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Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac

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Sears presents an interesting series of portrats relating to commanders and issues that all to freqeuntly dominated the Army of the Potomac and often stood in the way of effective prosecution of the war in the Eastern Theater.

This book is well researched and effectively argued. Fans of Sear's Civil War works (of which I am one) will recognize many of the vignettes from works such as "Chancellorsville," "Landscape Turned Red," and "The Peninsula Campaign." They are more fully fleshed out in this book, but essentially contain the same information Sears has argued before.

However, this does not detract and the Sears reader will find other stories that contain new information and interesting portraits.

Gen. McClellan infuses most of the tales, his presence is never far and these different affairs demonstrate how much better "Little Mac" was at dominating the political life of the Army than the Confederates. Sears makes a compelling argument that the hapless General was excellent at everything except fighting. It begs the question as to whether or not his talents could have been more effectively employed had he gotten Halleck's job early on and field generalship been left to Meade, Hooker or Grant (although whether or not McClellan's ego or Lincoln's needs would have been satisfied by such an arrangement is in doubt).

In particular, the revolt of the generals, although covered somewhat in "Chancellorsville," is a good work and telling as to why the Army of the Potomac suffered such weak leadership at crucial times. The chapters on the General Stone affair reveal the downside of political expediency during the Civil War (and the willingness of McClellan to sacrifice is friends and colleagues -- as in Stone's case and Porter's court martial -- to further his prospects.)

Interestingly, the most striking analysis regards the generalship of Gen. Hooker. Although again, "Chancellorsville" covers this ground, Sear's original research and painstaking reconstruction of the events relating to Hooker's failure during that battle are convincing in their defense against what appears in hindsight to be the scapgoating of one of the few Union generals in the East who would and could fight. Sear's analysis is at odds with that of many Civil War chroniclers including Ken Burns, Shelby Foote and James McPherson regarding Hooker's failure during the height of the battle. After taking in the evidence, I'd say that Sears has it right.

The chapters are well organized, well documented and the writing succint. This form makes for excellent "pick-up" reading as it is not one story but a series of portraits. Recommended.

As one who enjoys reading American Civil War history, this collection of essays was a wonderful birthday present. Sears presents informative, lively, readable essays on several crucial controversies within the Union Army of the Potomac's high command. His takes on Joe Hooker were particularly convincing and compelling. For example, I'd never read anything to contradict the assessment (supposedly by Hooker himself!) that "For once, I lost confidence in Hooker" to explain his defeat at Chancellorsville. Yet Sears leaves little doubt he simply never said that, and in fact the injury he sustained at his HQ in that battle explains much (if not all) of his problem there.

Also interesting was the essay on the courts martial of Stoneman and of Porter, and the Mclellan-go-round.

Just a tremendous book, and easy to pick up and put down, given the right-sized essay lengths.

I truly enjoy reading Stephen Sears' work, and have since having "Landscape Turned Red" recommended to me by a friend. He's just a fine writer.

Stephen Sears' CONTROVERSIES & COMMANDERS "examines ten incidents of war as waged by the Army of the Potomac in which `controversy' and commanders' were spoken in the same breath." In the process he examines the court-martialed and the cashiered, the mad and the mutinous. Not surprisingly for the man who has written the biography and edited the selected papers of that most controversial of Civil War generals, Sears seldom strays far from the aura of George B. McClellan.
Indeed, the book's first essay concerns Little Mac and his treatment by the historians. It arrives at the decidedly uncontroversial conclusion that McClellan was a deeply flawed warrior general and a highly expert executive general.
We pick up a little speed with the second entry on the `Ordeal of General Stone,' who was arrested in 1861 after the debacle at Ball's Bluff. Sears does a masterful job in explaining the political pressures at work behind the scenes in both Gen. Stone's arrest and in the court-martial of McClellan's protege Fitz John Porter, which is the topic of the third essay.
`September Crisis' and `Last Words on the Lost Order' rework very old subjects indeed, and Sears has nothing much new to say about McClellan's reinstatement to his old role as commanding general of the Army of the Potomac or on the discovery of SO191, the famous lost order that would allow McClellan to whip Lee at Antietam.
Jumping ahead a bit, no book about Civil War controversies would be complete without the embodiment of controversy, the political general Dan Sickles. The infamous Dahlgren raid on Richmond and the little discussed removal of General Warren by feisty Phil Sheridan during the war's last battle are also treated.

