This book uses game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Topics include "explicit collusion," "tacit collusion," "semicollusion," and the detection of predatory pricing. The book discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.
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Book Description
Using game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms, this text also considers the implications for competition policy. It discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.
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Inside This Book
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First Sentence:
From a methodological point of view, the message of this chapter is that explicit collusion can and should be analysed as the solution of a non-cooperative game. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
unconstrained monopoly profit, fanatic predator, positive entry value, geographical price discrimination, partial cartel, collusion detection, joint profit maximisation, weak monopolists, collusive game, collusive profits, collusive equilibrium, sunk entry costs, cartel contract, flour additives, cartel manager, explicit collusion, tacit collusion, profit frontier, alleged predator, collusive outcome, first price sealed bid auction, normal competition, bus miles, basing point system, predatory price cutting Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Allied Mills, North American, Treaty of Rome, European Court of Justice, Roman Treaty, European Commission, Time Market New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
From a methodological point of view, the message of this chapter is that explicit collusion can and should be analysed as the solution of a non-cooperative game. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
unconstrained monopoly profit, fanatic predator, positive entry value, geographical price discrimination, partial cartel, collusion detection, joint profit maximisation, weak monopolists, collusive game, collusive profits, collusive equilibrium, sunk entry costs, cartel contract, flour additives, cartel manager, explicit collusion, tacit collusion, profit frontier, alleged predator, collusive outcome, first price sealed bid auction, normal competition, bus miles, basing point system, predatory price cutting Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Allied Mills, North American, Treaty of Rome, European Court of Justice, Roman Treaty, European Commission, Time Market New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 16
books:
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9
books
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- Economic Policy 32 by Georges De Menil in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Models of Strategic Rationality (Theory and Decision Library C) by Reinhard Selten in Back Matter
- C: Industrial Economics I: Dynamic Models of Oligopoly (Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics) by D. Fudenberg in Back Matter
- The Social Sciences: (Access to Higher Education series) by Bill Myers in Back Matter
- The Economics of Price Discrimination by Louis Phlips in Back Matter
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- Market Structure and Competition Policy: Game-Theoretic Approaches by George Norman on 6 pages
- Applied Industrial Economics by Louis Phlips in Front Matter, and page 283
- The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford Studies in European Law) by Okeoghene Odudu in Back Matter
- Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives by Elmar Wolfstetter in Back Matter
- Managerial Economics: A Problem-Solving Approach by Nick Wilkinson on page 521
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