Customer Reviews

Consciousness

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Hill extends the representational theory of mind into new areas, and is able to use it to raise new problems for dualistic
theories of qualia and consciousness. In addition, the book contains illuminating accounts of pain, emotions, perceptual
experience, and introspection. Bravo!

This is a nice little book on consciousness from a philosophical prespective. Not to be thought of as an intreoduction to consicousness studies. Actually, it is quite entrenched in a philosophical debate, that of the representational nature of consciousness.

Hill is a representationalist. Thing is, he does not offer very powerful arguments FOR representationalism. This, I think, is a problem for t¡his agenda. I believe in some way or other consciousness must be representational, but it is not to be just taken as a given. In fact, the debate is quite complex. Hill seems to just say that cognitive science has been working under a representational assumption, but that is no argument.

Hill is also a content externalist: qualia are viewpoint-dependent properties of external objects. This indeed in a nuturalistic account of phenomenal consicousness, but it is not without problems. I believe the brain in a vat argument is quite difficult for externalists, and Hill does not discuss it at lenght, or even explicitly. If brains in vats have qualia, these are not viewpoint related properties (ans sayng they are as-if properties, like dreams or hallucinations, does not quite cut it).

His style is fluid, and his arguments are well constructed, but there is not much progress aside from Hill explaining how his views differ from other representationalists, like Dretske, Tye or others. The book should be read by anyone interested in the topic, but you must have some background on the topic (or philosophy). I believe most of his ideas are plausible and probably in the right track, but I do not see how this book can convince the philosophical world.

Too many books by professional philosophers on the subject of consciousness seem to me to just be arguing about language. I just don't get it. I gave the book 3 stars instead of 2 because I must just not be understanding something correctly. I much prefer consciousness books by neuroscientists.