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4.0 out of 5 stars
Engage the enemy more closely. Please, May 10, 2011
The title should read "Command at Sea in the Royal Navy from English-language sources until Navarino, and then in the US navy". There is nothing wrong with that, as long as you are aware of the limitation. Luckily I read a library copy and didn't buy it.
The first chapter is on the period up to 1650. The second covers the first three Anglo-Dutch wars. 3-6 covers the rest of the wooden sailing navy. 7 is the Age of Steam to the end of the Great War. 8 is from 1918 to the end of the Second World War, and 9 covers the Cold War and first Gulf War.
The Author's theme is the development of naval command and control, and its use and abuse. The story really begins in the Anglo-Dutch wars with the earliest sets of Fighting Instructions, and in the first two-thirds of the book we follow their development through to the end of the sailing navies. We examine the problems of their use in battle, and the author's view is that there are two basic types of commander - the controller and the delegator. The controller attempts to micro-manage the action, and the delegator recognises the impossiblity of controlling a battle, and lets his subordinates decide what to do. The fun comes in looking at the examples. The book actually opens with a description of the Battle of the Nile. Nelson is the epitome of the delegator, and he is shown as having thoroughly discussed his intentions with his captains, so they know what his overall intentions are in the forthcoming battle. Nelson planned to concentrate his attack on the first two-thirds of the French line. The captain of the leading British ship noticed that there was room to pass along the inside of the French line, and took his ship along that route, and was followed by several more. He knew what was expected of him, and behaved accordingly. The problem in many of the Royal Navy's battles in the 18th century, was that not all the admirals discussed their intentions with their subordinates, and in some cases, were not even on speaking terms with them.
The development of the Line of Battle is also examined. Basically, the line is to allow the projection of broadside firepower, and is a very powerful defensive formation. In order to defeat it, you must somehow break up the enemy formation, or outnumber or outgun it, or concentrate your force on part of the line. It is very difficult to win a battle in line if your opponent is as strong as you are. The Royal Navy has been accused by some writers of being hide-bound and sticking too closely to the line in battles. The author demonstrates that this is not the case. The line is used for manoeuvreing before battle, especially if you don't know what you are facing, but is frequently abandoned when circumstances allow. However, is some cases, the admiral was unable, due to the limitations of the signaling system, to make his subordinates understand what he intended. Two of the most famous examples were Graves at the Chesapake (Disaster), and Jervis at St. Vincent (Glorious Victory), where only Nelson understood what was required - or at least, was prepared to act on his own initiative. I don't know whether the Author's excellent descriptions of the various actions are fully accurate, or biased in favour of his theories, but they do sound credible.
Some examples:
1718 - Cape Passero - Sir George Byng - general chase
1744 - Toulon - Matthews and Lestock - Matthews attempted to bring on a general engagement from line, but had confusing signals flying. Had not discussed intentions beforehand, and had even refused to speak to Admiral Lestock the night before. Courts martials all round.
1747 - 1st Finisterre - Anson - general chase
1747 - 2ndt Finisterre - Hawke - general chase
1748 - Havanna - Knowles - general chase, but left it too late in the day to achieve anything.
1756 - Minorca - Sir John Byng - subordinates didn't understand his signals, and followed the 'line' order to the letter. He lost control of the battle. Byng requested a court martial. Lost.
1758 - Lagos - Boscawen - general melee
1759 - Quiberon Bay - Hawke - kept van in line, close action for the rest of the fleet.
1778 - Ushant - Keppel - admirals on both sides lost control of the battle, leading to an inconclusive engagement. Courts martials all round.
1779 - Grenada - Byron - started as a general chase, then discovered the enemy had been reinforced and were in superior numbers - formed line, but was defeated. No punishment for failiure.
1779 - 'Moonlight Battle' off Cape St. Vincent - Rodney - general melee, though captains did this themselves without orders.
1780 - Martinique - Rodney - manoeuvred in line to concentrate against part of the emeny line, then ordered an attack but subordinates apread out to engage along the whole enemy line.
1781 - Chesapeke - Graves - signals couldn't cope with situation; subordinates waited for orders.
1782 - the Saintes - Rodney - after much manoeuvreing the French line collapsed due to change of wind direction - English break the line with 2 out of 3 divisions sailing in formation. Rodney's First Captain (chief of staff) Sir Charles Douglas kept badgering Rodney to break formation - "Well, well, do as you like". Line break ordered, but as the British were down-wind, they passed through the line and the French were eventually able to escape downwind; Rodney failed to pursue.
1794 - Glorious First of June - Howe - ordered his fleet to penetrate the French line, but only 7 out of 26 ships succeeded. 6 French taken.
1797 - St Vincent - Jervis - 15 British versus 27 Spanish who were in a confused formation. Jervis sent his van to chase and formed line with remainder of his ships and split the Spanish fleet. Signals failed, only Nelson used his initiative. Eventually Jervis orders general close action.
1797 - Camperdown - Duncan - a bit of manoeuvreing in line, then Duncan ordered his fleet ot break the Dutch line. General melee.
As you can see, not many line to line engagements there. The author's view that control freaks were generally unsuccessful is borne out by his descriptions, and those commanders who relied on their fully-briefed subordinates were more successful. The later chapters cover much the same ground, but with better equipment, faster ships, and more deadly weapons. The command & control centralisation moves up the hierarchy in the Battle of the Atlantic, and even further up in Vietnam and the Gulf, with people in Washington deciding in real-time what weapons their front-line forces should use in engagements. The British in WW2 seem to have adopted decentralization to the extreme.
To be honest, most of what the Author suggests is pure common-sense, but until someone actually says it, it seldom occurs to people.
From page 45:
"To be sure, the line ahead was not an entirely novel formation. One of its earliest and best documented combat uses occured at the battle of Dunkirk on 16th September 1639. A small force of seventeen Dutch ships, twelve of them commanded by Tromp, deployed and fought in a close-hauled line ahead against a Spanish fleet of sixty-seven ships. Tromp reputedly told his commanders before the battle: "Work in such a manner that these our ships unite so closely, that by no chance will they allow any contrary force to penetrate between them."
But Tromp's use of the line at Dunkirk was a tactical aberation, a desperate defensive measure to hold off a much larger enemy force. At the Downs on 21 October 1639, where Tromp commanded a heavily reinforced Dutch fleet of more than a hundred ships, he reverted to group tactics and the melee against the Spanish. The Dutch were still using such tactics when the First Anglo-Dutch War began, and there is no evidence that the English "stole" the idea for the line-ahead formation from their enemy."
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