Philosopher David H Lund advances a non-materialist and non-reductionist interpretation of the self in this rigorously argued work in the philosophy of mind. This thorough, erudite, and highly original defence of dualism as a serious philosophical explanation of consciousness will be of interest to philosophers, cognitive scientists, and anyone with an interest in the perennial riddle of consciousness.
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The Conscious Self,
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This review is from: The Conscious Self: The Immaterial Center of Subjective States (Hardcover)
This is a great defense of Cartesian dualism! David Lund works through philosophy of mind, metaphysics of persons and philosophy of personal identity when mounting a defense for Cartesian dualism. This is the most thorough use of the phenomenological argument for Cartesian dualism that I have ever seen. It is a sure refutation of materialist renderings of personhood. Two other distinctives of Lund's work include his unique and interesting development of the modal argument for the immaterial self and his development of causation and agency that flow from his Cartesian dualism. This is a tightly developed argument that conclusively argues in favor of an enduring simple immaterial self.
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Inside This Book
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First Sentence:
In this book, I argue that the conscious self must be accorded the ontological status of a metaphysically basic particular in the philosophically fundamental account of what exists. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
conceivability data, subjectless view, positive conceivability, defeasibility objection, uninterpreted awareness, facie conceivability, apparent fission, irreducible causal properties, total auditory experience, conceptual fix, dualistic causation, subjectless experience, deep causal connection, nomological assumption, bodily continuity criterion, criterial view, noncausal properties, diachronic identity, commissurotomy cases, multiple occupancy thesis, possible disembodiment, synchronic singularity, occurrent consciousness, diachronic singularity, nonmodal properties Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
New York, Oxford University Press, Philosophical Studies, University Press of America, Cambridge University Press, David Hume, Idealistic Studies, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly New!
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Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
In this book, I argue that the conscious self must be accorded the ontological status of a metaphysically basic particular in the philosophically fundamental account of what exists. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
conceivability data, subjectless view, positive conceivability, defeasibility objection, uninterpreted awareness, facie conceivability, apparent fission, irreducible causal properties, total auditory experience, conceptual fix, dualistic causation, subjectless experience, deep causal connection, nomological assumption, bodily continuity criterion, criterial view, noncausal properties, diachronic identity, commissurotomy cases, multiple occupancy thesis, possible disembodiment, synchronic singularity, occurrent consciousness, diachronic singularity, nonmodal properties Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
New York, Oxford University Press, Philosophical Studies, University Press of America, Cambridge University Press, David Hume, Idealistic Studies, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 61
books:
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- Reasons and Persons (Oxford Paperbacks) by Derek Parfit on 5 pages
- The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind (International Library of Philosophy) by John Foster on 4 pages
- Personal Identity by Harold W. Noonan on 4 pages
- Personal Identity (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy) by Raymond Martin on page 250, Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Case for Idealism (International Library of Philosophy) by John Foster in Front Matter, page 323, and Back Matter
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