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Considered Judgment [Hardcover]

Catherine Z. Elgin (Author)
4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)


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Book Description

0691028796 978-0691028798 November 25, 1996
Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a "via media" between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In "Considered Judgment," she argues for a reconception that takes reflective equilibrium as the standard of rational acceptability. A system of thought is in reflective equilibrium when its components are reasonable in light of one another, and the account they comprise is reasonable in light of our antecedent convictions about the subject it concerns.

Many epistemologists now concede that certainty is a chimerical goal. But they continue to accept the traditional conception of epistemology's problematic. Elgin suggests that in abandoning the quest for certainty we gain opportunities for a broader epistemological purview--one that comprehends the arts and does justice to the sciences. She contends that metaphor, fiction, emotion, and exemplification often advance understanding in science as well as in art. The range of epistemology is broader and more variegated than is usually recognized. Tenable systems of thought are neither absolute nor arbitrary. Although they afford no guarantees, they are good in the way of belief.


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Editorial Reviews

Review

"Elgin has managed an eloquent argument for a contextual epistemology that is relative and relational without being relativistic.... This work is likely to be widely read and debated. Her philosophical voice is an example of well-reasoned and eloquent debate." -- Word Trade

From the Publisher

Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment she argues for a reconception that takes reflective equilibrium as the standard of rational acceptability. A system of thought is in reflective equilibrium when its components are reasonable in light of one another, and the account they comprise is reasonable in light of our antecedent convictions about the subject it concerns.

Many epistemologists now concede that certainty is a chimerical goal. But they continue to accept the traditional conception of epistemology's problematic. Elgin suggests that in abandoning the quest for certainty we gain opportunities for a broader epistemological purview one that comprehends the arts and does justice to the sciences. She contends that metaphor, fiction, emotion, and exemplification often advance understanding in science as well as in art. The range of epistemology is broader and more variegated than is usually recognized. Tenable systems of thought are neither absolute nor arbitrary. Although they afford no guarantees, they are good in the way of belief.


Product Details

  • Hardcover: 240 pages
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press (November 25, 1996)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0691028796
  • ISBN-13: 978-0691028798
  • Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6.5 x 0.9 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds
  • Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,358,188 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars Epistemology done very well, July 21, 2002
For those who find modern philosophy a rather pointless affair, this book may offer some relief. Elgin offers some hope for understanding the roots of human knowledge by finding a difficult but satisfying middle path between impossible certainty and excessive relativism.

Elgin reviews the notion of "foundationalism," the traditional philosophical search for a certain foundation for human knowledge, and like most modern philosophers finds it to have failed.

She then reviews the modern notion of knowledge arising from language games and the notion that it is socially constructed, and finds some redeeming value in that but also finds that we don't actually entirely work that way when we accumulate understanding of a topic, especially in science.

Her middle ground is a "reflective equillibrium" that we seem to come to by maximimizing the collective tenability of a set of beliefs. We examine the implications of our own beliefs after ascribing some initially tenable beliefs, and we correct incorrect assumptions in an incremental process. Because of this we don't have to assume foundational beliefs that must be absolutely accurate, and we don't have to assume that beliefs are purely relative to social groups.

Perhaps her most important and practical conclusion is that "knowledge" as we intuit the concept in terms of accumulating truths is not what we really gain from our experience as much as we gain "understanding." Her most interesting sections are where she argues effectively that emotion, metaphor, and other sources of understanding traditionally often excluded as knowledge are actually essential parts of human understanding. They orient us by shifting patterns of attention and revealing what is salient in an example. This potentially makes art and literature a source of understanding by giving epistemic access just as scientific experiments do.

The downside of Elgin's argument is that she doesn't tie it into science as well as I would have liked, such as showing why we find some beliefs initially tenable and not others, or how the process of reflective equillibrium can be distinguished by its neurological or psychological faculties from other kinds of process. She also offers little in the way of empirical tests to distinguish her view from others (she addresses a specific critique of her idea by Stephen Stich, but not a test for resolving it).

As philosophy that is readable by the non-philosopher, this is very well done and gives me some hope that some sort of common-sense and even useful ideas do arise in academic philosophy from time to time that can have application to daily life.

While in retrospect there is little that is really revolutionary here, it is very satisfying to read something about human thinking that represents us as having a potential for rationality and well-founded beliefs as well as giving a possible way for different kinds of understanding to be reconciled. This is a very sane and grounded epistemology as far as it goes, though I would have liked it to have been taken farther scientifically.

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5.0 out of 5 stars amazing work, epitomizes the power of philosophy, November 14, 2011
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I won't waste your time with my half-educated babbling, but this book is amazing.

Elgin injects knowledge derived from emotion and the arts into philosophy, making the discipline better for it.
Although we'd reflexively say that of course we gain knowledge from fiction or a new perspective enabling new knowledge after an emotional experience, she revolutionized philosophy by including these sources of knowledge in her epistemology.

Essentially, this book is all that I wish psychology offered me presented in a well-written, beautifully articulated form. Very interesting to the layman as well as the devotee
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Inside This Book (learn more)
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First Sentence:
Unaccountable success, like inexplicable failure, disconcerts. Read the first page
Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
tenable commitments, initial tenability, imperfect procedural epistemology, epistemic misfortune, pure procedural epistemology, pure procedural philosophy, tenable system, epistemic allegiance, unjustified emotions, epistemic entitlement, epistemic hierarchy, procedural stance, tenable belief, epistemic standing, normal inquiry, pure procedure, tenable claims, epistemic circumstances, perfect procedure, exemplify features, reflective equilibrium, modal facts, intentional idioms, bizarre rule, epistemic access
Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
The Versailles, New York, Richard Rorty, Cambridge University Press, Nelson Goodman, Harvard University Press, Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Investigations, Number One, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Oxford University Press, Consequences of Pragmatism, Doll's House, Donald Davidson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Two Concepts of Rules, Indianapolis Hackett, John Rawls, The World Well Lost, Thomas Kuhn, Two Dogmas of Empiricism
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