Problems of fair division, equitable cost-sharing, division of a joint benefit, or the choice of a truly democratic voting rule are familiar subjects of dispute in technologically advanced democracies. This book provides a comprehensive and unified presentation of these technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms.
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Editorial Reviews
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"A most valuable contribution to the essence of the social sciences, and especially of economics: how agents, be they collective or individual, make choices." Georges Bernard, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
"This book is a real pedagogical tour de force...it is beautifully produced thanks to the Econometric Society and Cambridge University Press. It is not only highly recommended but, in the reviewer's opinion, an obligatory reading for every theoretically inclined economist or political scientist." Maurice Salles, University of Caen
"...the volume will be most useful as an introduction and guide to the axiomatic literature. Exposition throughout the book is uniformly clear and beautifully concise." Journal of Economic Literature
"This book is a real pedagogical tour de force...it is beautifully produced thanks to the Econometric Society and Cambridge University Press. It is not only highly recommended but, in the reviewer's opinion, an obligatory reading for every theoretically inclined economist or political scientist." Maurice Salles, University of Caen
"...the volume will be most useful as an introduction and guide to the axiomatic literature. Exposition throughout the book is uniformly clear and beautifully concise." Journal of Economic Literature
Book Description
A comprehensive presentation of problems of fair division, equitable cost-sharing, division of a joint benefit, or the choice of a truly democratic voting rule, all of which are subjects for dispute in technologically advanced democracies.
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First Sentence:
Utilitarianism is a philosophical thesis two centuries old. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
marginal contribution vectors, proportional veto function, cet winner, feasible utility set, feasible utility vectors, leveling tax, consistent voting rule, maximin program, issue monotonicity, capita nucleolus, veto core, technological monotonicity, utility pace, population monotonicity, private good economy, pivotal mechanism, phantom voters, voting correspondences, social welfare relation, strategyproof mechanisms, collective utility function, zero independence, public good economy, strict component, separability axiom New!
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Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Utilitarianism is a philosophical thesis two centuries old. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
marginal contribution vectors, proportional veto function, cet winner, feasible utility set, feasible utility vectors, leveling tax, consistent voting rule, maximin program, issue monotonicity, capita nucleolus, veto core, technological monotonicity, utility pace, population monotonicity, private good economy, pivotal mechanism, phantom voters, voting correspondences, social welfare relation, strategyproof mechanisms, collective utility function, zero independence, public good economy, strict component, separability axiom New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 27
books:
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28
books
cite this book:
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- Fair Allocation (Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics) by H. Peyton Young in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
- Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner by Leonid Hurwicz in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Collective Choice and Social Welfare by A.K. Sen in Front Matter, and Back Matter
- Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees (Econometric Society Monographs) by Bezalel Peleg in Front Matter, and Back Matter
- The Strategy of Social Choice (Advanced Textbooks in Economics) by Herve Moulin in Front Matter, and Back Matter
See all 27 books this book cites
- Handbook of Utility Theory: Volume 2: Extensions by Salvador Barbera on page 244, and page 322
- Microeconomics of Market Failures by Bernard Salanie on page 36, and page 65
- Readings in Public Choice Economics by Jac C. Heckelman on page 352
- Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory by Wulf Gaertner in Back Matter
- Utility Maximization, Choice and Preference (Studies in Economic Theory) by Fuad Aleskerov in Back Matter
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