Customer Reviews

Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War

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This book analyzes how the US came to adopt the policy of using conventional tactics to fight the insurgency in Vietnam. It provides a great analysis of the American way of conducting war and gives examples of attempts to fight the war in other means. Author has/had first hand knowledge of what was going on behind the scenes in the 60's. This book is required reading at many military schools which realize our past failures and are trying to teach current military personnel how to avoid similar mistakes in the future.

This is an outstanding book for understanding why the US military has such problems with confronting insurgency. Counterinsurgency is never easy, but the US has proved monumentally incompetent across generations of command. The book's thesis is that bad counterinsurgency doctrine made a successful intervention in Vietnam impossible, and that the conflict was lost as soon as it began.

The most crucial misconception is that there is no such thing as an organic, self developed insurgency. Insurgency was seen as the policy of a foreign nation seeking to intervene within a country, likely as a prelude to invasion. Insurgencies were dependent on foreign support for supplies, bases and command. Combatting an insurgency required severing the link between the foreign support and the insurgents.

Related to this was a belief that light military pressure, or even just the presence of US forces could compel the withdrawl of insurgent support, because such a presence would signify US resolve to oppose an invasion or intervention.

The application of this logic led to a dynamic where the US pressured North Vietnam in retaliation for VC attacks. North Vietnam interpreted that pressure not as a response to it's own policies but as a direct attack upon it's existence. Consequently it increased rather then decreased supplies and support for the VC, ultimately sending not just supplies but regular troops. In essence the US created exactly the scenario it's policies were intended to prevent.

That this is happening again in Iraq and Iran suggests too few people in command read this book.

Dr. Larry Cable's experience and intellectual appraisal for the counterinsurgency role of the U.S. armed forces in Southeast Asia are placed into perspective. While not completely supporting all U.S. activities regarding the reduction of irregular forces, Cable examines the reality on the ground that was the wake-up call for American military leaders in Vietnam. An extremely effective and important book that should be read as much for the intellectual value as the historical value.

I had the great privilege of taking many of Dr. Cable's classes while I was at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. Dr. Cable is a true gift to the historical field. His courses were difficult, but his amazing story-telling ability shines both in class and in both of his books (conflict of myths and unholy grail). While reading his books, I can actually still hear his delivery and cadence. As we go further into a time when local squabbles and terrorists will engage the attention of our foreign policy, his writings and experiences are all the more appropriate.