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The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822

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The author, Harold George Nicolson (1886-1968), served in the British Foreign Office from 1909 to 1929 prior to his impressive career as a scholar and writer. The present book was originally published in 1946 and clearly reflects Nicolson's diplomatic experiences. `The Congress of Vienna. A study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822' is a historical (re)construction of the background, negotiations and result of the Vienna Congress in 1814-15. This chronologically structured volume begins with Napoleon's abandonment of his troops on the Russian fields in December 1812 and ends with the collapse of the conference system after the Congress of Verona in 1822. This unusual periodization is due to the author's intention with the work, namely to present "an examination, in terms of the past, of the factors which create dissension between independent States temporarily bound together in a coalition" (p. 46). According to Nicolson, the formation of the final coalition (The Quadruple Alliance) that defeated Napoleon began in 1812 and was dissolved ten years later.

The main argument runs as follows: The basic principle that is required in order to establish an alliance is an agreement between at least two states to "subordinate their separate interests to a single purpose" (p. 49). In 1813 (as well as in 1914 and 1939) the purpose was the defeat of a common threat and enemy. However, once victory seems in reach, the common purpose begins to fade away on behalf of the separate interests of the allies. In other words, the constitutive element in the alliance is crumbling. The political controversials between the members are only brought to the surface once the war enters its final stage, even though the disinterests might have been latent all the way. Therefore, the negotiators often lack the necessary rational judgment once the political matter with the defeated enemy has to be settled which often results in frail peace treaties.

This explanation theory appears very universal in its wording, which methodologically is a problem because it is only tested empirically on the Quadruple Alliance against Napoleon. But it is apparent, though, that the theory (as a hypothesis) seems applicable to the two world wars of the twentieth century as well. The Versailles Settlement, in retrospect at least, does not seem as the result of a very rational calculation, and concerning WWII we are already too familiar with the clash of separate interests between the two wartime allies, the United States and the USSR.

Except for this issue of the seemingly general theory there are other flaws in the book. Nicolson's statement that Castlereagh's plans for a `just equilibrium' objectively were ideal is difficult to maintain. Sure the scheme of the foreign secretary might have generated a perfect balance of power on the continent including Russia, but this was exactly in the (subjective) interests of Britain. As long as there would be no continental rival Britain would remain the world's undisputed leader. Nicolson does not deny this either but maintains that the British solution would have been the better for Europe at large. Why then, one must ask, was this plan rejected? I think the explanation is that the other great powers simply were not willing to accept British supremacy in order to establish a perfect equilibrium on the continent. If every continental power was prevented from gaining some kind of hegemonic status so should Britain. That is exactly why each power continued to achieve a balance-of-power-solution on its own principles claiming that this particular scheme would be perfect. Castlereagh's proposal was no different than any other idea. The reason for Nicolson's flaw is, perhaps, that he does not come up with any definition of the concept of `power'. Directing his attention at the negotiators' various proposals to a post-napoleonic Europe he precludes any discussion of the power base of the participants. This is probably why Henry Kissinger has commented that Nicolson was "ascribing to negotiating skill what may have been due to a great many other factors" (Kissinger: A World Restored, p. 342).

One last critique of this book: documentation lacks! Having in mind that the author solely draws on secondary sources (due to the war Nicolson was not able to consult archives across the continent) and that references are omitted, the reader must remain critical regarding the precise wording of quotes and exacts dates and times.

Though I have focused on the negative, the book also includes many positive aspects. It is brilliantly written with an eloquence that ought to inspire many present day historians. What is an even greater delight is that Nicolson is completely aware and straightforward with his philosophy of history, that is the forces that determine historical process and the directionality of history.

The book is suitable not only to professionals but also to the average historical minded reader.