I found Sears' essays on the revolt of the generals and a defense of Fighting Joe Hooker the most compelling. Sears brings a sense of order to the tangled tale of the knaves and marplots among the officers following Little Mac's final dismissal and the arrival of General George Meade. "It had," Sears writes, "become virtually open rebellion in the high command." The villains included political generals, disgruntled holdovers from the McClellan regime and various ambitious loose cannons. Their first victim was the inadequate innocent Ambrose Burnside, who replaced McClellan against his wishes and his better judgment. The second lamb to fall under their knife was the epitome of conniving generalship, Fighting Joe Hooker.
Sears' defense of Hooker's reputation is poignant. (A little ironic, too, considering the rather harsh verdict he delivers on McClellan in this and other more extended treatments.)
Sears' defense rests on the testimony of Lincoln secretary John Hay and hinges on the interpretation of the Bigelow footnote. The incident in question is Hooker's behavior as commanding general at the battle of Chancellorsville. Hooker, never short of self-confidence or bluster, began the Chancellorsville campaign sure that his brilliant plan would lead him shortly to the gates of Richmond. On the first day the Union army met a terrible reverse (Chancellorsville has been called Lee's greatest battle) and Hooker was seriously injured - a pillar he was standing next to was hit by a cannonball and he was knocked unconscious. Drifting in and out of consciousness Hooker was incapacitated but never ceded command. Later in the day the Union lines stabilized and a majority of his lieutenants recommended resuming the offensive the next day. Going against this advice, and casting a cloud over his career, Hooker ordered a retreat.
Hooker, like Ulysses Grant, had a reputation as an alcoholic that preceded his Civil War career. Again like Grant he had apologists. Lincoln's personal secretary, John Hay, is quoted by Sears as observing that it took very little alcohol to make Hooker seem drunk. This testimony is used to counter the claim of some historians that Hooker, who vowed to abstain from spirits upon his promotion, perhaps needed a shot or two to steel his courage.
The Bigelow footnote speaks to Hooker's irresolution, and Sears refutes its authenticity. The footnote first appears in 1910, and cites as its source an aide to General Abner Doubleday, who asked Hooker what happened to him at Chancellorsville and was reportedly told: "Doubleday, I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Joe Hooker, and that is all there is to it." Whether suffering from the d.t.s or, as Sears would have it, a severe concussion, Hooker acted like a man who'd suffered a sudden lack of confidence in himself. The Bigelow footnote fits regardless of its authenticity.

CONTROVERSIES & COMMANDERS may be a little thick for someone new to the topic. For the Civil War buff it's a treat.

This book is not your typical Civil War book. Sometimes my fervent interest in the Civil War is somewhat diminished as I attempt to plow through a tome filled with copious amounts of meaningless and irrelevant information (recountings of troop movements, long lists of command structure changes, etc.) Mr. Sears' book adroitly avoids these pitfalls of the typical Civil War narrative. I found the book to be pure enjoyment. I gained much insight on the inner workings of the various changes in command in the Army of the Potomac, and the internal machinations which caused them. Mr. Sears certainly comes to some conclusions with which other historians might disagree, but he makes a strong case for his arguments. This book is one of my top five Civl War recommendations.

The Army of the Potomac exemplified Clausewitz' maxim that war is politics by other means. Sears takes vignettes from the Army of the Potomac's history, side stories that may have ended up as footnotes, literally, in other histories, and tells the story of some of the army's more bizarre incidents, its scapegoats and boars. Controversies and Commanders reveals a side of military heroism that often does not appear in histories or receive full detail or explanation or understanding, the kind of heroism for which one does not receive medals, ribbons or commendations: organizational bravery. The heroes (or lack thereof) in the Army of the Potomac for organizational bravery are those who do not engage in backstabbing, lying, self-aggrandizement and other sins committed by any number of officers in the eastern theater.

Each chapter concerns a single vignette in the history of the army - the court martial of Fitz John Porter, the revolt of the generals, etc. Together, these chapters cover the history of the Army of the Potomac, not from the vantage point of battle or campaign histories, but from the "back page" or the "gossip column."

This may be Sears' best book in that he takes a challenging subject - the infighting and politicking that went on in Army of the Potomac - and writes it in his usual scholarly, engaging manner.

A word of caution: this book is not for the Civil War novice or someone with passing interest in the Army of the Potomac.

Sears offers a fascinating assortment of brief essays on the Union's Army of the Potomac and some of the storms that swirled around a number of its commanding generals from the beginning of the Civil War to its end. Each of the essays is brief enough to be enjoyed in one sitting, and offers some fascinating new insights into aspects of the Civil War in the East. Even where he is covering ground that has been well covered before--e.g., Lee's "Lost Order" before the Battle of Antietam--Sears manages to introduce some new information and fresh insights.

Anyone who has done much reading about the Civil War knows that one of the major challenges confronting Lincoln as commander-in-chief was finding a dependable general to put in charge of the Army of the Potomac. This volume reviews some of the problem generals with whom he had to deal--including McClellan (a Sears specialty) and Joe Hooker (whom Sears defends in an unconventional review of Hooker at Chancellorsville). But the book also goes below the command level to look at colorful characters like Dan Sickles and Phil Sheridan. Especially engaging are the essays dealing with the court martials and less than honorable discharges of generals who were unfairly treatged for a variety of reasons.

While to some degree, these essays are "insider baseball" and would be best appreciated by readers with background on the Civil War, they stand alone and can be appreciated by almost anyone with an interest in the era.

