"This short volume is full of good philosophy. Michael Tye raises new questions about the unity of experience, and his answers cast important light on personal identity. All philosophers working on consciousness or personhood should read this book." --David Papineau, Department of Philosophy, King's College London "Tye presents a compelling, original, philosophically sophisticated theory of the unity of phenomenal consciousness without ever getting bogged down in philosophical trench warfare." --Brian P. McLaughlin, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University "Not just another book on consciousness! This one is about various kinds of unity (and a few disunities) in phenomenal experience. Provocative claims are defended, and the presentation is lucid and engaging throughout. I especially recommend Tye's chapter on the specious present." --William G. Lycan, William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina "It would be impossible not to learn from this outstanding book. Michael Tye displays real insight into the problems of unity and identity, and an intimidating mastery of the relevant philosophical and psychological literature. But almost as important, its brevity and clarity make the book a pleasure to read." --Frank Jackson, The Australian National University
About the Author
Michael Tye is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Ten Problems of Consciousness
(1995), Consciousness, Color, and Content
(2000), and Consciousness and Persons
(2003), all published by the MIT Press.