Review
"Constitutional law Lipkin develops a provocative account of revolutionary adjudication as a common practice in U.S. constitutional history. His critiques of Ackerman for lacking a theory of interpretation and of Dworkin for lacking an account of revolutionary transformation are astute. One need not agree with his argument as a whole to appreciate the importance of the concepts and arguments he introduces to constitutional theory."--Mark Tushnet, Georgetown University Law Centre " Lipkin's scholarly work has long had a significant influence on my teaching and scholarship. With the publication of Constitutional Revolutions, Professor Lipkin has offered an explanation of constitutional law that bridges the gap between traditional and post-modern constitutional thought in a cogent manner. Scholars and students alike cannot ignore this book if they are seriously engaged in an effort to understand constitutional adjudication in the contemporary era."--Rodney K. Smith, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law "Robert Lipkin does more than provide a provocative and important account of constitutional change. He brings to his work the rigor of an analytic philosopher, the energy and joy of a renaissance reader, and the rare treat of a pragmatic postmodernist who writes with both clarity and flair. Anyone who seeks to understand our Constitution will want to read this book."--Steven Shiffrin, Cornell University "Lipkin's theme is outstanding and important. He accurately identifies the central problematic for constitutional jurisprudence at the end of the twentieth century. Namely, how should constitutionalism be conceptualised or reconceptualised in a post-modern world. On this most central point, Lipkin has surpassed in a most important way many other contemporary constitutional theorists, including luminaries such as Cass Sunstein and John Ely."--[PERMISSION PENDING] [RR, PP, edited] Stephen M. Feldman, University of Tulsa College of Law "Building on the theory of constitutional revolutions of Bruce Ackerman, the theory of adjudication of Ronald Dworkin, and the philosophy of science of Thomas Kuhn, Lipkin develops an important, novel theory of constitutional interpretation."--[PERMISSION PENDING] [RR, PP, edited] Ken Kress, University of Iowa College of Law "Lipkin gives new, structured, and rigorous meanings to the familiar ideas of a 'living constitution' and a constitutional revolution. This work is the most systematic, sustained, and rigorous application of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions to constitutional theory yet to be developed."--[PERMISSION PENDING] [RR, PP, edited. See notes before asking for perm.] James E. Fleming, Fordham University School of Law "An uncommonly sophisticated account of the process of constitutional change. Without an explanation of how "the Constitution" changes dramatically over time even when it is not formally amended, we cannot even approach understanding American constitutionalism. Lipkin combines the best insights of analytic and post-analytic philosophy with a deep historical understanding of American constitutional law to produce a book that explains both the ordinary and the extraordinary in constitutional adjudication. Although the book is totally accessible to the non-philosopher, it brings cutting-edge philosophy to bear on the issue of constitutional adjudication and on the problem of constitutional change in a way that makes it essential reading for scholars and students of American constitutional adjudication."--Frederick Schauer, Harvard University [I told him that this was quite long and that if we edited it we would check with him]
Product Description
In Constitutional Revolutions Robert Justin Lipkin radically rethinks modern constitutional jurisprudence, challenging the traditional view of constitutional change as solely an extension or transformation of prior law. He instead argues for the idea of “constitutional revolutions”—landmark decisions that are revolutionary because they are not generated from legal precedent and because they occur when the Constitution fails to provide effective procedures for accommodating a needed change. According to Lipkin, U.S. constitutional law is driven by these revolutionary judgments that translate political and cultural attitudes into formal judicial decisions.
Drawing on ethical theory, philosophy of science, and constitutional theory, Lipkin provides a progressive, postmodern, and pragmatic theory of constitutional law that justifies the critical role played by the judiciary in American democracy. Judicial review, he claims, operates as a mechanism to allow “second thought,” or principled reflection, on the values of the wider culture. Without this revolutionary function, American democracy would be left without an effective institutional means to formulate the community’s considered judgments about good government and individual rights. Although judicial review is not the only forum for protecting this dimension of constitutional democracy, Lipkin maintains that we would be wise not to abandon judicial review unless a viable alternative emerges.
Judges, lawyers, law professors, and constitutional scholars will find this book a valuable resource.