Sears knows about General McClellan better than anyone including his strengths and his severe shortfalls. A great organizer that failed when his line cames close to the enemy. He orchestrated intense loyalty that creates a cabal that undermines future commanders such as Pope, the naive Burnside and of course Hooker. Splendid highly readable detail on the conspiracies and standout chapters on the wars most controversial Generals of the Army of the Potomac such as the political court martials of Fritz John Porter at Second Manasas and Stone at the Ball's Bluff fiasco. Includes great chapters on Dan Sickles' controversial forward line at Gettysburg, General Warren's relief of command at Five Forks and a new look at Hooker at the critical moments of Chancellorsville. Would like to have had more detail on why Hooker thought Sedgewick failed him and why his calvary failed him also. If you thought the south had prickly egotistic leaders such as Johnson, Beuraguard and Davis; Sears makes it clear that the Army of the Potomac's early generals were virtually Lee's greatest asset.

In the Civil War, it was often difficult if not impossible to see more than a few yards during battles because of all the gunpowder smoke. This "fog of war" frequently increased the likelihood of confusion (as if battlefields aren't confused enough!) and fatal mistakes.

But there's another kind of war fog, and that's the behind-the-scenes political machinations and personal feuds between powerbrokers that affect command decisions and whose unhappy consequences are felt by the troops in the field. Stephen Sears, in this excellent collection of essays about the Army of the Potomac, explores this fog of war. It only stands to reason, given McClellan's influence on the Army of the Potomac (not to mention Sears' special interest in him) that he's the direct agent or indirect cause of much of it.

In five of the book's 10 essays (not counting the first, which is an interesting historigrapical essay on McC), Little Mac's shadow features prominently. Because Lincoln, Stanton, and a majority of the presidential cabinet eventually found themselves fed up with McC's timidity in the face of Lee's army, but because McC was too popular to go after himself, his lieutenants found themselves scapegoated. General Stone after Ball's Bluff was the first to fall (chapter 2), but Fitz John Porter, whose incessant and virulent criticisms of McC's first successor, General Pope, undermined the morale of the army, was the second (chapter 3). Following the disastrous second battle at Bull Run, the top generals, almost all McClellanites, launched a quiet coup to get rid of Pope, then Burnside, and then, following Little Mack's brief return, Joe Hooker (chapter 6). Lincoln, afraid that the Army of the Potomac would disintegrate after second Bull Run, reluctantly brought McC back (chapter 4). But even some of McC's most loyal lieutenants thought he should've followed Lee after Antietam, and lobbied for a new chief. Not, however Gouverneur Warren, who remained loyal to McC's cautious military style throughout his military career--part of the reason he found himself disgraced at war's end (chapter 9).

The political and high echelon in-fighting described by Sears is fascinating. But it's also terrifying when one realizes the damage it wrought, the lives it wasted, the time and property it squandered. War isn't a science, no matter how much its boosters claim otherwise. It's messy, chaotic, and unpredictable--more of a crapshoot than an algorithm--and often what winds up happening on the battlefield has little to do with tactics. Sears' wonderful book only underscores this truth.

There were a lot of battles during the Civil War but the one battle that often gets over looked is the political battle. This book examines the political battles that raged on inside the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War. Battles that at times that became so bad that they nearly crippled the entire army.

This book isn't really one solid story but a series of short stories written by Stephen Sears that examine specific incidence inside the army. We see the Corp Commanders of the army revolt against more than one commander as both Burnside and Hooker have their Corp commanders go behind their backs to get them relieved. We see General Stone arrested in one of the worst cases of scapegoating during the war and Dan Sickles, the epitome of the political general. And looming over all of this is the shadow of George McClellan.

I was almost surprised by this book. I've liked every book I've read by Sears and expected to enjoy this one but I really found this to be one of his very best. Sears does a great job. His piece on Dan Sickles makes you almost want to stand up and throttle the man.

Stephen W. Sears is one of the better-known Civil War Historians alive. A former editor of American Heritage, he's been writing books on the Civil War for about 20 years now, and has concentrated almost exclusively on the Army of the Potomac, and its nemesis the Army of Northern Virginia. This volume contains ten essays ostensibly on the Army of the Potomac, though one (the Lost Order essay) is really about Lee's army.

The essays are topical rather than combat-oriented. There are two discussions of a particular character's treatment by historians: in one installment, Sears insists that McClellan deserves the bad reputation he's gotten from historians, in another he carefully dissects Hooker's fall at Chancellorsville, and decides he's been unfairly condemned by his colleagues. Several other essays deal with incidents (the Dahlgren Raid, the crisis between 2nd Manassas and Antietam). Two essays are about generals who were wronged by their superiors: Charles Stone as a result of Ball's Bluff, Gouvernor Warren at Five Forks. One of the essays is a straight mini-biography, of Dan Sickles, the colorful character who shot his wife's lover and went on to be a Civil War hero, at least in the newspapers. One deals with an unsolved mystery, that of the fabled lost order at Antietam.

Most of these essays are valuable and interesting. I only had objection to one: Sears accepts without much discussion that the famed Dahlgren orders (calling for Richmond to be burned and the Confederate leadership to be murdered) are authentic. Without going into details, I've always found this explanation to be improbable in the extreme. Sears seems to dislike Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and places most of the blame for the plot on his shoulders.

Other than that, the history here is to my mind impeccable, and the writing is clear and readable throughout. I enjoyed this book, and would recommend it to all Civil War buffs.