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Philosophy, its Competitors, and Authority, October 25, 2011
This review is from: The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit Der Fakultaten) (Paperback)
This is a rather rarely read book by Kant. Who reads it? First, I believe it is read by those who think it a testament in the history of the struggle for intellectual freedom. Next, most people who bother to read this book today come at it from a theological background. They are interested in the contentious relationship between theology and philosophy. The last reason people might pick up this edition is that it is a bilingual edition and thus they hope they can use it as an aid in learning, or translating, the German language. The Table of Contents of this edition is as follows:
Translator's Introduction, vii;
Errata, xxxv;
Preface, 9;
First Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Theology Faculty
Introduction, 23;
I. On the Relation of the Faculties
First Section. The Concept and Division of the Higher Faculties, 31;
A. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Theology Faculty, 35;
B. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Faculty of Law, 37;
C. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Faculty of Medicine, 41;
Second Section. The Concept and Division of the Lower Faculty, 43;
Third Section. On the Illegal Conflict of the Higher Faculties with the Lower Faculty, 47;
Fourth Section. On the Legal Conflict of the Higher Faculties with the Lower Faculty, 53;
Outcome, 59;
II. Appendix: The Conflict between the Theology and Philosophy Faculties, as an Example Clarifying the Conflict of the Faculties
1. The Subject Matter of the Conflict, 61;
2. Philosophical Principles of Scriptural Exegesis for Settling the Conflict, 65;
3. Objections concerning the Principles of Scriptural Exegesis, along with Replies to Them, 79;
General Remark: On Religious Sects, 85;
Conclusion of Peace and Settlement of the Conflict of the Faculties, 111;
Appendix: Historical Questions about the Bible, Concerning the Practical Use and Probable Duration of This Sacred Book, 125;
Appendix: On a Pure Mysticism in Religion, 127;
Second Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law
An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?, 141;
Conclusion, 169;
Third Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Medicine
On the Power of the Mind to Master Its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution, 175;
The Principle of the Regimen, 181;
Conclusion, 205;
Postscript, 209;
Translator's Notes, 215;
Mary J. Gregor authors the Translators Introduction and she is listed as the translator of this book. However, this is not exactly right. In the Bibliographical note we learn that the "translation of Part II of 'The Conflict of the Faculties' is by Robert E. Anchor and is reprinted from the collection "Kant: On History..." (p. xxx)."
The books title, the "Conflict of the Faculties", refers to the University Faculties of Theology, Law, Medicine, and lastly, Philosophy. Philosophy is referred throughout as the "lower faculty" while the other three are the "higher faculties". What is the basis of this peculiar ranking? Kant tells us that, "a faculty is considered higher only if its teachings - both as to their content and the way they are expounded to the public - interest the government itself, while the faculty whose function is only to look after the interests of science is called lower because it may use its own judgement about what it teaches" (pp. 25-27). So, that is why those three faculties are considered 'higher': they are rightly chained by Authority! And they are 'rightly' so chained because their sayings and doings affect society. In the Preface we learned that Kant is pleased to consider this book a belated answer to an Edict sent to him (to Philosophy!, I might add) by a creature of the King. So you see, it seems that Kant's defense of philosophy basically is that philosophy is entirely irrelevant to what ordinary people believe, say and do.
This extraordinary defense of Philosophy in the Introduction ends thusly:
"The reason why this faculty, despite its great prerogative (freedom), is called the lower faculty lies in human nature; for a man who can give commands, even though he is someone else's humble servant, is considered more distinguished than a free man who has no one under his command. (p. 29)"
This, however, is not exactly the same as the point we thought Kant had made earlier. There he basically argued that only the faculty that was irrelevant to the behavior of society was Free, while the rest were rightfully chained to Authority. In other words, one could infer from this that the inferior position of philosophy vis-à-vis the other faculties is merely an artifact of Civil Society (Nomos); that is to say, it is but fashion. Now, at the end of this Introduction, he finds the roots of this lower ranking to be in human nature itself. That, unfortunately for philosophy, is not merely fashion. I suspect that here we are meant to understand that under any Authority (I mean to say under any possible Religion, any possible Politics) philosophy would still be the powerless 'faculty' and, perhaps for some even more worrisome, that there will always be an extra-philosophical (or non-philosophical) Authority judging philosophy.
If one includes the Preface, Part One (the part specifically concerning theology) takes up more than half the book. Why is so much attention paid to Theology? Because, as Kant indicates, it was thanks to Theology, in a conflict with Philosophy over Biblical Interpretation, that the hounds of the State were released against Philosophy. One might assume that Kant intends to return the favor by warning Authority that the other faculties can, and at times have, overstepped their legitimate bounds.
"So the biblical theologian (as a member of a higher faculty) draws his teaching not from reason but from the Bible; the professor of law gets his, not from the natural law, but from the law of the land; and the professor of medicine does not draw his method of therapy as practiced on the public from the physiology of the human body but from medical regulations. As soon as one of these faculties presumes to mix with its teachings something it treats as derived from reason, it offends against the authority of the government that issues orders through it and encroaches on the territory of the philosophy faculty... (p. 35)"
The "higher faculties" are regulated by the State (or whatever Powers be), answer to it, and therefore cannot be (primarily) concerned with Reason. (As an aside we should note that Kant is merely being polite -or prudent- when he says here that the "biblical theologian" teaches from the Bible; theology was also quite 'regulated' by the State in Frederick William II's Prussia.) So again, we see that the freedom of thought that philosophy enjoys comes at a price: practical irrelevancy. But we should also note that for Kant there are only two competent Judges of the Higher Faculties: Philosophy and Authority. It seems that Kant is here proposing a détente between these two 'powers'. But don't these two very different Judges ever come into conflict? No. Kant (in the theological section of this book) seems to intend for us to believe that Philosophy is a Judge without any practical Jurisdiction. And the State has no Authority over (because it has no vital, that is to say, practical interest in) mere Reason Itself. ...How could there ever be a conflict?
Kant strives to demonstrate this throughout Part One of this text. One does wonder how successful this argument was or could ever be... And how well received his subtle contention that mere Authority (and again, here he seems to mean any political or religious Authority) is never entirely guided by Reason. Authority herself, unlike Philosophy, therefore seems to be an admixture of nature and fashion.
I leave the niceties of the argument over biblical interpretation to those more knowledgeable of biblical criticism in the Eighteenth Century.
Now I would like to continue with a consideration of the discussion of Law that makes up Part Two. It poses the question: "Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" But first, I want to note that there is a different translation of Part Two (see "
Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics)", H.B. Nisbet translator) that I will also refer to. Those who bought the present book as an exercise in translation might find a comparison of this translation by Robert E. Anchor with the Nisbet translation beneficial. Overall, I found the Nisbet translation more readable and will often make use of it below.
Question: "how is a history a priori possible? Answer: if the diviner himself creates and contrives the events which he announces in advance. (pp. 141-143)" So, one does not merely predict the future, one makes it too. Or, more clearly, the 'making' is the prediction. Now, Kant sees three possibilities regarding a predictable human History: "The human race exists in continual retrogression toward wickedness, or in perpetual progression toward improvement in its moral destination, or in eternal stagnation in its present stage of moral worth among creatures (a stagnation with which eternal rotation in orbit around the same point is one and the same. p. 145)" Kant at this point seems, perhaps a bit more than ever so slightly, to consider the last possibility of an eternal cycle the most likely. The first possibility is dismissed because, if true, humanity likely would have long ago destroyed itself. The second is 'untenable' because of the admixture of good and evil in each individual. But the third possibility,...
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