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Complete Series Bundle RC: The Logic of Scientific Discovery

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This is the book where Popper first introduced his famous "solution" to the problem of induction. Originally publish in German in 1934, this version is Popper's own English translation undertaken in the 1950s. It should go without saying that the book is a classic in philosophic epistemology--perhaps the most important such work to appear since Hume's "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding." Popper argues that scientific theories can never be proven, merely tested and corroborated. Scientific inquiry is distinguished from all other types of investigation by its testability, or, as Popper put, by the falsifiability of its theories. Unfalsifiable theories are unscientific precisely because they cannot be tested.

Popper has always been known for his straightforward, lucid writing style. There are no books on epistemology that are as easy to read and understand than Popper's. Nonetheless, of all Popper's books, "Logic of Scientific Discovery" is easily the most difficult. I don't know whether it is because it was his first book or because it was originally written in German or because of all the technical problems in probability and quantum theory that are dealt within its pages. Whatever the reason, this book, despite its tremendous importance, cannot be recommended to those seeking an introduction to Popper's thinking (and Popper, whether you agree with his conclusions or not, is well worth getting to know). For those who merely want a rough overview of Popper's opinions, perhaps the best book is "Popper Selections," edited by David Miller. For those eager for more depth, I would recommend "Realism and the Aim of Science." Popper no where makes a better case for his epistemological views than in this eminently readable book. Further elaborations of Popper's views can be read in "Conjectures and Refutations" and "Objective Knowledge."

Popper has been severely attacked by philosophers who are offended by his bold fallibilism and anti-dogmatism. No philosopher attacked Popper more strenuously than David Stove. Stove's criticisms are interesting, but they are not as conclusive as one disparaging critic has suggested. Stove makes three main arguments against Popper: (1) Popper theories are bad because they lead to the epistemological relativism of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend; (2) Popper's dismissal of induction is contrary to common sense and is therefore "irrational"; and (3) Popper's argument on behalf of "conjectural knowledge" is fallacious because the phrase "conjectural knowledge" is a contradiction in terms. All three of these arguments are logically fallacious. The first commits the fallacy of "argument ad consequentiam," which tries to refute the truth of a doctrine by associating it to its (alleged) consequences. This is, in a way, a sort of guilt by association argument. The second argument simply assumes the very point at issue. No where in his book on Popper does Stove attempt to prove that induction is rational. He simply assumes it is and denounces Popper on the basis of this gratuitous assumption. The last argument is merely verbal and proves only that Popper has violated common linguistic usage. But why should we assume that linguistic usage must always be philosophically right? Stove also makes a great fuss about Popper's assertion that a "falsifiability" is preferable to "irrefutability." Stove assumes that this is palpably absurd. How can a theory that is falsifiable possibly be better than one that is irrefutable? But Stove appears to have missed the whole point of Popper's theory. Falsifiability merely means "testability." Irrefutable, on the other hand, means simply "untestable." When looked at in this line, Popper's theory no longer seems so absurd. In fact, it is merely a great leap forward in the fight against dogmatism and close-mindedness.

This is the book where Popper first introduced his famous "solution" to the problem of induction. Originally publish in German in 1934, this version is Popper's own English translation undertaken in the 1950s. It should go without saying that the book is a classic in philosophic epistemology--perhaps the most important such work to appear since Hume's "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding." Popper argues that scientific theories can never be proven, merely tested and corroborated. Scientific inquiry is distinguished from all other types of investigation by its testability, or, as Popper put, by the falsifiability of its theories. Unfalsifiable theories are unscientific precisely because they cannot be tested.

Popper has always been known for his straightforward, lucid writing style. There are no books on epistemology that are as easy to read and understand than Popper's. Nonetheless, of all Popper's books, "Logic of Scientific Discovery" is easily the most difficult. I don't know whether it is because it was his first book or because it was originally written in German or because of all the technical problems in probability and quantum theory that are dealt within its pages. Whatever the reason, this book, despite its tremendous importance, cannot be recommended to those seeking an introduction to Popper's thinking (and Popper, whether you agree with his conclusions or not, is well worth getting to know). For those who merely want a rough overview of Popper's opinions, perhaps the best book is "Popper Selections," edited by David Miller. For those eager for more depth, I would recommend "Realism and the Aim of Science." Popper no where makes a better case for his epistemological views than in this eminently readable book. Further elaborations of Popper's views can be read in "Conjectures and Refutations" and "Objective Knowledge."

Popper has been severely attacked by philosophers who are offended by his bold fallibilism and anti-dogmatism. No philosopher attacked Popper more strenuously than David Stove. Stove's criticisms are interesting, but they are not as conclusive as one disparaging critic has suggested. Stove makes three main arguments against Popper: (1) Popper theories are bad because they lead to the epistemological relativism of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend; (2) Popper's dismissal of induction is contrary to common sense and is therefore "irrational"; and (3) Popper's argument on behalf of "conjectural knowledge" is fallacious because the phrase "conjectural knowledge" is a contradiction in terms. All three of these arguments are logically fallacious. The first commits the fallacy of "argument ad consequentiam," which tries to refute the truth of a doctrine by associating it to its (alleged) consequences. This is, in a way, a sort of guilt by association argument. The second argument simply assumes the very point at issue. No where in his book on Popper does Stove attempt to prove that induction is rational. He simply assumes it is and denounces Popper on the basis of this gratuitous assumption. The last argument is merely verbal and proves only that Popper has violated common linguistic usage. But why should we assume that linguistic usage must always be philosophically right? Stove also makes a great fuss about Popper's assertion that a "falsifiability" is preferable to "irrefutability." Stove assumes that this is palpably absurd. How can a theory that is falsifiable possibly be better than one that is irrefutable? But Stove appears to have missed the whole point of Popper's theory. Falsifiability merely means "testability." Irrefutable, on the other hand, means simply "untestable." When looked at in this line, Popper's theory no longer seems so absurd. In fact, it is merely a great leap forward in the fight against dogmatism and close-mindedness.

