships. He does not describe battles in detail, but instead gives an overview of the general tactics used by the fleets in each encounter - Camperdown, Trafalgar, and the Glorious 1st of June all are described in some detail, but so too are lesser actions in North America and the Indian Ocean. That's not to say that the British are always in the right - Rodger clearly sympathises with the Dutch in their defense against naked British aggression. But the book really shines in the last dozen chapters or so, as Napoleon rises to prominence and is challenged by Nelson and Wellington.

A general knowledge of British/European history would make the book easier to follow, but after that, no particular knowledge is required to enjoy the book. Rodger does an admirable job of balancing original research for the historian with readability for the layman. I'm looking forward to the next book in his series!

This book is powerful history. It is the second book in a trilogy that N.A.M. Rodger is writing about the history of the Royal Navy. The subtitle of this book is "A Naval History of Britain" and that is important because this account is about more than just the RN. Rodger devotes only about half of the book to combat operations. The other half is a political, social, economic, technological, cultural, agricultural, and religious history of Britain and the interaction of the RN to those areas of activity. Although the navy consumed more time, money and energy than any other institution in British public life, it was a manifestation of the entire society. Simply put: you cannot understand Britain without understanding the Royal Navy.

Britain could only afford to have the RN because of its fiscal system was so much more advanced than those found elsewhere in Europe. The crown's bureaucracy was also important in that it developed complex logistical systems that kept the fleet supplied, which included matters such international commerce (making sure that shipyards had enough timber from the Baltic region to construct and repairs ships), to agriculture (the crews needed to have the right type of food to avoid scurvy). Rodgers often injects wit into his account. In dismissing previous numbers on scurvy, he notes that these numbers mean that "every man who served in the Navy died of scurvy approximately twice" (p. 308).

Control of the ocean gave the British strategic depth, which leaders of various stripes and hue believed the United Kingdome desperately needed because of the threat aimed at it from the predominately Catholic European mainland. The British people were not inherently sea minded. Only those living on the immediate coast thought along those lines, but the political leadership knew it was something that kept them secure. "Those who informed opinion and took decisions, were deeply convinced that their religious freedom, and hence their political freedom and material security, depended on it completely. Few of them knew much about the Navy, and many of them were profoundly ignorant of it, but they knew they needed it. This more than anything else accounts for the strong, consistent and broad-based political support for a costly Navy which distinguishes Britain from all other European powers, naval powers included" (p. 577).

In the end, the ultimate mission of any armed service is combat and Rodger--despite his attention to sociological issues--makes the application of force the central focus of this study. Here individual leadership mattered. Despite having the best, biggest, and most technologically advanced navy afloat, the British managed to lose half of their North American colonies because they misused their navy. Rodger indicated that it could have been much worse. They came close to losing India, Gibraltar, the rest of North American, and suffering an invasion of the United Kingdom itself.

Except for the American Revolution, the Royal Navy dominated their opponents, sometimes even before battles started. The loss of the central North America made British sailors angry, and they recovered. More times than not, the enemy expected to lose even before the battle started and that gave the British an enormous advantage. His research is multilingual and he tells his readers what is going on the enemy's ships, be they French, Dutch, or Spanish.

There are a number of extras that add more richness to this book: including a series of good maps, a number of interesting illustrations, a chronology, an essay on conversion of units of measurement and foreign ranks, a glossary of nautical terms, and a bibliography with commentary on the quality of various entries. The glossary is important and will help the reader make sense of the nautical terms that Rodger uses. This usage is not heavy, but it is strong enough that the average reader will require some assistance.

Ok, we have all read the other reviews arguing about perspectives, timelines and politics, but can I just say this:
This book is the first I have read that has tried even a little to put the history of a Military institution into a national context.
To many books just describe the actions, the motives, tactics etc. of the navy (army, etc) but with out explaining how it affected the whole nation.

I loved this book. Being an Australian I found it fascinating that all the political issues were argued about by reviewers.
Also, lets ignore the flogging issue as Prof. Rodgers is right. They weren't grievances at the time. In neither of the great 'fleet mutinies' was flogging a concern for the men, only excess, random flogging was.
That's history!

for decades to come, whenever we look at the development of the Royal Navy. It is an excellent book in so many ways. But I have to echo an earlier reviewer who was miffed by the politics of the book. Reading it, one is struck by how the author sees certain things. For him, beating and flogging people was, well, understandable, and kidnapping via the Press Gang was, just necessary, and the judicial murder of Admiral Byng was, well, justified, because the ends justify the means, and his execution did put some life into those admirals, didn't it? If the author is not a pure reactionary, he is certainly utterly amoral in his approach to the past. Perhaps that is acceptable to some, but for this military historian, such an approach does not pass muster. Nevertheless, this is a great work of research and synthesis, essential reading for any student of the era, naval historian or not.

NAM Roger's command of the English language, his delightful British-like asides and trenchant observations on personalities and happenstances, and his grasp of the British Navy in the period when it became the pre-eminent sea power of the world is a gripping narrative. The beauty of the work is that he also weaves in chapters at appropriate historical periods from 1649 to 1815 on the evolving social, economic and technological circumstances of not only Mother England but also those nations which she was opposing or allied with during this fascinating period of history.

Others above have criticized Rodger's revisionist tendency towards conservatism and I, also, found his description of some of the facets of "The American War" to be somewhat at odds with my own studies and perceptions. I can not comment on his overall bent in this direction, but found important items of which I was totally unaware about British and European history of this period. In all, a totally absorbing read if you are at all interested in this fascinating period of naval history. If you like Horatio Hornblower and Jack Aubrey, you'll love this background volume. But don't drop it on your foot! It's voluminous.