Customer Reviews

Command in War

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This is the best non-fiction book I have ever read. Van Creveld traces the history of command systems in organized warfare. His conclusion is that successful command systems did not employ breathrough technology but, rather, so organized themselves that they could function with less information flow. They did this by either compressing the organization so less communication was needed (e.g., the phalanx) or decentralizing decision making so that information did not have to flow as far up or down the organization. Added to this informational efficiency was a "directed telescope" that permitted commanders to focus on essential points in the system in detail, which had the secondary purpose of keeping lower level commanders honest through fear of intense scrutiny from on high. Finally, informal channels of communication existed to grease the wheels of the formal system, as well as to permit temporary but essential circumvention of the formal system in emergencies.

Van Creveld's scholarship is broad and impressive; he researched in, and translated from, several languages. His sense of irony and good story telling make for a can't-put-down read.

This book is great for military buffs, and is equally useful for business managers who recognize that the hot new management buzzwords being hawked by the consultant industry cannot compare to thoughtful analysis.

By the way, for those who believe the Internet will easily and immediately change how we do business, check out van Creveld's Technology and War.

I first heard about this book during lectures on military leadership. When I finally got around to buying it and started reading it, I could not put this book down. It thoroughly engrossed me in the subject of command under wartime conditions. Although the book uses examples from purely the land warfare aspect, it is easy to see how the concept of command can and ultimately does encompass all three services. The author has researched this subject extremely well (the endnotes are endless)and the bibliography exhaustive. I highly recommend this book to all military enthusiasts as well as the military professional.

This is the first book by Martin Van Crevold I have read, but it is a fine one. In this wonderful tome, Van Crevold analyzes the problem of military command in detail, looking at the evolution of Command systems, paying close attention to Napoleon, Van Moltke, Israel during 1967 and 1973, and the United States in Vietnam. A must buy for any military history buff.

Martin Van Creveld had chosen to use military history as the backbone to his thesis on Command and Conrol. The book not only deals with contemporary issues related to command, but traces the evolution of command and control alongside the development of warfare. This excellent analysis of specific battles is a good read for all who need to understand the fundamentals of command and control through storytelling.

This book is on the US Marine Corps Commandant's reading list for officers, I was a Cpl when I ordered this book. I think it should be read by all Corporals that are Infantry. It covers the change in battle command from so many years ago BC to modern day. Very good book.

This book is one of my favorites on military command. I especially liked learning about how Napolean inspired his troops and used a "telescoping" type procedure in which he would visit different sectors of the front. There are also very good lessons to learn from the command structure and its operation during the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 (Yom Kippur War).

If anyone is interested in studying leadership generally or military command in particular, I highly recommend this book. If you are a top leader in the military, you already know Martin Van Creveld, if you are not, but are interested in learning how different leaders lead their subordinates under conditions of complex uncertainty - this book is excellent.

Distinguished military historian Martin Van Creveld's 1985 "Command in War" is a comparative analysis of the challenges of exercising control over armies in conflict. It was and is an exceptional study on the impact of techonology, organization, and doctrine on the exercise of command.

Van Creveld cites a number of historical examples in the search by commanders for certainty on the battlefield, that is, certainty about the environment, their own forces, and the ability to communicate intent and direction. These historical examples include the ancient Greeks, the armies of Napoleon, the Prussian Armies of the wars of German unification, and the more modern armies of the First and Second World War and Vietnam.

Van Creveld's concluding thoughts suggest that neither technology nor organization nor doctrine provide any silver bullet answer to the quest for certainty; human enterprise remains subject to mistakes and the fog of war. The commander in conflict is advised to have a system suitable for his situation and his army, and make it work.

This book, although dated, is still highly recommended to students of the art of war and of command.

Much has happened (e.g. Boyd's OODA methodology, etc) since this book was written, but I still think it's the best single book I'ved read on Command and Control. Much of what van Creveld talks about historically is supported by Boyd's OODA theory and similar models of decision-making.

Highly recommended, and one of those books I've bought and given to others...

dave

I never realized the importance of supplies in war until reading this book. It covers a wide range of topics and is invaluable for broadening your understanding of military history. Its relatively short, a little dry, and a bargain.

Martin Van Creveld writes a thought provoking work which provides the framework for a critical analysis of command systems. This historical study of command provides insight into the evolution of modern problems, and suggests potential solutions for the inquisitive mind. Not just for the military professional, business professionals benefit from his suggestions on "rightsizing" and reorganization.