With decisive arguments, succinctly put, Popper finishes off inductivist philosophy of science, and follows Hume in noting that its probabilistic version flounders on the same rocks. In its place he puts falsificationism, whereby we at best edge nearer the truth by refuting erroneous ideas. His attempt to line up content, simplicity, depth, and possibly even elegance, with the parameters of falsifiability is a tour de force. The later chapters on probability and quantum theory are difficult, but the book can be enjoyed without them. It is a tough read because Popper never wastes a word, and because he invariably deals dialectically with objections to his own ideas. The reader has to stay alert not to confuse his claims with those he is rebutting.

In The Logic of Scientific Discovery Karl Popper presents his
brilliant thesis that no amount of positive experimentatal results can
prove a scientific theory to be correct but a single negative result
can prove a theory to be wrong. According to Popper, science is not a
collection of established laws but rather a system by which hypotheses
are tested experimentally. If a hypothesis survives numerous rigorous
experiments, it gains plausability -- but it can never be definitively
proven to be completely correct. This view is discomforting to many
scientists but, nevertheless, has become the dominant view in recent
years. As a research scientist with 43 years experience, I welcome
Popper's position that science is a vibrant process of
continuing hypothesis and experimentation rather than a stagnant
collection of unquestionable truths.

While much work has gone on in the philosophy of science (progressive and otherwise) since Popper wrote his magnum opus, this work still stands as a survey of central issues in the philosophy of science. It analyzes concepts central to science itself (e.g. probability) and attempts to characterize science itself. That the latter analysis is incomplete is well known by now. This does not detract much from the book's well deserved reputation - but does result in this book having a 4 star review from this reviewer. It should be noted that Popper's criterion is ultimately a sort of "negative rationalism" - and from there it is not far to irrationalisms. Be warned. Works of Bunge, Kitcher and Laudan (for example) attempt to deal with this latter problem. The student or curious individual studying this work for current (rather than historical) interest is well advised to keep these later works in mind, as well as the later works of Popper himself.

I received this book as advertised. Everything went as expected with no problems and I am completely satisfied with the purchase.

A major problem for philosophers, theologians, political commentators and even journalists is ... what do you do with your time once the truth is already known? How can you justify putting out the books, commentary, and giving the lectures needed to establish a reputation in your area of interest? Truth turns diversity into mere error.

Earlier this century, old structures were dissolving all around; Marxism, Freudianism, relativity theory, Dadaism and cultural relativism burst to the forefront ... as long as it seemed to provide a Great Reversal, upsetting previous thought, it was eagerly sought out and accepted. Over-turning apple carts is exciting and provides something to do, especially if the truth is personally inconvenient.

Science had previously been thought distinct because its' propositions were verifiable. Very well, Popper would say they are actually distinguished by falsifiability.

Since Bacon, science had been thought to be inductive, inferring future from past. Very well, Popper would say induction is not possible, that science in deductive, inferring known from unknown.

Everyone thought science was cautious. So Popper would say audacity is the essence of science. The bolder theory is the best one.

Conventional philosophy of science said scientific conclusions aren't certain, but have a vast preponderance of probability in their favor. Very well, Popper would say no scientific conclusion can ever be probable or even become more probable when evidence in its favor is discovered.

Do you start to see the pattern here? The contrarianism of a 2-year old dressed up in the complications of adult philosophy.

Someone interested enough to look up this book could more profitably spend their time with a copy of Stove's "Anything Goes: Origins of the Cult of Scientific Irrationalism"

In it, the author shows how the philosophies of Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and especially Karl Popper (the others being highly derivative of Popper) are dependent on a single unexpressed assumption implicit in the reasoning of Hume.

The hidden assumption takes the form of a logical error in that it assumes an exegetical negative which has not and cannot be proven.

Thus, Hume's inductive skepticism, mainstream 20th century science philosophy derived from it (Popper and later) flow from a logical error of Hume.

Stove traces the eager acceptance of this error to Popper's need to construct a defense against the future recurrence of the "catastrophic" fall of Newtonianian physics. He analyzes how Popper, Kuhn and others structure their language and arguments so as to make their irrationalism seem plausible, even delving into the force behind the peculiar errors of deduction that pepper their arguments.

Popper's primary value, along with his book, is of a historical nature now: why were they so screwed up with bizarre ideas? Feminists and postmodernists will still derive sustenance from the irrationality that permeates Popper, but the foundation and original source it flows from is now identified and recognized to be fouled.