Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy) [Kindle Edition]

Robert Barros (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Barros provides careful insight into the thinking and decision-making processes of the Chilean military government from 1973 to 1989..... A valuable addition to Latin American collections of theory on democracy and dictatorship. Highly recommended." Choice

"There is an immense amount of work in this account...The author showed great determination in tracking down the previously unobtainable documents...He also demonstrates the real significance of legal arguments in shaping the institutionality of the new regime...this is a highly impressive work not simply for the case of Chile but for the analysis of authoritarian regimes more generally." Bulletin of Latin American Research

Product Description

It is widely believed that autocratic regimes cannot limit their power through institutions of their own making. This book presents a surprising challenge to this view. It demonstrates that the Chilean armed forces were constrained by institutions of their own design. Based on extensive documentation of military decision-making, much of it long classified and unavailable, this book reconstructs the politics of institutions within the recent Chilean dictatorship (1973-1990).

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Product Details

• Format: Kindle Edition
• File Size: 3745 KB
• Print Length: 368 pages
• Simultaneous Device Usage: Up to 4 simultaneous devices, per publisher limits
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (June 30, 1998)
• Sold by: Amazon Digital Services
• Language: English
• ASIN: B001FB52GA
• Text-to-Speech: Enabled
• Lending: Enabled
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #613,531 Paid in Kindle Store (See Top 100 Paid in Kindle Store)

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4.0 out of 5 stars Fascinating constitutional theory, but both too long and short, January 28, 2010

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Enjolras (Washington, DC) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy) (Hardcover)

In Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy), Barros provides some fascinating alternative perspectives on courts in authoritarian regimes. He proposes that the Chilean Junta drafted the 1980 constitution i large part to institutionalize the junta and allocate power among all four branches of the defense services. Contrary to popular opinion, Pinochet did not wield absolute power, but rather all stakeholders in the junta limited their own power in order to convince the other branches that they would abide by the rules. Thus, the Tribunal Constitucional was created to enforce the authority of Pinochet in the executive and of the air force and navy as the legislative branch.

As a book though, I found Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy) both too long and too short. First, for those readers who know nothing about Chile - like me - it doesn't provide much context. Barros frequently referred to other prominent politicians in the junta, but I didn't have the context to appreciate some of his comments. The book seems geared toward readers with an interest and background in Chilean history. However, for readers primarily interested in constitutional theory, the book might seem a bit too long. The intricacies of the constitutional negotiations might be much. Indeed, Barros only gets to the tribunal 2/3 into the book. If you just want to understand his theory, I recommend reading one of his articles instead.

If you're interested in theories about courts in authoritarian regimes, I highly recommend Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes.